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ABSTRACT 
Nathan W. Dean:  Balancing the Plurality of Liberal Values 
(Under the direction of Jeff Spinner-Halev) 
The thesis of this dissertation is that liberal pluralism supports the rejection of state 
policies that reflect an imbalance of liberal values.  Specifically, it argues that liberal pluralism 
is inconsistent with permitting the promotion of values like autonomy, equality, and 
democracy to crowd out other values like liberty, toleration, and privacy.  It also argues that 
liberal pluralism is inconsistent with the promotion of overly narrow conceptions of liberal 
values (e.g. promoting equality by guaranteeing strict economic equality while showing little 
or no concern for equality of status or objective well-being, and vice-versa).  
The individual chapters of this dissertation reaffirm the importance of maintaining a 
balance of liberal values, while finding fault with a number of well-meaning attempts to 
promote particular liberal values.  Examining the promotion of liberal values like autonomy, 
equality, and fairness from the perspective of liberal pluralism, it becomes clear that because 
these liberal values often conflict with others, it is typically unwise to emphasize one or more 
of them without consideration for the others.  Liberal theorists who refuse to seek a balance 
of liberal values, or pretend that there is nothing to balance in the first place, run the risk of 
supporting policies that undermine the promise of liberalism even as they promote particular 
liberal values.  This dissertation serves as a reminder of the costs of inattention to balance 
and the benefits that can be achieved through the cultivation of explicitly liberal pluralist 
strategies for securing liberal democracy.   
 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Jennifer.  For everything.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………...................................1 
 
CHAPTER 1:  LIBERAL PLURALISM AND THE EXIT RIGHTS 
STRATEGY…………………………………………......................................6 
 
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………..6 
 
II. Autonomy………………………………………………………………….8 
 
III. Toleration and its Critics…………………………………………………..10 
 
A. Galston’s Tolerationism……………………………………………….11 
 
B. Autonomist Responses………………………………………………..16 
 
IV. Defending Galston and Tolerationism…………………………………….26 
 
A. The Alleged Link Between Value Pluralism and the Preference for 
Internally Diverse Cultures……………………………………………26 
  
B. The Tolerationist Exit Rights Strategy Versus the Promotion of     
Robust Autonomy…………………………………………………….32 
 
C. The Non-Democratic and Inegalitarian Internal Practices of             
Non-Liberal Groups…………………………………………………..35 
 
D. Liberal Toleration and the Alleged Commitment to Robust 
Autonomy…………………………………………………………….37 
 
V. Conclusion—The Conditions of Choice and the Right to Remain………...39 
 
A. Some Problems With Robust Autonomy……………………………...39 
 
B. Choice is All About Having and Exercising Options, and One Option    
is Simply to Remain……………………………………..........................43 
 
CHAPTER 2:  LIBERAL PLURALISM AND DEMOCRATIC 
PERSUASION…………………………………………………………....46 
 
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………46 
 vi
 
A. Civic Equality and the Theory of Value Democracy…………………...47 
 
B. Liberal Pluralism and Liberal Purposes………………………………..49 
 
C. Liberal Pluralism and Democratic Persuasion…………………………51 
 
II. Value Democracy…………………………………………………………52 
 
A. Background and Definitions…………………………………………..52 
 
B. Democratic Persuasion………………………………………………..55 
 
III. Some Concerns Regarding the Persuasive State…………………………...62 
 
A. The Limited Upside of Aggressive Persuasion………………………...66 
 
B. The Substantial Downside of Aggressive Persuasion………………….70 
 
IV. A Restrained and Liberal Pluralist View of Democratic Persuasion………..79 
 
A. The Liberal Pluralist State as Spender…………………………………82 
 
B. The Liberal Pluralist State as Educator………………………………...84 
 
C. The Liberal Pluralist State as Speaker……………………………….…88 
 
V. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...…91 
 
CHAPTER 3:  LIBERAL PLURALISM AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM…………….93 
 
I. Introduction………………………………………………………………93 
 
II. Scanlon’s Objections……………………………………………………...95 
 
A. Overview……………………………………………………………...95 
 
B. A Brief Description of Scanlon’s Objections………………………….96 
 
III. Background on Luck Egalitarianism…………………………………...…104 
 
A. “A Family of Views”………………………………………………....104 
 
B. Moral Equality and Equal Consideration………………………..……105 
 
IV. Some Common Objections to Luck Egalitarianism………………….…...108 
 
A. The Free Will Objection………………………………………..……109 
 
 vii 
B. The Harshness Objection……………………………………………118 
 
C. The Stigma Objection…………………………………………..……128 
 
V. Conclusion………………………………………………………………137 
 
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………141 
 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………….……145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This dissertation contributes to an understanding of “liberal pluralism”, a conception 
of liberalism that is predicated upon the beliefs that human values are “irreducibly multiple, 
frequently in conflict with one another, and sometimes incommensurable”1 and that 
liberalism is particularly well-suited to accommodate the plurality of human values.  Its thesis 
is that liberal pluralism supports the rejection of state policies that reflect an imbalance of 
liberal values.  Specifically, it argues that liberal pluralism is inconsistent with permitting the 
promotion of values like autonomy, equality, and democracy to crowd out other values like 
liberty, toleration, and privacy.  It also argues that liberal pluralism is inconsistent with the 
promotion of overly narrow conceptions of liberal values (e.g. promoting equality by 
guaranteeing strict economic equality while showing little or no concern for equality of status 
or objective well-being, and vice-versa).  The dissertation consists of three chapters, each of 
which is concerned with (re)balancing the diversity of values (e.g. liberty, equality, 
democracy, autonomy, toleration, privacy, fairness, fraternity, and humanitarianism) that is 
commonly associated with both classical and contemporary liberalism, and that is 
enthusiastically embraced by liberal pluralists.   
 The liberal pluralist interest in maintaining an appropriate balance of liberal values is 
particularly warranted in the context of contemporary Western democracies.  Many of these 
societies are marked by increasing diversity and their citizens are perhaps more autonomous 
(that is, more procedurally free to choose what they would like to believe and to be) than at 
                                                           
1 Crowder, 2007: 122.   
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any other point in history.  Though increasingly diverse and fairly autonomous, these citizens 
often find themselves subject to substantial pressure to conform to distinctively liberal 
conceptions of the good.  This pressure is not only a function of the mainstream media and 
culture, but also of the policies and practices of various liberal institutions (e.g. legislatures, 
executives, courts, bureaucracies, public schools, etc.).  In addition, many citizens also find 
themselves at once free and equal in the eyes of the law, but also burdened by the limitations 
associated with increasingly distressing socioeconomic inequalities.  Many citizens are, in 
other words, (1) simultaneously less constrained by tradition and more constrained by the 
mainstream liberal culture and liberal institutions, and (2) simultaneously more free to enjoy 
the fruits of social mobility from a legal standpoint and, as a result of the proliferation of 
profound socioeconomic inequalities in recent decades, less free to capitalize upon the 
absence of various discriminatory legal restraints.  
 In real terms this situation means that a significant number of citizens in liberal 
democracies find themselves incapable of fully enjoying the fruits of liberalism.  These 
citizens may be fairly autonomous, but substantively incapable of opting out of the dominant 
liberal paradigm.  They may also find themselves procedurally free to fill almost any role in 
their societies, but substantively incapable of exercising that freedom.  Thus, the poor are 
free to fill roles for which they are too poor to earn the qualifications and, in similar fashion, 
citizens are free to embrace a wide variety of cultural differences, but only so long as their 
cultures happen to already be internally diverse and essentially liberal.   
 The claim of this dissertation is that liberal political theorists would do well to take a 
fresh look at the balance between liberal values reflected in the policies and practices of 
Western democracies, because it is this balance, and not simply the values themselves, which 
enables all citizens to fully enjoy the fruits of liberalism.  Accordingly, this dissertation 
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evaluates the impact of various liberal viewpoints on the balance of liberal values from the 
perspective of a conception of liberalism—liberal pluralism—that is particularly sensitive to 
the dangers of monistic and imperialistic versions of liberalism.  Specifically, it reconsiders 
the appropriate balance of liberal values, responding to those theorists who often seem to  
• valorize toleration to exclusion of autonomy (e.g. John Gray and Chandran 
Kukathas2);  
• valorize autonomy to the exclusion of toleration (e.g. George Crowder, Will 
Kymlicka, Susan Moller Okin, and Daniel Weinstock3); 
• valorize equality to the exclusion of liberty (e.g. Brian Barry, Stephen Macedo, Susan 
Moller Okin, Ian Shapiro, George Crowder, and Corey Brettschneider4);  
• valorize fairness to the exclusion of fraternity and humanitarianism (e.g. Eric 
Rakowski, G.A. Cohen, and Ronald Dworkin5); and 
• valorize fraternity to the exclusion of fairness (e.g. Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel 
Scheffler6).   
 
 The first chapter, “Liberal Pluralism and the Exit Rights Strategy”, is a defense of a 
particular strategy (the “exit rights strategy”) endorsed by the liberal pluralists William 
Galston and Jeff Spinner-Halev.  The intention of the exit rights strategy is to guarantee 
individuals a substantive and meaningful right to exit their cultural and religious groups.  The 
chapter will (1) show that this strategy is far more sensitive to concerns related to the liberal 
values of liberty, toleration, and privacy than its rivals, and (2) claim that this sensitivity 
emerges from its proponents’ realization that the state can guarantee a meaningful right to 
exit without at the same time promoting a conception of autonomy so robust that it crowds 
out liberty, toleration, and privacy.  The chapter will argue that the exit rights strategy is 
                                                           
2 See, e.g. Gray, 1995a; Gray, 1995b; Gray, 2000; Kukathas, 2003.  
3 See, e.g. Crowder, 2004; Crowder, 2007; Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka, 2002; Okin, 2002; Weinstock, 2009.  
4 See, e.g. Barry, 2001; Macedo, 2000; Okin, 2002; Shapiro, 1999; Crowder, 2007; Brettschneider, 2011; 
Brettschneider, 2012.   
 
5 See, e.g. Rakowski, 1991; Cohen, 1989; Cohen, 2008; Dworkin, 2000.   
6 See, e.g. Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2008; Scheffler, 2003a; Scheffler, 2003b.   
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superior to its rivals because it not only safeguards the conditions of choice and exit for the 
times when individuals change their minds and wish to leave non-liberal cultural and 
religious groups (thereby safeguarding autonomy), but also permits the pursuit of a wide 
range of valuable ways of life for those individuals who choose to remain within them 
(thereby also safeguarding liberty, tolerance, and privacy).   
 The second chapter, “Liberal Pluralism and Democratic Persuasion”, consists of a 
critique of Corey Brettschneider’s conception of “democratic persuasion” and a proposal for 
an alternative conception consistent with the goals of liberal pluralism.  Democratic 
persuasion is the main practice associated with Brettschneider’s theory of “value 
democracy”.  It refers to both the state’s defense of the values of free and equal citizenship 
and its efforts to convince citizens to adopt the democratic values of freedom and equality as 
their own.  The chapter will consider whether or not Brettschneider’s conception of 
democratic persuasion is sufficiently sensitive to the importance of maintaining a balance 
between the liberal impulse to promote values like equality and autonomy, on the one hand, 
and the liberal concern to foster toleration and to safeguard liberty and privacy, on the other.  
The chapter will ultimately conclude (1) that Brettschneider’s aggressive view of democratic 
persuasion does not, in fact, do enough to foster toleration and to safeguard liberty and 
privacy, and (2) that liberal pluralists nevertheless have good reason to favor an alternative 
and significantly more constrained view of democratic persuasion.   
 The third chapter, “Liberal Pluralism and Luck Egalitarianism”, is a liberal pluralist 
defense and critique of the luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice.  The goals of luck 
egalitarians, generically speaking, are to concurrently eliminate the impact of unchosen 
circumstances (“brute luck”) on the wealth or capabilities of individuals and to fully permit 
their free and genuine choices (“option luck”) to have unlimited impact on the wealth or 
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capabilities of those same individuals.  The chapter will claim that it is possible to conceive 
of luck egalitarianism in such a way that it to some significant degree responds to liberal 
pluralist concerns regarding the balancing of values.  It will also consider whether or not this 
more responsive revised conception is luck egalitarian enough to continue to warrant that 
label.  The chapter will ultimately conclude that a revised “pluralist egalitarian” approach to 
distributive justice would go a long way toward satisfying liberal pluralist concerns regarding 
the balancing of values, but that pluralist egalitarianism has about as much in common with 
other popular approaches to distributive justice (like democratic egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism) as it does with luck egalitarianism.   
 Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation reaffirm the importance of 
maintaining a balance of liberal values, while finding fault with a number of well-meaning 
attempts to promote particular liberal values.  Examining the promotion of liberal values like 
autonomy, equality, and fairness from the perspective of liberal pluralism, it becomes clear 
that because these liberal values often conflict with others, it is typically unwise to emphasize 
one or more of them without consideration for the others.  To claim that balance is required 
is not, of course, to claim much in the way of superior insight regarding the exact nature of 
the optimal balance.  What this dissertation offers, instead, are (1) arguments against 
conceptions of liberalism which are significantly (though not always egregiously) overloaded 
in favor or one more liberal values as opposed to others, and (2) arguments in support of 
those theorists whose conceptions of liberalism are more self-consciously concerned with 
maintaining an appropriate balance of liberal values.   
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CHAPTER 1:  LIBERAL PLURALISM AND THE EXIT RIGHTS STRATEGY 
I. Introduction 
Liberal pluralists are liberals who accept the “truth of value pluralism” (roughly, the idea 
that human values are “irreducibly multiple, frequently in conflict with one another, and 
sometimes incommensurable”7) and the claim that liberalism is particularly well-suited to 
accommodate the plurality of human values.  Some of them disagree, however, about 
whether the core purpose of liberalism is to safeguard a robust version of individual 
autonomy for all citizens or to maximally protect “legitimate differences among individuals 
and groups over such matters as the nature of the good life, sources of moral authority, 
reason versus faith, and the like.”8  While all liberal pluralists agree that there is no one 
supervalue that trumps all others, some—call them Autonomy Liberals or “autonomists”—
believe that all liberals ought to agree that “a way of life in which personal autonomy is 
encouraged is better from a pluralist point of view than one in which personal autonomy is 
stifled or neglected.”9  Others, call them Toleration Liberals or “tolerationists”, believe that 
those who accept the truth of value pluralism are committed to something like the pursuit of 
“a policy of maximum feasible accommodation, limited only by the core requirements of 
                                                           
7 Crowder, 2007: 122.   
8 Galston, 2002: 21.   
9 Crowder, 2007: 141; see also, Weinstock, 2009.    
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individual security and civic unity”10 rather than the imposition or the promotion of a 
particularly robust version of autonomy.11   
George Crowder, William Galston, Joseph Raz, and Jeff Spinner-Halev are liberal 
pluralists; they all accept the philosophical truth and the practical reality of value pluralism 
and agree that liberalism is particularly well-suited to accommodating the plurality of human 
values.12  They disagree, however, when it comes to the liberal values of toleration and 
autonomy.  Galston and Spinner-Halev, perhaps the best representatives of the Toleration 
Liberal position, emphasize the value of toleration, deemphasize the value of autonomy, and 
argue that the appropriate response of the liberal state to the non-liberal groups within its 
midst is a guarantee that all citizens enjoy a realistic right to exit the groups that they have 
joined or were born into.13  They contend that non-liberal groups housed within the liberal 
state represent worthwhile forms of life no matter how unfree or discriminatory they may 
appear to be from the perspective of liberal sensibilities so long as they do not subvert basic 
human rights or so-called “liberal purposes”.14  Crowder, Will Kymlicka, Susan Moller Okin, 
and Daniel Weinstock, on the other hand, emphasize a robust conception of the value of 
autonomy and believe that the liberal state ought to guarantee that all citizens are capable of 
a substantial degree of reasoned critical reflection about conflicting goods and are (1) capable 
of revising their beliefs, attachments, and ends and (2) willing to do so.  They claim that 
                                                           
10 Galston, 2002: 20 (emphasis in original).   
11 See, e.g. Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2000; Spinner-Halev, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2008.   
12 See, e.g. Crowder, 2002; Crowder, 2004; Crowder, 2007; Crowder, 2009; Galston, 1991; Galston, 1999; 
Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005; Raz, 1986; Raz, 1988; Spinner-Halev, 2000; Spinner-Halev, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 
2008.   
 
13 Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2000; Spinner-Halev, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2008.   
14 See Galston, 1991: 213-37; Galston, 2002: 126-8; see also, Spinner-Halev, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2008; 
Mautner, 2008.  For example, the liberal state may legitimately interfere with group practices in order to protect 
human life, to protect and to promote the normal development of basic capacities, and to safeguard the 
development of “social rationality”.  Galston, 2002: 23-4.   
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Toleration Liberals are wrong to think that particularly worthwhile lives can be led absent 
the cultivation of robust autonomy and that a right to exit can be both realistic and divorced 
from the promotion of robust autonomy.15   
This chapter defends the tolerationist exit rights strategy and the minimalist version of 
autonomy that goes along with it.  It argues (1) that the minimal degree of autonomy 
required by the exit rights strategy is superior because it offers individuals the option to 
remain constrained by their groups or to leave them if they so choose and (2) that 
guaranteeing a realistic right to exit is distinguishable from promoting robust autonomy 
because the right to exit does not, in fact, depend upon the cultivation of a high degree of 
critical reflection, a self-reflective disposition, or what Lucas Swaine refers to as “an attitude 
of revisability regarding one’s beliefs, attachments, and ends.”16  It concludes that the 
tolerationists get the better of the argument because their exit rights strategy safeguards the 
conditions of choice and exit for the times when individuals change their minds and wish to 
leave and permits the pursuit of a wide range of valuable ways of life for those that choose to 
remain.   
II. Autonomy 
Before I proceed to introduce Galston’s brand of tolerationism and consider some 
autonomist objections to it, I want to say a few words about autonomy.  My goal is not to 
canvass the vast body of scholarship regarding this complex notion, but simply to identify 
what autonomists seem to mean when they use the terms autonomy, substantial autonomy, 
strong autonomy, and robust autonomy, and what tolerationists seem to mean when they 
                                                           
15 Crowder, 2004; Crowder, 2007; Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka, 2002; Okin, 2002; Weinstock, 2009.  
16 Swaine, 2010.   
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talk of minimal autonomy, balanced autonomy, and heteronomy.  Autonomists claim that 
lives of robust autonomy are superior to minimally autonomous ones and cite “Mill’s 
celebration of individuality as the life of energetic and restless self-creation” as an example of 
the kind of autonomy that they have in mind.17  Tolerationists, on the other hand, tend to 
think of the minimally and sufficiently autonomous individual as one who is merely (1) 
capable of making non-coerced and considered choices and (2) capable of leaving his or her 
group for another or to enter the mainstream liberal society, and they claim that the lives of 
the minimally autonomous are in no crucial way inferior to robustly autonomous ones.18   
Swaine’s working definition of autonomy is useful here, as it illustrates the incremental 
steps along the path from the state of illiberal coercion at one pole to the state of Millian 
robust autonomy at the other.  He defines autonomy (what I am calling “robust autonomy”) 
as the “condition in which one engages in unforced and considered choosing, complemented 
by a self-reflective disposition and an attitude of revisability with respect to one’s interests, 
beliefs, aims, and attachments.”19  When autonomists talk of substantial, strong, or robust 
autonomy they mean something along the lines of all four of these components in Swaine’s 
definition.  They mean to say, in other words, that autonomy consists of “(a) unforced 
choices; (b) considered choosing; (c) an attitude promoting modifications or changes to 
one’s ends, attachments, beliefs, and interests, as appropriate; and (d) a self-reflective 
disposition.”20  My claim is that these four components of (robust) autonomy adequately 
                                                           
17 Crowder, 2007: 129.   
18 See Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005; Galston, 2006a; Spinner-Halev, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2008; Swaine, 2010.   
 
19 Swaine, 2010: 74.   
20 Swaine, 2010: 74; see also, Burtt, 2003.   
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capture what the autonomists have in mind when they aim to promote the development of 
Millian citizens engaged in energetic and restless self-creation.   
If we subtract (c) and (d) and retain only (a) unforced choices and (b) considered 
choosing, we are left with what Swaine calls “heteronomy” and what I take to be a good 
working definition of tolerationist minimal autonomy.  This minimalist conception of 
autonomy is focused upon guaranteeing the conditions of choice.  Tolerationists want to see 
that choices are non-coerced, that choices are the result of at least some small degree of 
critical reflection, and that individuals find themselves in a position to act upon their choices.  
They do not believe that the liberal state ought to impose or even to promote the cultivation 
of an attitude of revisability or a self-reflective disposition.  This unwillingness to impose or 
to promote the two components that push autonomy from its minimal to its robust form is 
at the very heart of the dispute between autonomists and tolerationists.  Autonomists think 
that lives lived without an attitude of revisability and a self-reflective disposition are inferior 
to those lived with them, and tolerationists disagree because they see no reason why the 
liberal state should be concerned to see that free choosers are not only capable of revising 
their beliefs, attachments, and ends but also so ready and willing to do so that they 
consistently and perpetually engage in “energetic and restless self-creation”.   
III. Tolerationism and its Critics 
The purpose of this section is to introduce Galston’s brand of tolerationism and then 
discuss four lines of objection to it that have been pursued by autonomists.  The first line, 
Kymlicka’s, is based on an argument about the nature and limits of the liberal conception of 
toleration.  He claims that liberal tolerance is marked by an historical and ongoing 
commitment to autonomy and that the liberal state has the right to compel newly arriving 
immigrant groups (and perhaps others) to support autonomy.  The second line of objection 
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hinges upon an argument regarding the relationship between acceptance of the truth of value 
pluralism and the value of autonomy.  Crowder and Weinstock both argue that truly 
committed value pluralists must endorse a robust conception of autonomy and that 
tolerationists must choose between their commitment to value pluralism and their rejection 
of autonomy.  The third line of objection has to do with the extent to which the essential 
conditions of the tolerationist exit remedy mirror the essential conditions of robust 
autonomy.  Autonomy Liberals argue that anyone committed to a realistic right to exit is also 
committed to a robust conception of autonomy.  And the fourth line of objection has to do 
with the need for the promotion of liberal values independent of concerns related to 
whether or not the right to exit is genuinely realistic.  Autonomy Liberals argue that the 
liberal state has reason to intervene in the inegalitarian and non-democratic practices of even 
those non-liberal groups that already guarantee a right to exit based on robust autonomy.   
A. Galston’s Tolerationism 
The Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, illustrates an important practical 
distinction between Autonomy Liberals and Toleration Liberals.21  The case was concerned 
with a challenge by the Old Order Amish community to a Wisconsin law which required 
school attendance until the age of sixteen.  The Amish claimed that the law interfered with 
their free exercise of religion.  The Court found that the right of parents to remove their 
children from school before the age of sixteen on religious grounds must be respected unless 
compelling state interests dictate otherwise and that Wisconsin failed to make such a case.  
Autonomists tend to think the case was decided incorrectly (at least as a question of political 
theory) because allowing Amish parents to remove their children from school before the age 
                                                           
21 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Galston, 1995; Galston, 2002.   
 12
of sixteen threatens the cultivation of robust autonomy; tolerationists tend to think the case 
was decided correctly (at least as a question of political theory) because they think that 
liberalism is properly concerned with safeguarding the diversity of reasonable conceptions of 
the good and not with imposing or even promoting robust autonomy.   
Galston looks back to the history of liberal thought for the origins of the 
fundamental disagreement between autonomists and tolerationists that culminates in their 
contrasting interpretations of Yoder.  There are, he contends, “two concepts of liberalism” 
within the liberal tradition, (1) a Reformation concept of liberalism based on diversity and 
geared toward Lockean tolerance, and (2) an Enlightenment concept of liberalism based on 
autonomy and geared towards the Kantian or Millian promotion of rational self-direction.  
Devotees of Reformation liberalism think Yoder was decided correctly and devotees of 
Enlightenment liberalism think it was decided incorrectly.  Galston, a devotee of 
Reformation liberalism, contends that Yoder was decided correctly because the robust 
autonomy ideal of Enlightenment liberalism protected by the Wisconsin law is not, in fact, 
an essential feature of all associations and communities housed within the liberal state.22   
Galston mentions with disapproval a “standard liberal view (or hope)” which says 
“that autonomy and diversity fit together and complement one another.”23  He argues, to the 
contrary, that those who promote autonomy do so at the expense of diversity, and vice-
versa.24  Promoting autonomy means undermining “the lives of individuals and groups that 
do not and cannot organize their affairs in accordance with that principle without 
                                                           
22 Galston, 1995.   
23 Galston, 1995: 521.  This “standard liberal view (or hope)” is perhaps best exemplified by the work of Will 
Kymlicka.  See Kymlicka, 1989; Kymlicka, 1995.   
 
24 Galston, 1995: 521; see also, Levy, 2003: 281.   
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undermining the deepest source of their identity”25 and promoting diversity means 
embracing certain ways of life that either reject or do not encourage autonomy.  Galston 
opts for the sacrifice of (some26) autonomy because he thinks (1) that liberalism, properly 
understood, is about the protection of diversity, not the promotion or facilitation of 
autonomy, and (2) that a commitment to the protection of diversity is most consistent with 
the Berlinian notion of value pluralism (with the aforementioned idea that human values 
human values are “irreducibly multiple, frequently in conflict with one another, and 
sometimes incommensurable”27).28  He wants to protect diversity because he accepts Isaiah 
Berlin’s assertion of the truth of value pluralism and he endorses Reformation liberalism 
because since it is not fixated upon the promotion of autonomy or any other particular 
value, it is well-suited to accommodate the plurality of human values.   
Galston’s brand of tolerationist liberal pluralism is marked by a “principle of 
expressive liberty” that justifies the nature and delineates the bounds of the liberal 
accommodation of plural values and diverse ways of living.  The principle of expressive 
liberty amounts to “a robust though rebuttable presumption in favor of individuals and 
groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in 
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value” and that 
further “implies a corresponding presumption (also rebuttable) against external interference 
with individual and group endeavors.”29  Liberalism, guided by the principle of expressive 
                                                           
25 Galston, 1995: 521.   
26 See Galston, 2005:  182-5.   
27 Crowder, 2007: 122.   
28 Galston, 1995; Galston, 1999; Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005.   
29 Galston, 2002: 3.   
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liberty, is optimally tolerant—it permits the flourishing of diverse forms of life, liberal and 
non-liberal alike, “constrained only by the ineliminable requirements of liberal social unity.”30  
Expressive liberty “protects the ability of individuals and groups to live in ways that others 
would regard as unfree” and permits groups to take measures to prevent their members 
from becoming robustly autonomous so long as they frustrate no liberal purposes and their 
members remain substantively free to leave.31  
Galston contends that the essential constraints on expressive liberty imply and 
require a substantive and enforceable right to exit for individual group members.  Groups 
are permitted to “order their internal affairs as they see fit”, and may do so in ways that 
“significantly abridge individual freedom and autonomy” so long as they do “not coerce 
individuals to remain as members against their will, or create conditions that in practical 
terms make departure impossible.”32  At a minimum, effective exit rights must meet two 
criteria:  “(1) it must be practically (physically, economically, logistically) possible for 
someone who wishes to exit to act on that desire (call this the anti-imprisonment criterion); 
and (2) education and cultural circumstances should not be such as to eradicate any 
meaningful capacity to choose (call this the anti-brainwashing criterion).”33  Galston also 
claims that a meaningful right to exit must satisfy these four sets of conditions:   
• Knowledge Conditions:  “the awareness of alternatives to the life one is in fact 
living” 
• Capacity Conditions:  “the ability to assess these alternatives if it comes to seem 
desirable to do so” 
                                                           
30 Galston, 2002: 23.   
31 Galston, 2002: 29, 24; Galston, 1991.   
32 Galston, 2002: 122.   
33 Galston, 2006a.   
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• Psychology Conditions:  “freedom from the kinds of brainwashing that give rise 
to heartrending deprogramming efforts of parents on behalf of their 
children, and more broadly, forms of coercion other than the physical that 
may give rise to warranted interference on behalf of affected individuals” 
• Fitness Conditions:  “the ability of exit-desiring individuals to participate 
effectively in at least some ways of life other than the ones they wish to 
leave.”34  
Galston acknowledges that the liberal state ought to protect the ability of individual 
members to leave their groups but he does not think it should require groups to cultivate a 
capacity for critical reasoning beyond the minimal degree required for exit and for liberal 
democratic citizenship.35  He uses the Amish community to express this point.  That 
community discourages both active participation in public affairs and critical reasoning but 
nevertheless satisfies both criteria and all four conditions of the realistic right to exit, or so 
Galston claims.36  Individual members are physically, economically, and logistically capable 
of leaving; they are aware of alternatives, possess enough of a capacity for critical reasoning 
to assess those alternatives should they choose to do so, have not been brainwashed, and 
generally can participate effectively within society if and when they choose to leave.  It is true 
that when the Amish remove their children from public school before the age of sixteen they 
may very well compromise the full development of their autonomy but, so far as Galston is 
concerned, this is not an issue for the liberal state.37  No liberal purposes are undermined 
simply because some people are less engaged in public affairs and do not engage in the kind 
of critical reflection and rational self-direction commonly associated with the Enlightenment 
ideal of autonomy.   
                                                           
34 Galston, 2002: 123.    
35 Galston, 2002: 107.   
36 See Galston, 2002: 106-8.  
37 See Galston, 2002: 106-8.   
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B. Autonomist Responses 
1. Liberal Toleration and the Commitment to Autonomy 
Kymlicka defends a version of what Galston calls the “standard liberal view (or 
hope)”, the view that says that the values of autonomy and toleration fit together and 
complement one another.  In the face of Galston’s claim that autonomy promotion 
undermines toleration, Kymlicka responds by saying that liberal tolerance and autonomy are 
actually “two sides of the same coin.”38  He distinguishes between the modus vivendi 
conception of tolerance associated with the Ottoman millet system39 and what he has 
identified as autonomy-based liberal tolerance.  The millet system, Kymlicka says, was 
“generally humane, tolerant of group differences, and remarkably stable” but it did not result 
in anything that could be called a liberal society.40  The “legal traditions and practices of each 
religious group, particularly in matters of family status, were respected and enforced”, but 
the state “did not recognize any principle of individual liberty of conscience.”41  Liberal 
toleration, on the other hand, not only protects groups from persecution by the state but 
also “limits the power of illiberal groups to restrict the liberty of their own members…”42  
Liberals are indeed committed to a conception of toleration, says Kymlicka, but it is a 
distinctly liberal conception of toleration that does not apply to groups that are unwilling to 
                                                           
38 Kymlicka, 1995: 158.   
39 “In the ‘millet system’ of the Ottoman empire…Muslims, Christians, and Jews were all recognized as self-
governing units (or ‘millets’), and allowed to impose restrictive religious laws on their own members…Since 
each religious community was self-governing, there was no external obstacle to basing this self-government on 
religious principles, including the enforcement of religious orthodoxy.  Hence there was little or no scope for 
individual dissent within each religious community, and little or no freedom to change one’s faith.”  Kymlicka, 
1995: 156-7.   
 
40 Kymlicka, 1995: 157.   
41 Kymlicka, 1995: 156-7.   
42 Kymlicka, 1995: 158.   
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at least facilitate the development of individual autonomy for all of their members (or to 
permit the state to do it for them).43    
2. Autonomy and Respect for the Plurality of Human Goods 
Crowder argues that acceptance of the truth of value pluralism implies support for 
the promotion of internally diverse cultures.  His claim is that acceptance of the truth of 
value pluralism leads the liberal pluralist to want to promote a diversity of goods44 not just a 
diversity of cultures.  Crowder believes that diversity is optimally satisfied by a society that 
not only accommodates multiple ways of life but also ensures that the members of each way 
of life—each cultural or religious group—find themselves capable of developing “a variety 
of goods, virtues, and personal projects.”45.  I call this “the argument from diversity”. 
Crowder also argues that respect for the truth of value pluralism implies support for 
providing everyone with the capacity for the reasoned critical reflection necessary to make 
difficult choices between conflicting goods.  His claim is that liberal pluralists ought to 
promote the cultivation of a high level of practical reasoning and critical reflection for 
everyone, ensuring that all citizens find themselves in the best position to choose between 
the conflicting goods that life has to offer.  Crowder believes that the inevitably hard choices 
inherent in the pluralistic moral universe ought to be made wisely and that this standard calls 
                                                           
43 Kymlicka, 1995: 158; Kymlicka, 2002.  It is also worth noting, however, that Kymlicka makes an important 
distinction between liberal intolerance and liberal interventionism.  He believes that there are in fact times 
when the liberal state may intervene in order to impose autonomy-facilitation on certain groups but thinks that 
such imposition would be improper when it comes to the case of “national minorities” and long-standing 
ethnic groups or religious sects, like the Amish and Mennonites, who emigrated many years ago and have been 
allowed to maintain certain illiberal institutions.  Newly arriving immigrants, however, present a different case 
as far as Kymlicka is concerned.  For these groups—groups that know in advance that liberal principles may be 
imposed and choose to come anyway—the case for the imposition of autonomy is definitely strong enough for 
state action.  Kymlicka, 1995: 170.   
 
44 Crowder’s use of “goods” seems to be a kind of shorthand for conceptions of the good and ways of life in 
line with those conceptions of the good.  See Crowder, 2007:  135-6.   
 
45 Crowder, 2007: 135.   
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for strongly autonomous citizens—citizens who are self-reflective, aware of almost all of the 
options available to them, and prepared to thoroughly consider the fitness of those options 
for them even when those options clash with their current beliefs, attachments, and ends.46  I 
call this “the argument from hard choices”. 
a. The Argument from Diversity 
Galston values diversity because he accepts the truth of value pluralism and he 
favors a liberal state because of its tolerance for diversity.  He believes that diversity is 
important and ought to be accommodated because human values are plural and often 
conflicting, and he believes that the liberal state accommodates reasonable diversity better 
than any other.  Crowder accepts this argument but thinks that Galston doesn’t go quite far 
enough.  He notes, first, that the argument ought to be reinforced by a principle that he calls 
“respect for plurality”:  the idea that acknowledgement of the truth of value pluralism 
implies a degree of respect for each of the diverse and conflicting goods evident in the 
human moral universe.47  Liberal pluralists ought therefore to (1) exhibit a corresponding 
degree of respect for cultural and religious groups because (but only to the extent that) these 
are repositories for the diverse and conflicting goods of the moral universe, and (2) agree 
that “it is generally better that a society embrace a greater rather than narrower range of 
values.”48   
The key to Crowder’s argument is a claim about the appropriate unit of diversity.  
John Gray, a pluralist but not a liberal pluralist, argues that pluralists ought to care about 
diversity amongst political communities and Galston, a pluralist and a liberal, argues that 
                                                           
46 Crowder, 2007: 136-9.   
47 Crowder, 2007: 132.   
48 Crowder, 2007: 132.   
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pluralists ought to care about diversity within political communities as well as between them.49  
While Galston’s liberal version of pluralism leads him to favor permitting maximal diversity 
amongst cultural communities within the liberal polity, Crowder claims to take that logic one 
step further.  Crowder argues that pluralists ought to care not only about diversity within 
political communities as well as between them, but also about diversity within cultures 
themselves.  He asks, “Shouldn’t pluralist diversity be diversity not merely of states (Gray), 
nor merely of cultures within states (Galston), but of internally diverse cultures?”50  
Crowder’s claim is, then, that respect for the plurality of values entails not only the founding 
and preservation of liberal political communities but also the promotion of liberal and 
“internally diverse” cultures and groups themselves.   
What are “internally diverse cultures”?  According to Crowder, internally diverse 
cultures are cultures that permit and enable their members to pursue diverse and conflicting 
conceptions of the good.  And what kinds of cultures permit their members to pursue 
diverse and conflicting conceptions of the good?  They tend to be liberal cultures marked by 
a robust version of individual autonomy.  These liberal cultures based on individual 
autonomy are particularly valuable, then, from a pluralist point of view because and to the 
extent that they feature members who “are genuinely able to pursue a multiplicity of goods 
and personal projects, either interpreting the culture in new or different ways, or 
transforming it.”51   
Ironically, Galston’s goal of a maximally diverse conception of liberalism is 
“optimally satisfied by a society that accommodates multiple ways of life, each of which allows 
                                                           
49 See, e.g. Gray, 1995a; Gray, 1995b; Gray, 2000; Galston, 1999; Galston, 2002.   
50 Crowder, 2007: 134.   
51 Crowder, 2007: 134-5; see also, Weinstock, 1997: 493.   
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its members to pursue and develop a variety of goods, virtues, and personal projects.”52  The cultures 
themselves would seem to be less diverse—at the very least they all share a commitment to a 
robust version of individual autonomy and perhaps other liberal values like democracy and 
equality—but the goods available to their members are, Crowder claims, as diverse as they can 
be.53  The principle of respect for plurality, a principle implied by Galston’s own argument, 
provides a powerful justification for a robust version of individual autonomy because it is 
only amongst the profoundly autonomous—amongst those exposed to many different ways 
of life, capable of a high degree of reasoned critical reflection, and willing to seriously 
consider the revision of their beliefs, attachments, and ends (or goods or values)—that truly 
diverse goods develop and proliferate, or so Crowder claims.   
b. The Argument from Hard Choices    
Crowder also claims that a robust version of autonomy enables individuals to 
“choose critically and wisely when they are confronted by choices among conflicting 
goods.”54  He argues that those who acknowledge the truth of value pluralism should not 
only respect the plurality of human goods but also agree that pluralist choices ought to be 
taken seriously, and that a pluralist choice is not taken seriously when it is made arbitrarily or 
casually.55  Liberal pluralists ought to be highly attuned to the weighty and even tragic nature 
of choices between rival goods, and they ought to be concerned to see that pluralist choices 
are made “only for a good reason.”56 
                                                           
52 Crowder, 2007: 135, emphasis mine.   
53 Crowder, 2007: 134.   
54 Crowder, 2007: 138.   
55 Crowder, 2007: 137.   
56 Crowder, 2007: 137.   
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According to Crowder, liberal pluralists will want to see that choices between rival 
goods are made on the basis of reasoned critical reflection and in light of an attitude of 
revisability.  They will want to see that conflicts are not decided by resort to nothing more 
than “the mechanical application of conventional rules.”57  Conventional rules are 
problematic both because they are arbitrary—simply the product of this received tradition as 
opposed to that one—and because they “tend to rest on monist assumptions.”58  More 
specifically, conventional rules tend to rest on an assumption that the pluralist knows to be 
false, the assumption that there is something like a singular Good.  Pluralists know that “the 
nature of the good life is subject to reasonable disagreement” and that, therefore, 
“conceptions of the good cannot be permanent bases for decision but must be subject to 
revision themselves and to balancing with other such conceptions.”59  According to 
Crowder, the citizens of the liberal pluralist state ought to understand this truth.60  Moreover, 
they ought never forget that no matter what way of life they have chosen for themselves, 
they could have chosen otherwise, and may very well do so in the future.61   
3. The Right to Exit and the Value of Autonomy 
Autonomy Liberals attack the tolerationist right to exit in at least two different ways.  
They claim (1) that the tolerationist defense of groups that do not value autonomy is 
incompatible with a realistic right to exit,  and (2) that even a truly meaningful right to exit is 
insufficient to justify certain illiberal practices.  The first argument is meant to show that the 
                                                           
57 Crowder, 2007: 137.   
58 Crowder, 2007: 137.  
59 Crowder, 2007: 138.   
60 Crowder, 2007: 138.   
61 Crowder, 2007: 138; see also, Weinstock, 1997: 491-2.    
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guarantee of a realistic right to exit implies the promotion of robust autonomy, and the 
second is meant to show both that a realistic right to exit is not enough and that exit is not 
the only reason for wanting the state to promote liberal values.   
As is already clear from the discussion above, the conditions required for Galston’s 
right to exit are quite substantive.62  His liberal pluralist state is empowered to ensure, 
broadly, that groups are not prisons and that they do not brainwash their members and, 
more specifically, that groups do not undermine the state’s efforts to guarantee the 
knowledge, capacity, psychology, and fitness conditions essential to a meaningful right to 
exit.  The tolerationist state guarantees that all citizens live free from outright physical 
coercion and that they are aware of other life-options, that all citizens are able to assess those 
options, that all citizens are psychologically capable of thinking for themselves, and that all 
citizens are fit to survive in the mainstream liberal society.   
Autonomists aren’t typically satisfied by the use of a right to exit as the sole response 
to certain illiberal practices.  They do not however, seem to take issue with Galston’s 
description of the essential conditions for exit itself.  Their problem isn’t with Galston’s 
conditions per se, but rather with his insistence (1) that exit (and the conditions that make it 
realistic) ought to be the liberal state’s sole response to the illiberality of groups, (2) that his 
exit conditions do not amount to the facilitation of robust autonomy, and (3) that his 
conditions are satisfied by groups like the Amish.63  They think that the satisfaction of his 
conditions—the satisfaction of any set of essential conditions for a meaningful right to 
exit—cannot be achieved short of promoting robust autonomy for all members of society, 
that such an endeavor would surely entail the kind of state intervention (like mandatory 
                                                           
62 The same can be said for Spinner-Halev.  Spinner-Halev, 2008: 567-72.   
63 Crowder, 2004; Crowder, 2007; Okin, 2002; Weinstock, 2009.   
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school attendance until the age of sixteen) that tolerationists are unwilling to endorse, and 
that not even this avowedly meaningful conception of exit offers sufficient protection for 
the rights of internal minorities.   
Crowder argues that in order to be free to leave one must have the capacity to 
overcome “informational, economic, and psychological” obstacles, and Galston seems to 
agree.64  Galston’s conditions demand awareness, rule out brainwashing, and would even 
disallow communal property arrangements which render exit economically infeasible.65  
Crowder also claims, however, that the capacity to overcome the obstacles to exit requires 
“the capacity to stand back from the group’s norms and to assess them critically—that is, the 
capacity for autonomous judgment.”66  He says that the exercise of the right to exit—
meaning any meaningful right to exit, including Galston’s own—is contingent upon the 
capacity for independent judgment and that “[t]o be capable of independent judgment is to 
be autonomous.”67   
The claim isn’t that Galston’s conditions do not amount to a meaningful right to 
exit, but that because they do, they are indistinguishable from the promotion of robust 
autonomy.  The point for the autonomists is that the good faith application of Galston’s 
conditions actually yields results that Galston would himself reject.  Weinstock, for instance, 
discusses the case of minority groups like the Amish living in the context of modern 
societies.  He assumes that Galston’s knowledge conditions are satisfied without the need for 
any state action simply by virtue of the conditions of modern life and the ubiquity of the 
                                                           
64 Crowder, 2007: 128; Galston, 2002; Galston, 2006a.   
65 Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005; Galston, 2006a.   
66 Crowder, 2007: 128.   
67 Crowder, 2004: 12.   
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mainstream liberal society, but contends that the remaining conditions will surely require 
substantial state intervention.  Weinstock argues that it is precisely because groups cannot 
adequately regulate the awareness of options that they construct a host of “material, 
epistemic and psychological barriers” in order to prevent their members from (1) being in a 
position to assess the options as something conceivable for them, and (2) being in a position 
to participate effectively in those ways of life.68   
Okin echoes Weinstock’s sentiments regarding the capacity, psychology, and fitness 
conditions (or he echoes hers) and also questions the satisfaction of the knowledge 
conditions.  She wonders how a girl, educated in a sheltered setting on the basis of a 
curriculum understood to reflect the received will of God that informs her that the proper 
role of a woman is to be an obedient wife and full-time mother, can “be said to be ‘aware 
of…alternatives’ in any meaningful way, to be able to ‘assess these alternatives’ (or even to 
think it desirable to do so), or to be able to ‘participate effectively’ in other roles or ways of 
life?”69  It is precisely because groups are permitted to limit the autonomy of their members 
that such groups do not satisfy Galston’s conditions for a realistic right to exit.70   
In order to address the kind of scenario that Okin describes, Weinstock claims that a 
tolerationist like Galston must authorize a number of far-reaching intrusions by the state, 
not the least of which is a compulsory educational program aimed specifically at 
“counterbalancing many of the teachings and ethical dispositions inculcated by teachers and 
parents within the community in question.”71  Tolerationists cannot stop at ensuring that all 
                                                           
68 Weinstock, 2009.   
69 Okin, 2002: 226.   
70 Okin, 2002: 226; Weinstock, 2009.   
71 Weinstock, 2009.  
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children are aware of alternatives, but would have to “present the community’s vision of the 
proper role of women as false” and somehow “put in place mechanisms whereby the 
psychological and motivational hold of the community upon children is lessened…”72  The 
bottom line, then, is that a demand for the conditions required for a realistic right to exit is 
indistinguishable from a demand for robust autonomy, and robust autonomy requires the 
provision of a considerable education in the practice of reasoned critical reflection as well as 
the cultivation of an attitude of revisability, neither of which is consistent with Galston’s 
stance vis-à-vis non-liberal groups like the Amish.73   
The critics of tolerationism also argue that a realistic right to exit is not the only 
justification for the promotion of robust autonomy, and that the promotion of robust 
autonomy is not the only justification for interfering with the practices of non-liberal groups.  
The claims, made by Okin and echoed by Crowder and Weinstock, are (1) that “a realistic 
right of exit is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for genuine freedom” and (2) that 
the liberal state has reason to promote liberal ideals like autonomy, equality, and democracy 
even where a right to exit has been substantively guaranteed.74  A right to exit, no matter 
how substantive and realistic, is never enough because the right to exit is no help to those 
oppressed members of non-liberal groups (often women and girls) who find themselves 
“deeply attached to their cultures but not to their oppressive aspects.”75  Thus the critics 
insist that tolerationists are wrong to think that a right to exit can justify oppressively illiberal 
practices and that the liberal state can stop short of promoting liberal ideals (like autonomy, 
                                                           
72 Weinstock, 2009.   
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74 Okin, 2002; Crowder, 2007; Weinstock, 2009.    
75 Okin, 2002: 226-7; see also, Crowder, 2007: 130; Weinstock, 2005: 238.   
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equality, and democracy) that enable group members to opt out of oppression even as they 
maintain their cultural attachments and identification.   
IV. Defending Galston and Tolerationism 
Galston’s critics are wrong to think that the truth of value pluralism leads to a preference 
for internally diverse cultures marked by robust autonomy and consisting of members who 
make their choices on the basis of reasoned critical reflection rather than conventional rules.  
His critics are also wrong to think that a meaningful right of exit is indistinguishable from 
robust autonomy and that groups lacking coercive power must promote liberal values like 
autonomy, democracy, and equality.  Finally, Galston’s critics are wrong to the extent that 
they believe that the values of autonomy and toleration are not in conflict and do not need 
to be balanced against one another.   
A. The Alleged Link Between Value Pluralism and the Preference for Internally 
Diverse Cultures 
Crowder claims (1) that an acknowledgement of the truth of value pluralism implies 
a principle of respect for the plurality of human goods; (2) that the principle of respect for 
the plurality of human goods implies a preference for a liberal society that is itself plural and 
that also ensures that the cultures or groups that it is home to are themselves internally 
diverse; (3) that internally diverse cultures are made up of members who find themselves 
capable of developing “a variety of goods, virtues, and personal projects”; (4) that internally 
diverse cultures tend to be marked by a robust version of individual autonomy (one that is 
concerned with exposing members to many different ways of life and with cultivating a high 
capacity for reasoned critical reflection and an attitude of revisability); and (5) that the liberal 
state often has reason (though perhaps not definitive reason) for intervening in the affairs of 
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groups which do not facilitate the cultivation of such a version of autonomy on their own.76  
His “argument from diversity” is meant to show that liberal pluralists ought to promote 
cultures that are themselves liberal and dedicated to robust autonomy because promoting 
cultures like these is the only reasonable response to the truth of value pluralism and the best 
way to show respect for the plurality of human goods.  I question neither the truth of value 
pluralism nor the claim that it implies a principle of respect for the plurality of goods.  I do 
question, however, the view that the best way to exhibit respect for the plurality of goods is 
for the liberal state to demand or promote the universal adoption of the robust version of 
autonomy advocated by autonomists.   
The promotion of robust autonomy, rather than being a recipe for the expression of 
maximal respect for the plurality of human goods, would actually pave the way for 
(heightened) tyranny of the liberal monoculture.  In a society where all groups, in order to be 
seen as valid, must be liberal groups based on robust autonomy (and perhaps also internally 
democratic and egalitarian), the sum total of meaningfully distinct human goods that may be 
legitimately pursued diminishes rather than increases.  The range of meaningful diversity 
narrows as the pressure of liberal conformity increases, and the universal promotion of 
robust autonomy threatens to dilute, if not dissolve, many reasonable ways of interpreting 
and pursuing the human good.77 
The autonomist response to this line of argument is to say that the concern regarding 
dissolution merely amounts, in Crowder’s words, “to the familiar conservative sentiment that 
                                                           
76 Crowder, 2007.   
77 See, e.g. Galston, 1999b: 875 (“…if we insist that each civil association mirror the principles of the 
overarching political community, meaningful differences among associations all but disappear; constitutional 
uniformity crushes social pluralism.”); Galston, 2002; Galston, 2005; Spinner-Halev, 2000: 68; Spinner-Halev, 
2005; Spinner-Halev, 2008; Thunder, 2009.   
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any cultural change must mean destruction.”78  His point is that it isn’t the case that the 
imposition of robust autonomy will necessarily destroy non-liberal cultures and I don’t 
disagree.  But I also think that the unjustifiable diminishment of meaningful cultural diversity 
comes well before complete destruction.  Crowder is surely right that groups like the Amish 
would not necessarily disappear from the face of the Earth were their children required to 
attend public schools until the age of sixteen.  The culture might, in fact, adapt and evolve.  
But in so doing, something crucial to their conception of the good could be lost (this, at 
least, has been their concern and the basis for the Yoder litigation).  In order to pursue their 
way of life, the Amish seem to think it necessary to limit the exposure of their children to 
other ways of life (to the limited extent that they can) and to limit the degree of instruction 
in reasoned critical reflection and revisability that their children receive.  Notice that this 
does not mean that they wish to completely shelter their children from other ways of life 
(and they couldn’t even if they wanted to) or that they wish to completely stifle their capacity 
for critical reasoning and unforced choosing.  They would not deny their members 
autonomy per se, but they would wish to deny their members the robust version of 
autonomy associated with energetic and restless self-creation.  Under the autonomist 
model—a model in which each group within the liberal state is expected to provide or 
permit the facilitation of robust autonomy—the Amish lose the capacity to take an 
alternative path; they have no choice but to accept robust autonomy and become liberals 
themselves.   
The autonomist response at this point might be to wonder (as Crowder has) why the 
defenders of a valuable way of life would ever be afraid of subjecting it to critical reflection.79  
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I will have more to say about this later on in the chapter but for now I just want to say that 
groups like the Amish needn’t (and shouldn’t) reject critical reflection altogether.  Their 
desire to stifle the cultivation of what Swaine calls an attitude of revisability and a robustly 
self-reflective disposition is simply a function of their conception of the good and their 
minimally autonomous lifestyle, and not necessarily an indication of the disvalue of their way 
of life.  This is true because (1) they permit the facilitation of some critical reflection 
(enough, according to Galston, to make them satisfactory liberal democratic citizens80) and 
expect their members to actively choose to remain in the group, and because (2) they don’t 
necessarily restrict critical reflection for some insidious reason (like a concern that theirs isn’t 
really the best conception of the good) but, rather, because part of what they believe in may 
be the undesirability of engaging in energetic and restless self-creation.  That is, part of what 
they think is right and good may itself be the very unwillingness to think and act in 
accordance with some Enlightenment ideal, and the only way to really occupy a point of 
opposition to that ideal may be to refuse to engage in the very practices that make it a 
theoretical possibility.  It may be the case that pre-theoretical submission to the received will 
of God, for instance, and robust autonomy simply do not mix.  This is not because ways of 
life based on submission are necessarily lacking in value, but because at least some part of 
their value comes from something like a relaxation of the temptation to scrutinize certain 
features of one’s worldview.   
The autonomists, unsurprisingly, remain unconvinced.  Even were they to accept the 
claim that the universal demand for internally diverse liberal cultures would lead to a 
diminishment rather than an increase in meaningful diversity, they would continue to insist 
on robust autonomy.  Autonomy Liberals are not at all comfortable with “something like a 
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relaxation of the temptation to scrutinize certain features of one’s worldview,” and think it 
universally unwise for people to make important choices about their conceptions of the 
good and how they wish to conduct their lives on the basis of reasons that have not been 
fully scrutinized.81  According to them, acknowledgment of the truth of value pluralism and 
adherence to the principle of respect for the plurality of human goods leads the liberal 
pluralist to every one of the following conclusions:  (1) that each rationally and morally 
defensible way of life is just one out of many ways of life that are rationally and morally 
defensible; (2) that something significant (some defensible rival good) is lost when one 
chooses one way of life over all of the others; (3) that choosing between different ways of 
life is serious business; and (4) that the only way to take the activity of choosing between 
rival goods and ways of life seriously is to ensure that those who are making the choices are 
profoundly capable of subjecting their options to reasoned critical reflection and decidedly 
open to the conceivable need to revise their beliefs, attachments, and ends as appropriate.82  
What they are worried about is the possibility of the members of non-liberal groups making 
choices about how they wish to live their lives on the basis of conventional rules, because 
conventional rules reek of monism and monism is false.  In more concrete terms, 
autonomists worry that people who choose to remain within a particular way of life without 
possessing a profoundly experienced sense that their beliefs, attachments, and ends are 
revisable without too much difficulty do not choose wisely.  They worry, in short, about 
members (especially women and girls) choosing to remain without ever seriously comparing 
and evaluating the beliefs and practices of their group in light of the alternative beliefs and 
practices of other groups and the mainstream liberal society.   
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In responding to these concerns it is important to be clear about the nature of the 
tolerationist position I aim to defend.  Galston neither dismisses the seriousness of choosing 
between rival goods nor claims that citizens can choose wisely without any exposure to other 
ways of life or without any capacity to reflect critically upon their options.  What he says, and 
what I aim to defend, is (1) that defensible ways of life needn’t reflect a conscious awareness 
of the truth of value pluralism; (2) that groups needn’t maximize the exposure of their 
members to alternative ways of life; and, (3) that groups needn’t maximize the capacities of 
their members for critical reflection (let alone cultivate an attitude of revisability).   
According to Galston, to hold that groups ought to reflect a conscious awareness of 
the truth of value pluralism “is to affirm what value pluralism denies—the existence of a 
universally dominant value.”83  Liberal pluralists know (or think) that value pluralism is true, 
but they have no reason to believe that truth itself qualifies as a “universally dominant 
value.”  That is to say, they are not justified in claiming that those who subscribe to ways of 
life based on (what they take to be) illusion are any less entitled to their particular 
conceptions of the good.  Nothing about an acknowledgement of the truth of value 
pluralism commits one to the conclusion that there is anything invalid about the many non-
liberal groups built around the sometimes monist and sometimes mechanical application of 
unshakeable conventional rules.   
Likewise, an acknowledgment of the truth of value pluralism does not commit one 
to the promotion of robust autonomy.  A liberal pluralist’s recognition of the difficult and 
serious nature of plural choice does not commit him to wanting to see that children are 
exposed to a great many different ways of life (especially given the pervasiveness of the 
mainstream liberal society), that they are rendered capable of the high degree of critical 
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reflection associated with robust autonomy, or that they are engendered with a self-reflective 
disposition and an attitude of revisability.  The liberal state ought not to concern itself with 
monists who don’t know the truth, with limitations on exposure to other ways of life that do 
not extend beyond some minimal threshold (a threshold significantly lower than the degree 
of exposure evident in the mainstream liberal society), or with limitations placed on the 
capacity for critical reflection that do not undermine the capacity for meaningful choice.  
Where the exact line ought to be drawn in terms of exposure and in terms of the minimal 
capacity for critical reflection is up for debate, but Galston is surely right to say that the 
appropriate line for a liberal pluralist falls well short of promoting not only the capacity for 
unforced and considered choices, but also the willingness to engage in energetic and restless 
self-creation.   
B. The Tolerationist Exit Rights Strategy Versus the Promotion of Robust 
Autonomy 
Liberal pluralists agree that “[n]ot to be to able to leave the group in which one has 
been raised for an alternative mode of life is a serious violation of the kind of freedom that is 
basic to liberalism,” and all autonomists and most tolerationists agree that “individuals must 
be not only formally free but substantively and more or less equally free to leave their 
religions or cultures of origin…”84  Among tolerationists, Galston endorses perhaps the 
“thickest” (most substantive) right to exit.85  As discussed above, he claims that in order to 
be meaningful a right to exit must satisfy four sets of conditions:  (1) knowledge conditions, 
(2) capacity conditions, (3) psychology conditions, and (4) fitness conditions.  The 
autonomist critics of Galston’s tolerationism tend not to quarrel with these four sets of 
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conditions.  In fact, they tend to find them “entirely plausible.”86  Where autonomists differ 
with Galston isn’t on account of the conditions for realistic exit that he endorses, but with 
(1) his belief that a realistic right of exit amounts to something less than robust autonomy, 
and (2) his belief that expressive liberty protects the ability of individuals and groups to live 
in ways that others would regard as unfree, non-autonomous, non-democratic, and 
inegalitarian.   
Galston’s response to the first concern is to say that the conditions required for a 
meaningful right to exit amount to a minimal rather than a robust version of autonomy.  He 
is (since at least 2005) willing to endorse a “modest conception of autonomy as freedom of 
choice”, but continues to reject the “strong autonomy” of the autonomists that tends to 
imply the necessity of “highly developed capacities for rational reflection, for self-criticism, 
and criticism of the norms and practices of one’s community.”87  Galston’s right to exit 
implies the facilitation of autonomy, but it is a modest or minimalist version of autonomy.  
Whatever degree of reasoned critical reflection is necessary for modest autonomy is so 
minimal that it is regularly satisfied by non-liberal and robust-autonomy-rejecting groups like 
the Amish, groups who “have demonstrated their capacity for critical reasoning in the ways 
that it is publicly reasonable to expect it.”88   
Galston is no doubt correct that space does exist for a modest conception of 
autonomy that falls well short of energetic and restless self-creation, but it is another 
question whether or not his conditions are in fact modest rather than robust.  In order to 
comprehensively defend the modest character of Galston’s version of autonomy, it would be 
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necessary to detail the ways in which groups like the Amish satisfy his conditions without, in 
so doing, cultivating robust autonomy.  It seems clear enough that the knowledge conditions 
are satisfied by the Amish and “all but the most isolated minority groups living in the 
context of modern societies,” and that the real dispute emerges only when it comes to the 
capacity, psychological, and fitness conditions.89  The autonomist claim is that in order to 
satisfy these conditions the liberal state would have to “counteract the epistemic and 
motivational obstacles that groups routinely, and quite rationally put in place to retain 
membership” and “put in place a compulsory educational program with an avowedly 
perfectionist agenda, aimed at counterbalancing many of the teachings and ethical 
dispositions inculcated by teachers and parents within the community in question.”90  As the 
autonomists see it, there is no way to ensure the capacity, psychology, and fitness conditions 
without massive state intervention in the interest of promoting robust autonomy.   
My reading of Galston’s conditions also suggests significant involvement and activity 
on the part of the liberal pluralist state, but it certainly does not suggest anything like the 
need to counteract the epistemic and motivational obstacles erected by groups, or the 
intentional counterbalancing of group teachings and ethical dispositions.91  Galston says that 
group members must have the ability to assess alternatives and in order to guarantee such a 
capacity the state needn’t directly counteract epistemic and motivational obstacles or 
counterbalance group teachings and ethical positions.  And the same can be said for the 
psychology and fitness conditions, since the satisfaction of these conditions does not imply 
education in support of an attitude of revisability and a self-reflective disposition.  That 
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certain people are members of monist groups that follow conventional rules does not mean 
that they are subject to imprisonment or brainwashing, and this is all that Galston is ruling 
out with his conditions.  It is not his intention to eliminate all of the pressure to stay, but 
simply to ensure that people have the meaningful capacity to choose to leave and the 
physical, economic, and logistical capacity to follow through with that decision.  These 
conditions do not imply teaching children that their way of life is wrong or serving up 
reasons for them to leave; they just necessitate ensuring (1) that they are aware of some 
alternative options; (2) that they can choose between those options; and (3) that they can 
make a reasonably successful move when the time is right.   
C. The Non-Democratic and Inegalitarian Internal Practices of Non-Liberal 
Groups 
Autonomists claim both that a realistic right to exit is insufficient to justify illiberal 
practices, and that the liberal state has reason to promote liberal ideals like autonomy, 
democracy, and equality even where exit has been substantively guaranteed.  They think that 
tolerationists like Galston and Spinner-Halev go too far when they tolerate groups that do 
not promote particular liberal ideals even when this toleration is limited to groups that lack 
coercive power and do nothing to undermine a realistic right to exit.  The exit rights strategy 
does not work, the autonomists say, because the citizens of the liberal state must be able to 
affirm their identities and remain in their groups without thereby subjecting themselves to 
“oppression”.92 
The real issues here are (1) what counts as oppression, and (2) what is the proper 
role of the liberal state?  The autonomists call it oppression when, for instance, girls are 
raised within a religious community that teaches them to believe that God’s intention is for 
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them to be obedient daughters, sisters, wives, and mothers, and they contend that that 
oppression remains even when members are substantively free to leave.  Women are 
oppressed when their groups practice private discrimination, and this oppression is not 
eliminated by a realistic right to exit because even with that guarantee they are still faced with 
the unconscionably tragic choice between their cultural identities and their right to equal 
treatment.  The same is presumably true when group members must choose between their 
cultural identities and their rights to live strongly autonomous lives and to live free of non-
democratic procedures.   
Tolerationists recognize how difficult it must be to choose between one’s identity 
and one’s fondness for liberal values, but they fail to see how this difficulty implicates the 
liberal state.93  For them the women in the example are not at all oppressed, first, because 
their groups lack the power to compel them to follow the rules or even to stay on as 
members and, second, because if they decide to leave they have a place to go—they can 
enter any number of liberal groups or simply enter the mainstream liberal society itself.94  As 
the tolerationists see it, a properly restrained liberal state permits its citizens to associate with 
whomever they please and to subject themselves to whatever non-coercive rules they wish to 
follow so long as they remain free to change their minds (and this is true even though the 
decision to leave may be unbelievably difficult and even though some members certainly 
may wish that their groups would just go ahead and liberalize).   
To side with the autonomists would be to permit certain liberal values to crowd out 
other liberal and non-liberal values alike.  If we demand that all groups promote autonomy, 
democracy, and equality, we thereby undercut the liberal citizen’s right to associate with 
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other people who reject those values in favor of others.  Such a move is at odds both with 
the liberal conception of freedom and with liberal pluralist respect for the diversity of goods, 
because it places unreasonable constraints on the right to associate and on the pursuit of 
reasonable non-liberal conceptions of the good.  The right to associate and the principle of 
respect for the plurality of goods do not obligate the liberal state to deny the importance of 
autonomy, democracy, and equality, or to accommodate the pursuit of every conceivable 
conception of the good.  But they do mean that the state mustn’t undermine the practices of 
non-liberal groups that satisfy some reasonable moral minimum (no physical or 
psychological harm and a decent education for starters), especially when (1) those groups 
lack the coercive power to compel obedience to their rules or to prevent their members 
from leaving, and when (2) departing group members are welcomed by other liberal groups 
and by the mainstream liberal society.     
D. Liberal Toleration and the Alleged Commitment to Robust Autonomy 
Recall that Kymlicka distinguishes between the modus vivendi form of toleration associated 
with the Otttoman millet system and the autonomy-based form of toleration that he 
associates with liberalism.  He also claims (1) that liberal toleration, unlike modus vivendi 
toleration, recognizes a “principle of individual liberty of conscience”95, (2) that liberalism 
“limits the power of illiberal groups to restrict the liberty of their members”96, and (3) that 
“[w]hat distinguishes liberal tolerance is precisely its commitment to autonomy—that is, the 
idea that individuals should be free to assess and potentially revise their existing ends.”97  
Kymlicka concludes both that “[n]o end is immune from…potential revision” and that 
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liberalism “is committed to (perhaps even defined by) the view that individuals should have 
the freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their 
community, should they come to see them as no longer worthy of their allegiance.”98 
I take it that much of what an autonomist like Kymlicka claims is also acceptable to 
tolerationists.  They can agree (1) that liberal toleration is distinguishable from modus vivendi 
toleration and recognizes a principle of individual liberty of conscience; (2) that liberalism 
limits the power of illiberal groups to restrict the liberty of their members; and (3) that 
liberalism is committed to the idea that individuals should be free to assess and potentially 
revise their existing ends.  The problem, from a tolerationist perspective, is that from (1)-(3) 
it does not follow (a) that liberalism is necessarily committed to the facilitation of robust 
autonomy, (b) that individuals should have the freedom and capacity to revise the traditional 
practices of their communities, or (c) that the values of autonomy and toleration are not in conflict 
with one another.   
Galston never claims that liberal pluralism entails a modus vivendi form of toleration, nor 
(ultimately) does he deny a role for minimal and balanced autonomy.99  He does claim, 
however, that the more autonomy you demand, the less tolerant you are, and he certainly 
does not agree that all individuals must find themselves capable of revising the traditional 
practices of their communities or think that none of their ends are immune from potential 
revision.  What liberalism recognizes is just what Kymlicka says it does, a “principle of 
individual liberty of conscience”, and liberalism is committed to just what he says it is, “the 
idea that individuals should be free to assess and potentially revise their existing ends.”100  
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None of this goes to show that autonomy does not conflict with toleration, that individuals 
must be so strongly autonomous that they recognize all of their ends as potentially subject to 
revision, or that individuals ought to find themselves in a position to demand (rather than to 
seek) egalitarian practices and democratic procedures from their groups.  All the liberal 
commitment to the principle of individual liberty of conscience makes clear is (1) that the 
maximization of toleration is incompatible with liberalism, and (2) that individuals must have 
the capacity to leave groups whose beliefs or practices are inconsistent with their 
consciences.  Both of these conclusions regarding liberty of conscience are wholly 
compatible with the tolerationist rejection of robust autonomy.  I have the right to leave 
groups whose beliefs and practices conflict with my conscience, and that is why the liberal 
pluralist state does not tolerate coercive groups.  But I cannot expect the liberal pluralist 
state to ensure that all or any groups will cater to my wishes.  Instead, the liberal pluralist 
state is designed to safeguard basic human rights and liberal purposes, maintain a 
mainstream society reflective of the full panoply of liberal values, and enable its citizens to 
possess and to pursue their conceptions of the good subject only to that foundational 
commitment to human rights and liberal purposes.      
V. Conclusion—The Conditions of Choice and the Right to Remain 
A. Some Problems With Robust Autonomy 
Crowder claims that “a way of life in which personal autonomy is encouraged is better 
from a pluralist point of view than one in which personal autonomy is stifled or 
neglected.”101  This is because he thinks that autonomy is required for a meaningful right to 
exit, because liberal values are essential for their own sake, and because making good choices 
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between competing values requires autonomy and an awareness of the truth of value 
pluralism.102  It should be noted again that the version of autonomy that Crowder and other 
autonomists have in mind is by no means minimal.  He endorses the superiority of the 
“substantially autonomous way of life” that is exemplified by Mill’s “celebration of 
individuality as the life of energetic and restless self-creation.”103  The autonomist version of 
liberal pluralism claims that an acceptance of the truth of value pluralism leads one to the 
conclusion that individuals are better off when they are quite strongly autonomous, when 
they are so conditioned toward a willingness to revise their ends that they are positively 
restless.  I do not accept this claim and submit that individuals unmarked by Millian104 
restlessness can indeed lead good lives.  I also claim, accordingly, that the liberal state ought 
to remain largely unconcerned with the practices of these minimally autonomous ways of 
life, recognizing that individuals have every right to ignore the truth of value pluralism, reject 
energetic and restless self-creation, and associate however they please above the basic 
threshold of human rights and liberal purposes.   
Robust autonomy is too robust because it overshadows other values and rules out ways 
of life that, though lacking in robust autonomy, are not at all bad.  Devout religious believers 
and committed secular humanists alike have every right to reject the imperative of energetic 
and restless self-creation, as well as the idea that their deeply held beliefs, dearest 
attachments, and most crucial ends are, as Kymlicka puts it, not immune from potential 
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revision.105  The autonomists may be right about the best way to live (always ready and 
willing to experiment and to change how one understands the world and lives, or something 
like that,) but they cannot prove that assertion, and there is at least some reason to believe 
that they may be quite wrong.  What, to use just one hypothetical example, can they say 
about a woman like Mother Theresa?  Can they say that her life was less well lived than it 
could have been because she never cultivated an attitude of revisability concerning her 
devotion to God and to care?106  Perhaps they would go that far, and perhaps they would be 
correct.  The claim isn’t that she definitely wouldn’t have been better off (I don’t think that I 
can prove that) but just that there surely seem to be any number of healthy and morally 
sound ways of living consistent with a thoroughgoing rejection of restless self-creation and 
an attitude of revisability.107  What is confusing and troubling about the autonomist position 
is the belief that every citizen who finds herself capable of revising her ends must also be 
energetic and restless about doing so.  “Experiments in living” might be a good idea for Mill and 
for others like him but that does not mean that liberals, especially liberal pluralists, should 
expect or even hope that everyone would live that way.   
An additional practical point to consider is that people cannot live these healthy and 
minimally autonomous lives if we insist that they become Mill-clones.  The state that 
imposes robust autonomy on its citizens (insofar as this is possible) rules out these ways of 
life, and the state that promotes robust autonomy (mostly, I suppose, through a particularly 
robust form of mandatory liberal civic education) makes it less likely that its citizens can 
pursue them.  The irony, then, is that the state that promotes robust autonomy actually 
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constrains the meaningful options of its citizens by constraining their constraints.108  By 
strongly encouraging experimentation and restless self-creation, the autonomist state 
minimizes the capacity of individuals to constrain themselves from pursuing particular lines 
of inquiry and from engaging in particular practices.  The strongly autonomous are taught to 
accept the truth of value pluralism and to cultivate a self-reflective disposition and an 
attitude of revisability.  Their only option is then to be open to being anything (and open to 
being something else after that, and so on) and they can’t ever definitively say “This is who I 
am, this is where I stand, and these are my everlasting beliefs, attachments, and ends.”  Thus 
the autonomist state is marked by a reduction rather than an increase in meaningful options 
because it says that all must be liberals, and it simply ignores the substantial advantages 
associated with lives of lasting devotion and the contented acceptance of traditional 
authority (or whatever we want to call the opposite of energetic and restless self-creation).   
It is also worth keeping in mind that not all experimentation is salutary, and that 
energetic and restless self-creation can bleed into anomie.109  The mainstream liberal societies 
of Western democracies seem to be chock-full of strongly autonomous individuals, but they 
(the societies and the people) are not without their problems.  In addition to robust 
autonomy (and I might argue because of it) we also find a whole host of social and personal 
ills, from avarice and consumerism, to substance abuse, depression, and social alienation.  
The liberal monoculture offers quick, easy, and pervasive instruction on instant gratification, 
but precious little on the goods that only come from restraint, and the individuals who might 
benefit from such restraint are to some extent simply out of luck.110  They can, of course, 
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join almost any group or association that they wish, but keep in mind that if the autonomists 
have their way all groups and associations will be as internally liberal as the liberal state itself, 
and that initiation into them will never be more than provisional because everyone will be 
taught not only that change is permitted but also that one ought to be constantly ready and 
restlessly disposed toward moving on.     
B. Choice is All About Having and Exercising Options, and One Option is Simply 
to Remain  
Liberal pluralists are pluralists because they believe that human values are 
“irreducibly multiple, frequently in conflict with one another, and sometimes 
incommensurable,” and they are liberals because they believe that liberalism is particularly 
well-suited to accommodate the plurality of human values.  The reason why liberalism is 
well-suited to the truth and practical fact of value pluralism is that, when well-conceived, it 
offers individuals the chance to possess and to pursue a range of conceptions of the good so 
wide that it is bounded only by considerations of basic human rights and liberal purposes.111  
Liberalism, properly understood, permits individuals to associate however they please, so 
long as they neither break general laws nor undermine anyone’s realistic right to exit.   
The best conception of liberal pluralism, then, is the one that offers the highest 
number of meaningfully different reasonable options without sacrificing basic human rights 
or liberal purposes.  I claim that the tolerationist version of liberal pluralism better satisfies 
this criterion, because it more comprehensively permits individuals to remain as well as to 
exit, and to live lives of lasting devotion and contented acceptance of traditional authority 
(one pole) as well as lives of energetic and restless self-creation (the other pole) and 
everything in between.  Minimal autonomy is better, more meaningful, and more in line with 
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value pluralism, because it always offers the individual the chance to constrain herself (or to 
remain constrained) as well as the option to cultivate an attitude of revisability and a self-
reflective disposition.112   
Tolerationists protect a larger set of options by simply guaranteeing the conditions of 
choice.  Every individual is as free to leave as she is to stay, and for most tolerationists 
(Kukathas excluded113) this freedom includes a substantive dimension.  It means that even 
the Amish must satisfy (or permit the state to satisfy) Galston’s knowledge, capacity, 
psychology, and fitness conditions, or something very much like them.  And this, in turn, 
means that every member of the Amish community will have the capacity, though quite often 
not the willingness, to revise his or her ends.  This is both just enough and just right.  Any 
more in the way of imposed autonomy, and we make it difficult for people to pursue certain 
worthwhile forms of life; any less in the way of autonomy and we allow groups to become 
prisons.  The focus ought to be on the conditions of choice—the background conditions 
required for making considered choices between alternatives and for the capacity to leave 
one’s group—and it should be left up to the individual whether or not he or she wishes to 
engage in energetic and restless self-creation or to follow another path.   
Toleration Liberals take seriously the need to balance liberal values (values like 
freedom and equality, autonomy and toleration), and they are right to claim that these values 
needn’t be endorsed by all of the groups within the liberal state.  They rely instead on an exit 
rights strategy that is quite distinct from the promotion of robust autonomy, in that it 
focuses not on cultivating a willingness to engage in energetic and restless self-creation, but 
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on securing the minimal degree of autonomy that is required for unforced and considered 
choosing.  This liberal strategy is most in line with the philosophical truth and the practical 
reality of value pluralism, because it safeguards maximal diversity and does so without 
sacrificing human well-being.   
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CHAPTER 2:  LIBERAL PLURALISM AND DEMOCRATIC 
PERSUASION 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter consists of a liberal pluralist critique of the practice of democratic 
persuasion and a proposal for a restrained version of the practice that appropriately balances 
liberal values and better accommodates the plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good.  
Democratic persuasion is the main practice associated with Corey Brettschneider’s theory of 
“value democracy” and refers to both “the process of defending the values of free and equal 
citizenship” and the liberal state’s efforts “to convince citizens to adopt the democratic 
values of freedom and equality as their own.”114  Liberal pluralism, for its part, is a 
conception of liberalism endorsed by those who accept the “truth of value pluralism” 
(roughly, the idea that human values are “irreducibly multiple, frequently in conflict with one 
another, and sometimes incommensurable”115) and the claim that liberalism is particularly 
well-suited to accommodate the plurality of human values.116  Liberal pluralists are very 
much concerned with minimizing the state’s interference with the practices of individuals, 
groups, and organizations, but have not had much occasion to weigh-in on democratic 
persuasion.  The goal of this chapter is to fill in that gap and to advance the claims (1) that 
liberal pluralism, though it is consistent with the practice of democratic persuasion, is not 
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consistent with the aggressive view of democratic persuasion endorsed by Brettschneider, 
and (2) that liberals have good reason to prefer an alternative, restrained, and distinctly 
pluralist view of democratic persuasion.   
A. Civic Equality and the Theory of Value Democracy 
Brettschneider’s Persuasive State is explicitly designed to combat hateful and 
discriminatory viewpoints in the way that it speaks, spends, and educates even as it continues 
to defend “robust rights of free speech, religion, and association.”117  The viewpoints held 
and practices engaged in by members of hate groups and discriminatory organizations are 
verbally criticized in public and in the context of childhood education, and they are also 
disfavored by the government when it comes to direct funding and tax breaks.118  Implicit in 
the justification for democratic persuasion are the assumptions (1) that realization of the 
ideal of free and equal citizenship is contingent upon citizens adopting democratic values as 
their own and (assuming we are prepared to grant this first assumption) (2) that democratic 
persuasion is, at worst, a very important and not-too-problematic tool for achieving the 
substantive guarantee of free and equal citizenship.  While I do not question much of the 
reasoning behind these two assumptions, I do think that the issue is more nuanced than it at 
first it appears.  Though it is true that free and equal citizenship cannot be substantively 
guaranteed if too few citizens endorse democratic values, and that the liberal state has an 
important role to play in seeing that the citizenry’s endorsement of those values never falls to 
unsafe levels, it is also important to keep in mind (1) that there are costs associated with 
democratic persuasion and (2) that it is doubtful that overtly hateful and discriminatory 
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viewpoints are (at least at present) the biggest threats to the realization of the ideal of free 
and equal citizenship.   
Brettschneider’s theory of value democracy is justifiably concerned with defending civic 
equality against hateful and discriminatory challenges, and thereby contributing to the 
realization of the ideal of free and equal citizenship for all citizens.  His aggressive 
conception of democratic persuasion is problematic, however, because it threatens liberal 
values other than equality (like tolerance, freedom of conscience, freedom of association, 
and the right to privacy), threatens to diminish both the appeal and the effectiveness of 
liberalism, and is largely unconcerned with truly major (but far less overt) obstacles to free 
and equal citizenship like institutional racism, institutional sexism, and profound 
socioeconomic inequalities.   
The theory of value democracy goes both too far and not far enough.  It goes too far in 
the sense that aggressive democratic persuasion fails to reflect the realities (1) that promoting a 
conformity of viewpoints regarding civic equality often comes at the expense of maintaining 
liberal tolerance, (2) that liberal society is largely unthreatened by the presence of a not 
overwhelming number of non-liberal groups, (3) that liberals can expect more of a 
reactionary than an assimilatory response from non-liberal groups whose views are openly 
and forcefully criticized in public and in the context of mandatory civic education, and (4) 
that stimulating a reactionary response is counterproductive—the non-liberal groups 
immersed within liberal societies will be less rather than more likely to want to liberalize if 
they are made to feel unwelcome and that their values are under attack.  And the practice of 
democratic persuasion (aggressive or otherwise) also does not go far enough in the sense 
that merely encouraging people to be less overtly racist and discriminatory does almost 
nothing to address the examples of institutional racism, institutional sexism, and 
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socioeconomic inequalities that not only pose what I take to be the most serious threats to 
equal citizenship but also persist with the tacit and insidious approval of a great many well-
meaning citizens who aren’t themselves overtly racist, sexist, or classist.   
B. Liberal Pluralism and Liberal Purposes 
William Galston’s “tolerationist” brand of liberal pluralism is marked by a “principle 
of expressive liberty” that justifies the nature and delineates the bounds of the liberal 
accommodation of plural values and diverse ways of living.  The principle of expressive 
liberty amounts to “a robust though rebuttable presumption in favor of individuals and 
groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in 
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value,” and that 
further “implies a corresponding presumption (also rebuttable) against external interference 
with individual and group endeavors.”119  Liberalism, guided by the principle of expressive 
liberty, is optimally tolerant—it permits the flourishing of diverse forms of life, liberal and 
non-liberal alike, “constrained only by the ineliminable requirements of liberal social 
unity.”120  In particular, expressive liberty “protects the ability of individuals and groups to 
live in ways that others would regard as unfree,” and permits groups to take measures to 
prevent their members from accepting liberal values so long as they break no general laws 
and their members remain substantively free to leave.121   
Tolerationist liberal pluralists like Galston and Jeff Spinner-Halev oppose the liberal 
state’s promotion of the robust conception of autonomy associated with what George 
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Crowder calls “restless and energetic self-making”122 and agree that “[t]here is no liberal or 
democratic reason to insist that voluntary associations are democratic or egalitarian.”123  
They agree that the liberal state can and ought to tolerate inegalitarian and non-democratic 
groups that satisfy certain minimal standards (including a meaningful right to exit) because 
freedom of association guarantees liberal citizens the right to opt into or to remain within 
lifestyles and groups that are consistent with their consciences.124  And they believe that to 
insist that such groups must themselves be “internally diverse” and liberal is to improperly 
elevate certain liberal values (like autonomy, democracy, and equality) over others (like 
freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and the right to privacy), cut down on the 
meaningful choices available to the citizens of the liberal state, and undermine many of the 
beneficial attributes associated with a vibrant and diverse civil society.125  
Liberal pluralists aim to keep interference with group practices to a minimum, but 
also think that interference is always justified in order to further the so-called “liberal 
purposes” that undergird the unity, structure the institutions, guide the policies, and define 
the public virtues of the liberal pluralist state.126  For example, the liberal pluralist state may 
legitimately interfere with group practices in order to protect human life, to protect and to 
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promote the normal development of basic capacities, and to safeguard the development of 
“social rationality”.127  This means not only that the state ought to refrain from restricting 
group practices unless they conflict with liberal purposes, but also (1) that the state ought 
not to impose its liberal values on groups through other means (like democratic persuasion) 
except to further liberal purposes, and, (2) that the state ought to tailor the interference 
associated with democratic persuasion in favor of certain liberal values in such a way that it 
does not undermine other ones.  Tailoring interference so as to minimize conflict with other 
liberal values requires a kind of balancing of values that both warns against and prohibits a 
conception of democratic persuasion so aggressive that it consistently prioritizes promoting 
egalitarian dispositions over accommodating the expression of a wide and diverse range of 
reasonable conceptions of the good.  
C. Liberal Pluralism and Democratic Persuasion 
The aggressive democratic persuasion of value democracy does (from a liberal 
pluralist perspective) exactly what it must not do.  It (1) imposes liberal values on non-liberal 
groups even when their practices neither violate nor threaten the pursuit of liberal purposes, 
and (2) fails to tailor justified persuasion such that it does not undermine freedom of 
conscience, freedom of association, or the right to privacy.  The problem is not with 
democratic persuasion, per se, but with thinking that aggressive persuasion is sufficiently 
tolerant toward non-liberals and that democratic persuasion, aggressive or otherwise, is 
sufficient to secure the ideal of free and equal citizenship.  The solution, then, is not to 
simply jettison the notion of democratic persuasion, but rather to conceive of it in a more 
restrained and tolerant way, and to be very clear about the limited role that it plays in 
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securing the goal of equal citizenship.  My goal will be to introduce the possibility of such a 
restrained and explicitly pluralist version of democratic persuasion, one that contributes to 
the cultivation of good citizens without sacrificing liberal values other than equality or 
alienating the non-liberals within our midst who pose no serious threat to security or civic 
unity.   
II. Value Democracy 
A. Background and Definitions 
Brettschneider’s theory of value democracy (1) defends “robust rights of free speech, 
religion, and association” that require “the state to refrain from coercively banning political 
viewpoints, religious groups, or civil associations,” and (2) underwrites both the state’s 
articulation of “the reasons that justify why rights should be respected in the first place” and 
the state’s efforts “to convince citizens to adopt the democratic values of freedom and 
equality as their own.”128  According to Brettschneider, the Persuasive State simultaneously 
avoids the specter of two dystopias, the Invasive State and the Hateful State.129  The Invasive 
State is a police state marked by authoritarian interventions on behalf of liberal values (e.g., 
banning hate speech and hate groups in order to enforce equality).  The Hateful State, on the 
other hand, maintains robust liberal rights protections and offers formal protections against 
racial discrimination, but its civil society is characterized by a discriminatory culture that 
treats minorities as inferior.  By protecting “robust rights of free speech, religion, and 
association”, articulating “the reasons that justify why rights should be respected in the first 
place”, and persuading “citizens to adopt the democratic values of freedom and equality as 
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their own,” the Persuasive State restrains itself even as it combats the hateful and 
discriminatory viewpoints that challenge its stability and legitimacy.   
1. Reflective Revision and Democratic Persuasion 
Value democracy holds that the citizens of the liberal state are under an obligation not 
only to reflect upon the values of free and equal citizenship that justify their rights, but also 
to both transform their own hateful or discriminatory viewpoints and encourage other 
citizens to do so as well.130  Brettschneider calls this practice “reflective revision”.  When 
citizens find themselves unwilling to transform their hateful or discriminatory viewpoints on 
their own, the Persuasive State is likewise obligated to convince them to transform those 
beliefs.131  Brettschneider calls this practice “democratic persuasion”.   
2. The Principle of Public Relevance   
The focus of reflective revision and democratic persuasion is on so-called “publicly 
relevant beliefs and practices,” meaning those beliefs and practices that “conflict with” the 
ideal of free and equal citizenship.132  While no beliefs and only certain practices are properly 
subject to the state’s coercive intervention, many beliefs (those that conflict with the ideal of 
free and equal citizenship) are properly subject to an individual’s own reflective self-criticism, 
the criticism of her fellows, and the criticism of the liberal state.  Hate groups that do not 
commit crimes but “express an ideology that opposes the idea of equality,” and families that 
do not abuse their children but raise their girls to feel inferior to their boys, are at once 
justifiably exempt from coercive intervention and appropriate targets for reflective revision 
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and democratic persuasion.133  The personal beliefs and actions of groups, families, and 
individuals, no matter how private, “should be in accordance with public values” because 
such beliefs and practices “can impact the norms of free and equal citizenship” by 
“affect[ing] the ability of citizens to function in society and to see others as free and equal 
citizens.”134   
3. The Ideal of Free and Equal Citizenship 
The ideal of free and equal citizenship itself “centers around the political ideal that all 
citizens have equal status under law” and entails what Brettchneider calls an “anti-caste 
principle:  to affirm the ideals of free and equal citizenship, we must reject the idea that some 
citizens are to be regarded as second class.”135  Free and equal citizenship is inconsistent with 
“[b]eliefs that relegate women, minorities, or other groups to second-class citizenship” and 
with support for “public discrimination, such as in education and employment.”136  Groups 
like the American Nazi Party, the Ku Klux Klan, and other hate groups challenge the ideal 
of equal citizenship in at least one of the following senses:  “they deny that all citizens 
possess equal rights, they oppose recognizing equal citizenship of minorities or women, or 
they defend discrimination in education or employment.”137  As such they are proper targets 
for reflective revision and for democratic persuasion.   
Free and equal citizenship is also implausibly consistent with certain non-hateful and 
merely discriminatory viewpoints.  A family that raises its boys to be all that they can be and 
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merely prepares its girls for domestic tasks doesn’t necessarily support the public 
discrimination of women, but does hold beliefs that (according to Brettschneider) relegate 
women to second-class citizenship.  As such they, too, are proper targets for reflective 
revision and for democratic persuasion.138   
B. Democratic Persuasion 
1. The Need for Active Criticism 
It is important that challenges to the ideal of equal citizenship are actively criticized not 
only by citizens but often also by the state, in order (1) to clarify the non-compatibility of 
specific hateful or discriminatory viewpoints with the ideal of free and equal citizenship, (2) 
to avoid the appearance of complicity that may result from the state’s protection of the 
expression of hateful or discriminatory viewpoints, and (3) to safeguard the stability and 
legitimacy of the democratic regime.139  It is important that citizens are made aware that a 
policy like “separate but equal”, for instance, is not compatible with equal citizenship (non-
compatibility), and that the state actively opposes the hateful and discriminatory viewpoints 
of hate groups even while it protects their rights to association, expression, and assembly 
(non-complicity).  It is likewise a matter of public concern when citizens’ beliefs conflict with 
the ideal of free and equal citizenship, because such views are “problematic from a 
democratic point of view.”140  They are problematic from a democratic point of view (a) 
because such beliefs lack democratic congruence—there exists “a lack of agreement between 
the egalitarian principles behind the laws and the discriminatory beliefs that citizens actually 
hold”—and in that way threaten the legitimacy of the democratic regime (the argument from 
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democratic congruence), (b) because private beliefs are often interconnected with public 
outcomes (the argument from interconnection), and (c) because “[r]egardless of what the law 
formally states, the law is carried out by public officials and bureaucrats who will often be 
influenced by their own beliefs” (the argument from public trust).141   
 Consider, for instance, a father and school board member who votes in favor of 
equal funding for girls’ and boys’ sports programs, says publicly “not only that all citizens 
should be treated equally on the basis of gender, but that equal access to sports is essential to 
girls’ ability to compete, and the ability to compete is essential to future citizenship,” and 
then “forbids his own daughters from participating in sports because of his belief, as a 
father, that girls should be confined to learning domestic tasks.”142  Brettschneider says that 
the board member’s decisions within his own family are publicly relevant because 
“participation in sports is an important way that girls learn to compete, and this skill is 
important to achieving success and equality in adult life.”143  His decisions are also 
“problematic from the standpoint of equal citizenship” for reasons of democratic 
(in)congruence, interconnection, and public trust.144  They are democratically incongruent 
“because he denies in his personal decision the same values and arguments that he has 
endorsed publicly.”145  They are also interconnected with public outcomes in the sense that 
they have the potential to undermine his daughters’ “chances to attain real-life equal 
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citizenship.”146  And, finally, his private decisions are problematic from the perspective of 
public trust because the beliefs they reflect may weaken his public protection (as a school 
board member) of the ideal of free and equal citizenship.147  
 It follows that the board member’s private decisions are appropriate targets for 
active criticism, at least in the form of self-criticism and critique by fellow citizens.  
Brettschneider stops short of directly saying that the board member’s private decisions 
should also be subject to criticism by the state.  He does say that “public scrutiny of the 
family and civil society using expression is consistent with protections against coercive 
intervention into those domains.”148  But he also reserves democratic persuasion for “clear 
cases in which citizens have failed to incorporate an ideal of equal citizenship.”149  I take this 
to mean that if the board member’s decisions are implausibly consistent with equal 
citizenship—as Brettschneider seems to think they are, in that he entertains no 
counterarguments150—then his private decisions regarding his daughters’ (non-)participation 
in sports should also be criticized by the Persuasive State in the event that reflective revision 
fails to change his mind.151 
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2. The Forms of Persuasion 
Perhaps it is the case that the school board member forbids his daughters from 
playing sports for religious reasons, and that he and they are members of a religious 
community or group that shares his particular viewpoint regarding the education of girls.  
The group’s viewpoint regarding the participation of girls in non-domestic tasks may coexist 
with many other less controversial viewpoints and practices, including some that a value 
democrat might agree reinforce (or at least do not challenge) the ideal of free and equal 
citizenship.  A group like this is properly subject to persuasion in the form of targeted 
criticism rather than outright condemnation.  In such a case the state would criticize the 
discriminatory viewpoint while avoiding censuring the group as a whole (or perhaps even 
avoid direct confrontation altogether and simply signal its critique in the context of the 
general promulgation of the reasons and arguments for rights).152  A hate group like the Ku 
Klux Klan, on the other hand, warrants persuasion in the form of outright condemnation 
because the entire reason why groups like the Klan exist is to oppose equal citizenship status 
and equal protection under the law.153  
3. The Limitations on Persuasion 
The Persuasive State is obligated to observe both a “means-based” and a “substance-
based” limit on democratic persuasion.  Value democracy “requires that the state not pursue 
the transformation of citizens’ views through any method that violates fundamental rights, 
such as freedom of expression, conscience, and association” (the means-based limit), and not 
to “seek to transform all inegalitarian beliefs, but only those that challenge the ideal of free 
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and equal citizenship” (the substance-based limit).154  For example, the state, meaning in this 
case individual U.S. Senators, was right to publicly criticize then-nominee Samuel Alito for 
his membership in a discriminatory Princeton University alumni group without taking steps 
“to coercively prohibit the beliefs they criticized.”155  The state was right to criticize because 
the views imputed to Alito are incompatible with the ideal of free and equal citizenship 
(satisfying the substance-based limit), and right to limit its response to a non-coercive 
critique (satisfying the means-based limit).156   
4. The Manner of Persuasion  
a. The State as Speaker 
The Persuasive State engages in expressive criticism of hateful and discriminatory 
viewpoints in an effort to promote the egalitarian values of free and equal citizenship.  
Public officials157 criticize viewpoints that are inconsistent with political equality directly, 
through celebrations, and through apologies.  Examples of direct criticism include the 
aforementioned Senatorial criticism of nominee Alito; judicial criticism of the discriminatory 
religious doctrine promoted by city councilmen in the case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. City of Hialeah158; Mayor Bloomberg’s criticism of anti-Muslim animus associated with the 
construction of the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque”159; and perhaps also President 
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Obama’s statement that he thinks that same-sex couples “should be able to get married.”160  
Celebrations include Martin Luther King Day and the construction of public monuments to 
honor the civil rights movement.161  And apologies include President Clinton’s apology for 
the Tuskegee syphilis study, along with the subsequent funding of a public memorial for the 
victims of the study and a National Center for Bioethics in Research and Health Care at 
Tuskegee University.162  Through these methods (and perhaps others as well), the Persuasive 
State speaks in an effort to articulate the reasons for rights and to convince its citizens to 
adopt the values of freedom and equality as their own.   
b. The State as Educator 
The Persuasive State also persuades as it educates.  It compels children to attend 
school and promotes democratic values (1) through instruction in the reasons for rights by 
means of non-neutral instruction on topics like the civil rights movement, the women’s 
movement, the gay rights movement, and the Holocaust, and (2) through efforts (a) to instill 
respect for basic liberal values (and to encourage reflection and debate regarding hard cases), 
(b) to transform religious beliefs that are at odds with the underlying values of democracy, 
(c) to dissuade children from endorsing racism, and (d) to “stress how some institutional 
arrangements and some decisions within the family threaten women’s equal citizenship.”163  
Parents remain free “to express their views freely to their children, even when those views 
are opposed to the core values of free and equal citizenship,” but “there is no parental right 
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to exclude children from democratic persuasion, and parents can be coerced to the extent 
necessary to ensure that their children receive schooling and are exposed to democratic 
persuasion.”164   
c. The State as Spender  
Lastly, the Persuasive State also speaks when it uses “financial means to promote the 
values of free and equal citizenship.”165  State promotion of free and equal citizenship takes 
the form of direct expenditures (the “funding of public education, civics curricula, and 
monuments”), grants to private organizations for the purpose of subsidizing activities with a 
public benefit, and special tax privileges for non-profits.166  The Persuasive State is under an 
affirmative obligation not to fund hateful or discriminatory groups that challenge the ideal of 
free and equal citizenship.167  The Persuasive State would be right, for instance, to refuse to 
recognize and fund a law school student group that discriminates against homosexuals, right 
to condition funding for adoption services on a group’s willingness to facilitate adoptions by 
gay couples, and right to deny non-profit tax-exempt status to a university that forbids 
interracial dating as well as advocacy for interracial marriage in the wider society.168  (It is 
worth noting here that the Persuasive State seemingly would not rescind the tax-exempt 
status of the Catholic church because its exclusion of women from the priesthood is not 
incompatible with equal citizenship for women, and though it does continue to preach 
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against homosexuality and oppose gay marriage, it does not “seek to dissuade gays and 
women from serving in public life…”169)   
III. Some Concerns Regarding the Persuasive State  
The Persuasive State of value democracy is bound to attract criticism from those 
theorists who accept “the logic of congruence” and from those theorists who accept “the 
logic of autonomy”.  “Muscular” democratic theorists like Brian Barry, Stephen Macedo, 
Susan Moller Okin, and Ian Shapiro often seem to accept the logic of congruence and argue 
that we should always resist compromising the democratic norms of fairness and equality, 
and that we should enforce the principles and practices that follow from these norms “in 
every sphere and ‘all the way down’.”170  They worry about the destabilizing impact of 
illiberal values, claiming with Macedo (1) that liberal citizens should be “alert to the 
possibility that religious imperatives, or even inherited notions of what it means to be a good 
parent, spouse, or lover, might in fact run afoul of guarantees of equal freedom,” and (2) that 
when confronted with such conflicts, liberal citizens should be “committed to honoring the 
public demands of liberal justice in all departments of their lives.”171  The most militant of 
these muscular democrats will be disappointed to see that the Persuasive State is not 
prepared to use coercion to enforce the values of free and equal citizenship.  While not 
endorsing the full-fledged Invasive State, they are prepared to claim that ideals like 
democracy, autonomy, and equality justify intrusive constraints on expressive liberty and 
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freedom of association.172  Their willingness to accept such constraints is often most 
apparent when it comes to court decisions that they endorse and reject.  Muscular 
democratic theorists tend to argue, for instance, that the Amish ought not to be permitted to 
remove their children from school before the age of sixteen (contra Wisconsin v. Yoder173), that 
groups like the Jaycees ought not to be able to exclude women (pro Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees174), that groups like the Boy Scouts ought not to be able to exclude gays (contra Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale175), that religious parents ought not to be able to exempt their 
children from learning about other cultures in public schools (pro Mozert v. Hawkins County 
Board of Education176), and that private schools ought not to be able to refuse to renew the 
contracts of pregnant teachers based on the religiously based belief that mothers with young 
children should not work outside the home (contra Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton 
Christian Schools, Inc.177).178 
At the other pole are those like Galston and Spinner-Halev who accept something like 
what Nancy Rosenblum calls the “logic of autonomy”.  They agree that public institutions 
should reflect the democratic norms of fairness and equality, but do not think that there is 
any good reason to insist that these norms also govern the autonomous spheres wherein we 
find relationships, families, groups, and associations.  They would presumably like to avoid 
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the Hateful State as well, but they reject heavy-handed efforts on the part of the state to 
prevent its emergence.  The most militant of these liberal pluralists (perhaps better called 
libertarian pluralists) will appreciate the restraint of the Persuasive State regarding coercion, 
but also disapprove of it (1) telling people how to run their relationships, families, groups, 
and associations, (2) indoctrinating children against the wishes of their parents, and (3) using 
its spending power to favor certain groups and disfavor others.179   
It is no wonder that the Persuasive State invites criticism from both sides of this debate, 
because it represents a laudable and useful effort to split the difference between the two.  
Brettschneider partially agrees with more and less muscular democrats like Macedo, Barry, 
and Okin among others, both in terms of their belief that liberal government needs support 
from liberal families and groups in order to survive, and in their contention that non-liberals 
must be transformed in order to maintain the requisite level of support for liberal values.180  
He also partially agrees with the liberal pluralists like Galston, Chandran Kukathas, and 
Spinner-Halev, however, in terms of their unwillingness to compel the transformation of 
non-liberals and this, in turn, leads him to a somewhat unique hybrid position that replaces 
(some) coercion with an aggressive form of persuasion in order to achieve the requisite 
degree of transformation without trampling upon civil liberties.181  In practical terms this 
means, for instance, that Brettschneider favors the muscular democratic position regarding 
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cases like Yoder and Mozert, but also seems to think that the Boy Scouts, rather than being 
compelled to accept gay members, ought merely to be subject to democratic persuasion.182   
There are at least two things we might doubt about Brettschneider’s seemingly 
reasonable effort to split the difference between congruence and autonomy.  The first has to 
do with the need for transformation itself, the second with the kind and extent of persuasion 
that is required in order to bring it about.  The proponent of democratic persuasion needs to 
show that transformation is truly required, that state-sponsored persuasion is required in order 
to bring it about, and that his conception of democratic persuasion is better than its rivals.  I 
for one am inclined to agree with Brettschneider and others that at least some 
transformation of non-liberal individuals and groups is continually required in order to 
maintain a liberal democracy, and that some kind and some degree of state-sponsored 
persuasion is required in order to achieve that result.  What I question, however, is whether 
Brettschneider’s conception of democratic persuasion is the best one that we can imagine.  I 
wonder how effective it is at bringing about transformation, and (whether or not it is 
particularly effective) I worry about the costs associated with it.  More specifically, (1) I 
doubt that hate groups and religious fundamentalists are a significant threat to liberal 
democracy in the United States; (2) I worry that direct, prominent, and continual state 
sponsored criticism of hate groups is more likely to operate as a form of free advertising for 
them, and as confirmation of their irrational fears about government conspiracies, than as a 
trigger for reflective revision on the part of their members or third parties; and (3) I worry 
that religious fundamentalists and other non-liberals will bristle, circle the wagons, and even 
radicalize in the face of direct, prominent, and continual state-sponsored criticism of their 
ways of life and compelled indoctrination of their children.   
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Given such doubts and worries I wonder whether or not there might a better way to 
achieve at least some of the ends that Brettschneider is after.  I suspect that it is possible for 
the liberal state to remain non-complicit with efforts to seriously undermine liberal values 
and avoid the Hateful State without engaging in a particularly aggressive form of democratic 
persuasion.  The restrained and liberal pluralist view of democratic persuasion that I will 
point towards in the next section should enable the liberal state to remain non-complicit 
with threats to equal citizenship, promulgate the reasons for rights, and gently persuade 
citizens to accept the value of free and equal citizenship that justifies those rights, while also 
balancing conflicting liberal values and supporting a vibrant and diverse civil society.  This 
liberal pluralist  version of democratic persuasion achieves these ends by moderating the 
persuasion in terms of tone and in terms of scope—both softening the manner of 
persuasion and reserving it for only those practices (practices reflective of hate and invidious 
discrimination) that truly threaten liberal purposes.   
A. The Limited Upside of Aggressive Persuasion 
Brettschneider distinguishes between “hateful” and “discriminatory” viewpoints, 
describes discriminatory viewpoints as “views that oppose or are inconsistent with the ideal 
of free and equal citizenship”, describes hateful viewpoints as extreme instances of 
discriminatory views, and claims that individuals “have no right to have their discriminatory 
or hateful views left unquestioned” by other citizens or by the state.183  Those who subscribe 
to hateful viewpoints “seek to bring about laws and policies that would deny the free and 
equal citizenship of racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, women, or groups defined by their 
                                                           
183 Brettschneider, 2012: 4.   
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sexual orientation,”184 and those who subscribe to discriminatory viewpoints presumably 
seek something less than this that nevertheless challenges or is implausibly consistent with 
the ideal of free and equal citizenship.  I mention these distinctions at the outset because 
Brettschneider doesn’t always (or even often) make clear which groups, practices, and beliefs 
are subject to criticism.  Nor does he clarify whether the criticism called for is merely 
reflective revision by citizens or also democratic persuasion by the state.   
It is clear enough, though, that groups like the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux 
Klan hold hateful viewpoints, in that “they deny that all citizens possess equal rights, they 
oppose recognizing the equal citizenship of minorities or women, or they defend 
discrimination in education or employment.”185  Such groups are obvious targets for 
reflective revision, state criticism, and even state condemnation.  They are the worst of the 
bunch because their views aren’t simply inegalitarian in a way that does not violate the ideal 
of free and equal citizenship, nor are they merely implausibly consistent with equal 
citizenship, but they are actually in direct opposition to the ideal.  They do not (simply) hold 
that minorities are metaphysically or theologically unequal, but instead claim that they are 
unequal in ways that are highly relevant to democratic citizenship.   
I’ll discuss my concerns about the application of aggressive democratic persuasion to 
merely discriminatory groups in the next sub-section, but for now I just want to question the 
need for and wisdom of aggressive state criticism and condemnation of hate groups.  My 
first, practical, concern is that aggressive persuasion may simply be overkill.  Hate groups like 
the Klan and the American Nazi Party are quite marginal and do not seem to pose any 
serious threat to liberal democracy.  Though the liberal state surely has an interest in 
                                                           
184 Brettschneider, 2012: 1.   
185 Brettschneider, 2012: 8.   
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opposing groups of this type, it seems that they have been and continue to be successfully 
combated through exposure to the moderating influence of liberal public institutions and 
what Spinner-Halev refers to as the “mainstream liberal society”186, through legislation, 
through the judicial system, and perhaps also through the kind of citizen-to-citizen reflective 
revision that Brettschneider also endorses.   
What does the liberal democratic state get out of aggressively criticizing and 
condemning hate groups?  What good would it do for the state to produce “public service 
announcements on radio and television telling people ‘Don’t believe the Klan; blacks should 
be regarded as equals’”?187  It is reasonable to question, as Larry Alexander does, whether an 
announcement like this would persuade anyone who would otherwise have been persuaded 
by the Klan, and whether these announcements would actually bring more attention to the 
Klan’s message than it could have garnered on its own.188   
Concerns such as these are distinguishable from claims that politicians should keep 
quiet about hate groups, that organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center and the 
Anti-Defamation League have outlived their usefulness, or that the liberal state should in no 
way disfavor hate groups.  Everyone, including government officials, can and should 
condemn hate groups (even if only in their hearts, the way they conduct themselves, and the 
way they raise their children), and the liberal state is justified in refusing financial benefits to 
them as well, both to indicate non-complicity and to tilt the playing field in favor of the 
benign elements of civil society.  Liberal citizens and the liberal state are justified in 
counteracting hate groups, and they can do so without offering them free airplay or 
                                                           
186 Spinner-Halev, 2000.   
187 Alexander, 2013: 4-5.   
188 Alexander, 2013: 4-5.  One can also imagine that such “bureaucratically generated propaganda” could serve 
as confirmation of some imagined governmental conspiracy against “white America” and as a tool for 
recruiting (even more of) the disaffected.   
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pretending for a moment that their viewpoints are sensible enough to demand direct 
refutation.   
These concerns are distinguishable from the claim that the validity of the liberal 
democratic American state is no longer threatened by racism or sexism (or socioeconomic 
inequalities).  There can be no doubt that deeply ingrained institutional racism and sexism 
threaten full citizenship for minorities and women, and that poverty and extreme 
socioeconomic inequalities do so as well.  Finding solutions to these problems is a 
monumentally important task, and surefire remedies clearly are not readily available.  The 
claim is not that hate groups are not a problem or that they are not an issue for the 
government, but rather that hearing the government denounce the Klan on the radio offers 
cold comfort to the citizens (and the non-citizens) who suffer from pervasive institutional 
racism and sexism as well as to the poor for whom the American dream is even less than a 
mirage.  Nor, it would seem, are such criticisms likely to motivate the garden-variety 
beneficiaries of white privilege, male privilege, regressive tax laws, and corporate welfare to 
finally recognize the civic equality of their fellow citizens, for they can sleep easy knowing 
that they abhor violence, don’t hate anyone, and don’t (often) consciously discriminate.189  
                                                           
189 I submit that these peaceful, non-hateful, and not consciously discriminatory citizens represent the greatest 
obstacle to achieving the ideal of free and equal citizenship because all too often they are either unaware or 
unmoved by the profound but somewhat less salacious citizenship inequalities revealed by facts such as these:   
• Women earned 77 cents for every dollar a man earned in 2012.   
• In 2012, the median earnings of American women working full time year-round were $37,791. 
American men earned a median income of $49,398.   
• African-American women earn 69 cents for every dollar paid to African-American men, and Latinas 
earn just 58 cents on the dollar compared to Latino men. The disparity grows wider when these 
women are compared to non-Hispanic white men.   
• Black Americans are nearly three times as likely as white Americans to live in poverty.  Hispanics are 
2.6 times as likely as white Americans to live in poverty. 
• Since the 1960s the difference in black and white incomes grew from about $19,000 in 1967 to 
roughly $27,000 in 2011. 
• The income gap between whites and Hispanics has widened over the past 40 years. In 1970, the 
difference between white and Hispanic incomes was about $15,500; by 2011 the gap had grown to 
roughly $27,000. 
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Though I certainly acknowledge that hate groups are a problem and should be opposed, I 
also claim (1) that combating them is not priority number one when it comes to achieving 
the ideal of equal citizenship, (2) that there probably are better ways—like eliminating 
socioeconomic inequalities190—to address their persistence, and (3) that aggressive 
democratic persuasion is neither sufficient nor even necessary to bring about their demise.   
B. The Substantial Downside of Aggressive Persuasion 
Brettschneider argues “that religious beliefs should not be exempt from the principle 
of public relevance”, and that “[w]hen religious beliefs oppose the core values of free and 
equal citizenship, democratic persuasion is justified in order to transform [those] beliefs.”191  
The reach of these arguments is obviously heavily dependent upon the determination of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
• In 1984, the median net worth of black households was less than 1/10th (9%) that of white 
households. By 2011, the black-white wealth gap had widened even further: black household wealth 
was 7% that of white households. Hispanic net worth also is notably smaller than white net worth, 
and the gap has widened over time. In 1984, the typical Hispanic household had 13% of the wealth of 
the typical white household, compared with 9% in 2011. 
• Black men were more than six times as likely as white men in 2010 to be incarcerated in federal and 
state prisons, and local jails, the last year complete data are available. That is an increase from 1960, 
when black men were five times as likely as whites to be incarcerated. 
• Black Americans are 10 times more likely to be imprisoned for illegal drug offenses than whites, even 
though both groups use and sell drugs at the same rate.   
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/22/race-demographics/ 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb13-165.html  
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/1950  
 
190 See, e.g. Chambers and Kopstein, 2001: 838-9, 848, 856, 859 (Claiming (1) that “socioeconomic factors are 
very important in understanding why people join ‘bad’ organizations”, (2) that “[p]overty, downward social 
mobility, diminished economic expectations, and even basic inequality…can create illiberal citizens that no 
amount of deliberation will convince otherwise”, (3) that “[c]ertain economic insecurities weaken commitment 
to core liberal democratic values by giving people reasons to distrust the promises of liberal democracy and to 
seek out scapegoats and targeted groups”, and (4) that “rights, civic education, promotion of good associations, 
and an expanded public sphere will not be enough to build liberal democracies (or maintain the quality of 
established liberal democracies) if failure in social justice leads to disillusionment with the promise of 
liberalism.”).     
 
191 Brettschneider, 2012: 143.  Prior to 2012 it seemed that Brettschneider only meant to claim “that when 
citizens try to impose their religious views on others through legislation that they should be stopped by the 
Court, and also told why it was wrong to do so, which is that it violates the tenets of equal citizenship.”  
Spinner-Halev, 2011: 777.  While it remains true that Brettschneider “does not believe that the state should 
wantonly seek to transform illiberal beliefs” (Spinner-Halev, 2011: 777) it is not (now) the case that he would 
limit democratic persuasion to instances in which “citizens try to impose their religious views on others 
through legislation”.  See Brettschneider, 2012.   
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public relevance and the inconsistency of particular beliefs and practices with the ideal of 
free and equal citizenship.  The definition of public relevance is, however, somewhat hollow 
and its scope is seemingly quite broad.  The principle of public relevance states that “beliefs 
and practices that conflict with the ideal of free and equal citizenship can be of public 
concern, and should be changed to make them compatible with democratic values.”192  This 
seems to mean that many beliefs and practices that are at least implausibly consistent with 
equal citizenship (including religious beliefs and practices) are publicly relevant, and being 
publicly relevant are subject to both reflective revision and (when necessary) democratic 
persuasion.193  The only limitation Brettschneider places on the reach of public relevance is 
to say that it leaves “immune from democratic persuasion many beliefs about the internal 
structure of the family and civil society.”194  For instance, government scrutiny of citizens’ 
dinner guest lists, or spying on them in order to determine the consistency of their beliefs 
with equal citizenship is out of bounds.195  
Brettschneider’s discussion of public relevance and his rejection of government 
spying on its citizens tell us absolutely nothing about the nature of the “many beliefs” that are 
immune from democratic persuasion.  We are told that many beliefs are immune, but then 
we aren’t given a single example; instead we are left with the impression that any and all 
beliefs and practices that are at least implausibly consistent with equal citizenship are subject 
to democratic persuasion (so long as their discovery isn’t the result of government spying).196  
                                                           
192 Brettschneider, 2012: 24.   
193 Brettschneider, 2012: 155.  
194 Brettschneider, 2012: 153.   
195 Brettschneider, 2012: 153.   
196 See, e.g. Brettschneider, 2012: 127 (Claiming that “there is no such thing as ‘private speech’ that is immune 
from justification or that should be protected from the influence of either other citizens or the state.”).   
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It is also worth noting the extent to which the principle of public relevance simply depends 
upon what counts as implausibly consistent with equal citizenship.  Putting all of this 
together, it seems that for Brettschneider beliefs and practices are publicly relevant and 
subject to democratic persuasion no matter where they are found, so long as (1) they are at 
least implausibly consistent with equal citizenship, (2) their discovery is not the result of 
government spying, and (3) reflective revision has failed to bring about the desired 
transformation.  With all of this in mind, I now want to consider some examples of beliefs 
that Brettschneider claims are and are not implausibly consistent with equal citizenship, raise 
some concerns about the implications of his determinations, and question whether or not 
these determinations are anything other than political conclusions that will surely change 
with each new crop of government officials.   
1. Inegalitarian Beliefs, Discrimination, and the Ideal of Free and Equal 
Citizenship   
According to Brettschneider, it is possible for groups to discriminate in ways that do 
not challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship.  The Catholic Church, for instance, 
neither challenges equal citizenship nor expresses beliefs that are implausibly consistent with 
that ideal when it excludes women from the priesthood.197  This theological inegalitarianism 
is distinguishable from a challenge to the civic equality of women.  The Catholic Church 
does not hold views inconsistent with recognition of the civic equality of men and women, 
or claim that women are in any way unfit for secular positions of authority.198  This case 
demonstrates the “substance-based limit” to democratic persuasion in action.  Criticism (at 
least from the state) is restricted to instances in which the views expressed directly challenge 
                                                           
197 Brettschneider, 2012: 134-6.   
198 Brettschneider, 2012: 135.   
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or are implausibly consistent with the ideal of free and equal citizenship.199  The Catholic 
Church escapes such criticism for its merely theological discrimination against women and 
against gays, but “may” threaten equal citizenship to the extent that it campaigns against 
same-sex marriage and gay adoptions.200   
Unlike the Catholic Church, the father and school board member from the example 
alluded to earlier is subject to criticism because “he has not internalized the value of equal 
citizenship.”201  Brettschneider concludes that this male citizen, father, and school board 
member should be criticized, at least by other citizens and presumably also by the state, 
should reflective revision fail to do the trick (1) because “participation in sports is an 
important way that girls learn to compete, and this skill is important to achieving success and 
equality in adult life”, (2) because the father and school board member “does not truly 
believe the public values he claims to endorse” (the argument from democratic congruence), 
(3) because his decisions as a non-state actor have the potential to undermine his daughters’ 
chances to attain real-life citizenship (the argument from interconnection), and (4) because 
he is failing to follow through on his public commitments and pronouncements as a public 
official (the argument from public trust).202   
 In order to tease out the implications of this example (call it “The Hypocritical 
Public Official” example), I first want to change around some of the facts to create two 
more examples:  
• The Non-Hypocritical Public Official:  He is a citizen, father, member of a particular 
religious community, and member of the town school board who votes in favor of 
                                                           
199 Brettschneider, 2012: 89.   
200 Brettschneider, 2012: 134, 166-7.   
201 Brettschneider, 2012: 56.   
202 Brettschneider, 2012: 56-9.   
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equal funding for girls’ and boys’ sports programs, saying publicly that he believes in 
the civic equality of all citizens regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation.  He is also known to forbid his daughters from participating in sports in 
accordance with his religious community’s understanding of the will of God.  
• The Non-Hypocritical Private Citizen:  He is a citizen, father, and member of a 
particular religious community who declares his belief in the civic equality of all 
citizens regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.  He is also known 
to forbid his daughters from participating in sports in accordance with his religious 
community’s understanding of the will of God.   
 
The male citizens in my examples are not hypocrites (or they are not hypocritical in the same 
way that Brettschneider’s male citizen is203).  They haven’t said that “equal access to sports is 
essential to girls’ ability to compete” or that “the ability to compete is essential to future 
citizenship”, but just that, being civic equals, boys and girls are equally entitled to state 
money for sports.  Nevertheless, they are both subject to democratic persuasion, perhaps not 
because they don’t truly believe in the public values they claim to endorse, or because they 
haven’t followed through on their public commitments and pronouncements, but because 
their decisions still have the potential to undermine their daughters’ chances to attain real-life 
citizenship.204  And it would also seem that their religious communities would likewise be 
subject to democratic persuasion as the source of the belief that girls should not participate 
in sports.   
                                                           
203 I recognize that arguments could be made that the male citizens in my examples are, in fact, hypocrites and I 
think I actually agree.  My points are just that the two citizens in my example aren’t hypocritical in the same 
way as the Hypocritical Public Official and that they aren’t necessarily any more hypocritical than a church (like 
the Catholic Church) that purports to recognize the civic equality of women and homosexuals but rejects 
particular roles for women and publicly declares that gays are sinners and bound for Hell.  Either civic equality 
is distinguishable from other kinds of equality or it isn’t and, so long as it is, I see no reason why a male citizen 
and a father cannot rationally affirm the civic equality of women even as he expresses the belief that women (or 
just the women in his community) ought, consistent with God’s will, to only assume domestic roles.   
 
204 See, e.g. Brettschneider, 2012: 39-40 (Arguing that “[t]he values of freedom and equality could be 
undermined by non-governmental institutions if most citizens opposed these values and the rights of free and 
equal citizenship.  For example, if families promoted discrimination in educating their children, it would risk 
undermining the formal respect for equality in the constitution.”); Brettschneider, 2012: 29 (Noting that “(t)he 
state uses democratic persuasion when it exercises its expressive capacity to criticize racist and other 
discriminatory beliefs in the family and civil society.”).   
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 I changed the facts to remove the democratic (in)congruence and public trust 
arguments because I think that the argument from interconnection is where the action is.  It 
doesn’t really matter whether or not this male citizen and father is a hypocrite, or whether or 
not he is a public official, it just matters that his decisions as a non-state actor have the 
potential to undermine his daughters’ chances to attain real-life citizenship.  The argument 
from interconnection does a lot of work here and, though I agree with the argument 
conceptually, I don’t agree with its application.  It is surely true that no father should have 
the power to forbid his daughters from, for instance, receiving an adequate education or 
adequate healthcare, because the exercise of that power would violate his daughters’ human 
and civil rights, and it surely also follows that the state shouldn’t hesitate to deny fathers this 
kind of power.  It is far less clear, however, that the state should be in the business of 
publicly criticizing groups of individuals who are themselves free to think whatever they 
please (including that God insists on different roles for men and women), and are free to 
associate with whomever they please (perhaps only with those who agree that, among other 
things, God insists on different roles for men and women), provided that they neither harm 
nor imprison their fellows.205  The point is that before we move to officially and publicly 
criticize groups like these, it ought to be kept in mind that very often their members are 
simply living in accordance with their conceptions of the good, and are doing so (1) with the 
blessing of liberal values like tolerance, freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and 
the right to privacy, and (2) without breaking any general laws (from which they haven’t 
already received exemptions), expressing hate, or imposing their religious views upon non-
members.   
                                                           
205 Note, however, that the group presumably wouldn’t even need to believe in different roles for men and 
women in order to attract criticism.  If it is true that playing sports is crucial for equal citizenship then a group 
that forbids all children from playing sports regardless of gender will also be subject to criticism for 
undermining all of their chances to attain real-life citizenship.   
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 Some of the issue here surely is about line-drawing.  Brettschneider says equal 
citizenship depends upon playing sports and others, myself included, disagree.  This doesn’t 
mean, however, that the only problem with democratic persuasion is Brettschneider’s 
conclusion regarding this one particular example.  The problem is larger than that, in part 
because the disagreement regarding sports and citizenship goes to show that well-meaning 
liberals can easily disagree about the appropriate reach and application of democratic 
persuasion.  The point isn’t that unanimity is required in order for Brettschneider’s 
arguments to carry the day, but that reasonable disagreement over what counts as a threat to 
citizenship makes it clear that democratic persuasion is more of a political football than he 
lets on.  What counts as implausibly inconsistent with equal citizenship is by no means clear, 
and it seems quite likely that different parties, different administrations, and different public 
officials will interpret its mandate quite differently and engage in democratic persuasion in 
controversially inconsistent ways.   
2. Aggressive Persuasion in the Context of Childhood Education 
The Persuasive State persuades children as it educates them and does not permit 
parents to isolate their children from educational persuasion by seeking religious exemptions 
or by enrolling their children in private schools.206  The value democratic conception of 
persuasive civic education is also remarkably robust.  Children are taught not only to side 
with Martin Luther King, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Harvey Milk (and to recognize the 
errors of their opponents), but also to (1) respect the basic liberal values championed by 
King, Stanton, Milk, and others; (2) reject racism; (3) transform any religious beliefs they 
hold which are implausibly consistent with equal citizenship; and (4) recognize that some 
                                                           
206 Brettschneider, 2012:  98-9.   
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family decisions threaten women’s equal citizenship.207  Schools as institutions and the 
curricula they use do not simply model the ideal of free and equal citizenship, but they also 
actively promote it, teaching children to recognize and to transform practices and beliefs that 
the state finds implausibly consistent with the ideal.   
Brettschneider notes, for instance, that the child of a parent who endorses the Nazi 
Party will be taught that the Holocaust actually happened, and that the Nazis wrongly 
opposed the basic principles of liberal democracy.208  While this example of educational 
persuasion related to an unquestionably hateful viewpoint seems fairly uncontroversial, it 
does not speak to the implications associated with seeking to transform merely 
discriminatory viewpoints that are (so far as Brettschneider is concerned) implausibly 
consistent with equal citizenship.  Teachers in the aggressively persuasive state aim to 
convince their students not only that Stanton was a hero and that the women’s movement 
helped to fulfill the promise of free and equal citizenship, but (presumably) also that the 
conception of gender roles put forth by particular communities or groups is false.209  The 
daughters of the religious fathers in the examples above would have to be taught that a 
father’s210 refusal to allow his daughters to play sports is the product of a flawed conception 
of gender roles, and that it threatens their chances at real-life citizenship.  Similarly, Catholic 
children would have to be taught not only to honor Stanton and Milk but also that, while 
their church’s prohibition on women priests and its teachings on the sinfulness of 
                                                           
207 Brettschneider, 2012:  46, 63, 93-101, 153, 155, 163-4.   
208 Brettschneider, 2012:  97.   
209 See also Weinstock, 2009.   
210 I say “a father” rather than “their father” because Brettschneider makes it clear that even though the goal is 
to convince children that all citizens should be treated as free and equal “parents should not be singled out and 
criticized directly in class for disagreeing with the state’s viewpoint” and “children should not be asked directly 
about their parents’ views…”  Brettschneider, 2012: 99-100.  I take it that disallowing the direct critique of 
individual parents and disallowing direct questions to children about their parents’ views does not rule out 
criticizing parents in general or criticizing the religious groups that parents and children belong to.    
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homosexual acts are consistent with equal citizenship, its opposition to gay marriage and 
adoption is not.211  The point is that if transformation is a goal, criticizing the bad guys is 
allowed, and certain merely discriminatory religious viewpoints are fair game, then aggressive 
educational persuasion implies that some children will be told not only that violent and 
hateful fundamentalists are on the wrong side of things, but also that (in general terms) their 
parents, priests, rabbis, imams, and pastors are as well.   
I find this view of educational persuasion troubling, both because aggressive 
educational persuasion is not required in order to transform a critical mass of non-liberals 
into good citizens, and because an unintended consequence of aggressive educational 
persuasion is that it renders liberalism less appealing to non-liberals (and because less 
appealing, less effective in safeguarding the rights of all citizens).  Civic education can and 
should achieve modest transformation without singling out cultures or religions for criticism 
and condemnation212 and without taking an explicit stand on controversial issues like gay 
marriage, gay adoption, or the validity of gender roles within the family.  Under a regime of 
moderate and restrained democratic persuasion, not every child will agree on all of the 
issues, but plenty of them will have the makings of good citizens, and some will, I suspect, 
experience less pressure from their parents and communities to reject the liberal values that 
are being imposed upon them.213  
                                                           
211 See Brettschneider, 2012:  136, 166.   
212 See Spinner-Halev, 2000b: 89.   
213 A note on the aggressiveness of Brettschneider’s view of democratic persuasion:   
In his discussion of what I’ve called the “form of persuasion”, Brettschneider acknowledges that 
some discriminatory views “might best be criticized not through direct confrontation, but through the general 
promulgation of the reasons and arguments for rights.” (Brettschneider, 2012: 44-5).  He recognizes, in other 
words, that there are some views—he offers no examples, unfortunately—that are implausibly consistent with 
equal citizenship but, for whatever reason, not ripe for democratic persuasion.  I make a note of this because I 
am admittedly critiquing a particularly aggressive construal of Brettschneider’s theory.  I’ve done this not 
because I am sure that Brettschneider wouldn’t pull back from the implications I’ve described, but because, so 
far as I can tell, he hasn’t forestalled any of them.  He might agree, for instance, that the state is better off not 
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IV. A Restrained and Liberal Pluralist View of Democratic Persuasion 
As discussed above, Brettschneider’s theory of value democracy (1) defends “robust 
rights of free speech, religion, and association” that require “the state to refrain from 
coercively banning political viewpoints, religious groups, or civil associations”, and (2) 
underwrites both (a) the state’s articulation of “the reasons that justify why rights should be 
respected in the first place”, and (b) the state’s efforts “to convince citizens to adopt the 
democratic values of freedom and equality as their own.”214  The view of liberal pluralism 
that I endorse accepts (1) and (2)(a) without the need for further clarification and accepts 
(2)(b) with certain reservations.  That view understands the liberal pluralist state to be 
primarily focused on the satisfaction of basic liberal purposes, but in a way that shows ample 
respect for expressive liberty—ensuring that “the intrusion of state institutions on individual 
lives is restricted to what is needed to secure the minimum conditions of civic unity and 
social justice.”215  Liberal pluralists do not lament the presence of non-liberal groups that 
challenge liberal values without breaking general laws or threatening the conditions of public 
                                                                                                                                                                             
criticizing people like the religious fathers in my examples, that teachers shouldn’t tell children that the Catholic 
Church is wrong to oppose gay marriage and gay adoption, and that there exists a basic non-ideal theory 
problem associated with the implementation of democratic persuasion by political actors from different 
parties…but he hasn’t said so.   
My intention has not been to caricature his theory, but simply to tease out what it might mean for 
those non-violent, non-hateful, and non-imposing non-liberals who are tolerated by the liberal pluralist state 
and whose viewpoints are, nevertheless, implausibly consistent with equal citizenship according to 
Brettschneider.  I am worried less about the implications of his theory for his main targets, hate groups, than 
about the implications for what I take to be his secondary targets—the merely discriminatory and often 
religious groups whose views are fairly close to the border between being plausibly and implausibly consistent 
with equal citizenship.  These merely discriminatory groups are particularly vulnerable under his theory 
because, as I’ve already pointed out, their relationship to equal citizenship is so crucially dependent upon 
judgment calls like whether or not playing sports is more like getting a decent education (crucial to citizenship) 
or more like playing chess or a musical instrument (not particularly relevant to citizenship).   
 
214 Brettschneider, 2012: 1, 4.   
215 Galston, 2005: 177.   
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order and civic unity.216  They embrace the “internalized norms and habits” of liberal 
pluralism “that restrain us from compelling others to live life our way rather than theirs, even 
when we have good reason to believe that their way is mistaken”, and they welcome a 
strong, vibrant, and diverse civil society capable of expressing a broad range of conceptions 
of the good life—mitigating state power, providing arenas for the accommodation of deep 
differences, nurturing trust, ensuring important places of dissent, and cultivating useful 
liberal and non-liberal virtues.217   
Liberal pluralists recognize the need for good citizens, but won’t use just any means 
in order to create them.218  They do not demand, for instance, that citizens of the liberal 
pluralist state cultivate a self-reflective disposition; adopt an attitude of revisability with 
respect to their beliefs, attachments, and ends; or actively participate in public affairs.219  The 
Amish, by way of example, reject the attitude of revisabillity, endeavor to stifle the 
cultivation of highly developed powers of critical reason, and discourage active participation 
in public affairs, but so far as liberal pluralists are concerned, there are compelling reasons 
(like faith and conscience) for allowing them to do so.220  Likewise, liberal pluralism does not 
authorize interfering with the exclusion of women from the Catholic priesthood, nor would 
it impose state-endorsed beliefs on a private fundamentalist school that decided not to renew 
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the contract of a pregnant married teacher because of its religiously based belief that mothers 
with young children should not work outside their homes.221   
The liberal pluralist state would, however, be justified in removing all forms of “public 
encouragement and favor” for “associations conducting their internal affairs in a manner 
contrary to core public purposes.”222  Bob Jones University, for instance, a school whose 
students were prohibited on religious grounds from engaging in interracial dating, was 
appropriately denied the privilege of tax-exempt status.223  From the perspective of liberal 
pluralism, the compelling state interest in ending racial segregation was not sufficient to 
overcome freedom of conscience and association concerns, and so did not justify overruling 
the policy against interracial dating.  But it does justify (1) “withhold[ing] recognition and 
legitimation from associations that speak and act along racialist lines”, and (2) the state’s 
“message that it considered the policy of Bob Jones University to be morally illegitimate as 
well.”224   
Liberal pluralists are, therefore, quite reluctant to supersede freedom of conscience 
and association concerns through the authorization of coercion, but they are willing to do so 
in order to safeguard civic unity and to advance fundamental liberal purposes.  And in 
certain cases where coercion would not be justified, the liberal pluralist state is also prepared 
to take the intermediate steps of (1) disfavoring particular practices in order to remain non-
complicit, and (2) persuading its citizens of the moral illegitimacy of certain objectionable 
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but not illegal practices.225  The liberal pluralist state is a persuasive one.  But, unlike 
Brettschneider’s aggressively persuasive state, it is only concerned to target the proponents 
of hate and the proponents of particularly pernicious and politically relevant forms of 
discrimination because they, and only they, have the potential to threaten civic unity and to 
frustrate liberal purposes without actually breaking the law.   
A. The Liberal Pluralist State as Spender 
The liberal pluralist state is under an affirmative obligation to refrain from engaging 
in discrimination, to refrain from contributing directly to groups that engage in 
discrimination, and to remain non-complicit with practices that, though legal, threaten civic 
unity and core liberal purposes.  This means that the non-discriminatory liberal pluralist state 
ought not to directly support discriminatory groups “through public funding, interest-free 
loans, publicly subsidized space, and the like,” because these forms of support offer positive 
incentives to such groups and undermine the strong public commitment to equal 
citizenship.226  It also means that the state is justified in revoking the tax-exempt status of 
groups, like Bob Jones University circa 1970, that engage in invidious discrimination so as 
not to comply with that kind of large-scale, systematic, and especially problematic 
discrimination.227 The liberal pluralist state is similarly justified in revoking the tax-exempt 
status of hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan, American Nazi Party, and Westboro Baptist 
Church because and to the extent that they actively deny that all citizens possess equal rights, 
oppose recognizing the equal citizenship of minorities or women, or defend invidious forms 
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of discrimination.228  The liberal pluralist state is justified in revoking the tax-exempt status 
of hate groups and groups that engage in invidious discrimination because they, and only 
they, pose a significant threat to civic unity and liberal purposes.  Only these groups work to 
deprive their fellow citizens of that which liberal purposes are intended to safeguard and 
upon which civic unity depends:  (1) their lives, (2) the normal development of their basic 
capacities (including a sense of one’s own dignity and self-respect), and (3) the kinds of 
understanding needed to effectively participate in the society, economy, and polity.229   
The liberal pluralist state would not, however, revoke the tax-exempt status of 
groups that do not engage in invidious discrimination and do not directly challenge the civic 
equality of their fellow citizens.  Brettschneider is right, for instance, to distinguish between 
the kind of discrimination practiced by the Catholic Church and the kind of discrimination 
that was practiced by Bob Jones University.  One form of discrimination seriously challenges 
civic equality while the other does not.  Bob Jones University’s rule against interracial dating 
was a form of invidious discrimination because it amounted to “systematic discrimination 
within a group that is part of a larger, unambiguous institutional effort to undermine the 
basic idea of the equality of citizens” and was particularly troubling for its role in the 
common Southern strategy of establishing private schools in order to preserve de facto 
segregation and to undermine the legal protections afforded by civil rights laws and Supreme 
Court rulings.230  The rule against female priests is also inegalitarian and discriminatory, but 
as Brettschneider recognizes, it does not present a significant challenge to the civic equality 
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of women, and therefore does not justify revoking the tax-exempt status of the Catholic 
Church.   
Similarly, the liberal pluralist state would not revoke the tax-exempt status of a group 
that believes it to be God’s will that (member) women and girls only engage in domestic 
tasks and forbids its members girls and women from playing sports.  A group such as this is 
clearly engaged in discrimination but this kind of discrimination has more in common with 
the discrimination practiced by the Catholic Church than that practiced by Bob Jones 
University.  Non-liberal groups like this one—groups scattered about the country and living 
well out of the limelight—clearly are not engaged in anything like the systematic and 
unambiguous institutional discrimination that Bob Jones University was a party to, and they 
offer no real challenge to the civic equality of member women, let alone women in general.   
Representatives of the liberal pluralist government are not, of course, expected to be 
indifferent to parental choices regarding the issue of sports for girls.  As individual citizens 
and as public figures they have every right to speak out against groups that forbid girls from 
playing sports, even when these groups pose no significant threat to the lives, basic 
capacities, or social rationality of women.  The point to note here is just that the liberal 
pluralist state is itself indifferent to such viewpoints and careful not to disfavor practices (no 
matter how inegalitarian they may be) that do not threaten civic unity or liberal purposes.   
B. The Liberal Pluralist State as Educator 
Citizens have power in the liberal democratic state, including the power to transform 
the state over time into something that is neither liberal nor democratic.231  Accordingly, the 
liberal state needs good liberal citizens in order to remain liberal and democratic, and the 
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liberal pluralist concern for civic unity and basic liberal purposes demands that we see to the 
cultivation of good citizens.232  Civic education plays an important role in cultivating good 
citizens, and schools should teach core democratic ideals and core liberal virtues regardless 
of whether these happen to conflict with the values of a particular culture or religion.233  It is 
wrong, however, to think that the state ought to engage in aggressive democratic persuasion 
where that includes the pervasive denial of religious exemptions and the singling out of 
particular religions, cultures, and practices for criticism or condemnation.234     
Brettschneider is surely right that civics curricula needn’t and shouldn’t be viewpoint-
neutral.235  Instruction in the reasons for rights by means of non-neutral instruction on topics 
like the Holocaust, the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the gay rights 
movement seems wholly justified and largely uncontroversial.  It also seems reasonable to 
teach about and encourage the acceptance of basic liberal values and to invite children to 
reflect upon and debate hard cases.  Brettschneider goes too far beyond liberal-neutrality, 
however, when he insists that no child may be exempt from any part of the civics 
curriculum, and when he does not reject the use of viewpoint criticism in the classroom (or 
at least limit such criticism to hateful, rather than merely discriminatory, viewpoints).236   
I agree with Brettschneider when he suggests that more schools ought to teach and 
honor the contribution of Harvey Milk as well as Martin Luther King and Elizabeth Cady 
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Stanton.237  Milk’s pursuit of justice ought to be honored and the teaching of his story surely 
is an excellent way to promote democratic values.  One can agree with Brettschneider about 
Milk, and about the fitness of his story for a civics curriculum, without also agreeing that 
every child must learn about him.  It isn’t the case that every child needs to receive instruction 
in the gay rights movement, because not all citizens in a liberal democracy must be good 
citizens,238 and (even if they did need to be) good citizenship is not so dependent upon 
instruction regarding the gay rights movement that granting exemptions from receiving it 
would threaten the state’s liberal or democratic future.   
It probably is true that teaching core democratic ideals cannot be distinguished from 
dissuading children from endorsing racism, sexism, and homophobia, or from the effort to 
transform religious beliefs that are at odds with the underlying values of democracy.  Liberal 
pluralism does not demand that civics education be viewpoint-neutral or that, being non-
neutral, it somehow shouldn’t have transformation as an end.  The claim is just that while 
restrained transformation is appropriate, the directly critical approach to transformation 
associated with aggressive democratic persuasion is not.  Modeling core democratic ideals in 
a non-neutral way is consistent with the maximum feasible tolerance standard of liberal 
pluralism, but the singling out of particular religions and cultures for criticism and compelled 
instruction in every conceivable expression of liberal values is not.  The upside of the 
restrained version of educational persuasion called for by liberal pluralism is that it is far 
more tolerant, permitting greater exercise of freedom of conscience (and perhaps also 
inspiring a greater sense of belonging and loyalty), and the downside is that a tiny minority of 
children that could grow into good citizens conceivably might not because the state was 
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unwilling to force them to hear their religions or cultures criticized directly, or to compel 
their exposure to subject matter that their parents find offensive.  
The liberal pluralist goal of transformation ought not to be convincing students that 
laws against gay marriage are definitively unconstitutional and immoral, or that groups that 
advocate domestic roles for girls threaten the equal citizenship of women.  Schools should 
simply teach the democratic ideals themselves (in an avowedly non-neutral way) and model 
those ideals within the institution itself.239  The children of non-liberal parents can draw 
conclusions for themselves about the conflicts between the inegalitarian views of their 
parents and religious leaders, and the fair and respectful treatment received by homosexuals 
and by girls from their teachers, coaches, counselors, administrators, and fellow students.240   
This restrained view of educational persuasion is sufficient to cultivate the good 
liberal citizens required in order to maintain the survival, health, and legitimacy of liberal 
democracy.  Brettschneider’s more aggressive form of educational persuasion, one that 
singles out discriminatory groups for direct criticism and rules out exemptions, does not 
show adequate support for freedom of conscience and wouldn’t necessarily yield better 
citizens.  Most children of non-liberal parents are likely, given their inescapable immersion in 
mainstream liberal society, to become more liberal than their parents without being told in 
no uncertain terms that their discriminatory religions or cultures are incompatible with 
liberalism, and without being told that laws against gay marriage are unconstitutional and 
immoral.241  Better, I think, to subtly and gently transform these children by showing rather 
than telling, both because doing so shows respect for them and their nascent moral powers, 
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and because it leaves their parents feeling more welcome within liberal society and less 
concerned to go to great lengths in order to shore up the non-liberal values of their children 
at home.   
C. The Liberal Pluralist State as Speaker 
Recall that the Persuasive State also engages in expressive criticism of hateful and 
discriminatory viewpoints directly, through celebrations, and through apologies.242  The 
expressive criticism inherent in the celebrations and apologies that Brettschneider points to 
is usually (or largely) implied.  It is true that to honor and celebrate Martin Luther King is to 
implicitly criticize George Wallace, Bull Connor, and the viewpoints that they represented, 
and that to apologize for Tuskegee is to implicitly criticize the racism of past American 
administrations.  Implied criticisms like these are probably unobjectionable from the 
perspective of liberal pluralism.  As has already been noted, the liberal pluralist state is “far 
from fully neutral with respect to conceptions of the human good”, and has a compelling 
interest in reproducing “the conditions necessary to its own health and perpetuation.”243  
This would seem to mean that some degree of transformation is justified not only in the 
context of education but also in the context of celebrations and apologies.  The keys here, 
however, are that the inherent criticism is (or could be) (1) by implication (or, at least, 
acceptably subtle, gentle, non-divisive, and tolerant toward diverse conceptions of the good) 
and, (2) appropriately limited to examples of hateful practices, hateful viewpoints, and 
instances of invidious discrimination.   
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The kind of expressive criticism that has the potential to conflict with liberal 
pluralism is the more direct and confrontational kind.  That said, and interestingly enough, 
liberal pluralists would not seem to have any reason to object to the Brettschneider examples 
discussed above.  The liberal pluralist state should not, need not, and would not prohibit 
public officials from criticizing and even condemning particular viewpoints, practices, and 
groups.  Senators have every right to criticize nominees for the Supreme Court for their 
membership in discriminatory groups; the Mayor of New York City has every right to 
criticize anti-Muslim rhetoric; and the President of the United States has every right to 
criticize the passage of a same-sex marriage bans.  The standard of maximum feasible 
tolerance governing the liberal pluralist state neither justifies nor warrants the muzzling of 
public officials—they can criticize or condemn whatever practices, viewpoints, and groups 
they like regardless of whether or not they challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship.  
Public officials are quite welcome to criticize the Ku Klux Klan, Bob Jones University, the 
Catholic Church, and fathers who steer their daughters toward domestic tasks.  None of 
these criticisms are objectionable from the standpoint of liberal pluralism because each of 
these politicians is merely expressing his or her own individual and Constitutionally-
protected concerns.244   
In some ways it is hard to imagine what truly objectionable examples of persuasive 
government speech would actually look like.  Consider Larry Alexander’s example once 
again:  “[G]overnment public service announcements on radio and television telling people 
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‘Don’t believe the Klan; blacks should be regarded as equals.’”245  Alexander is right to 
distinguish between this kind of official “government speech” and “speech by particular 
members of the government”, and to worry that government speech “will be viewed by 
many as bureaucratically generated propaganda.”246  It is also worth thinking about what 
government speech of this type would look like when aimed at merely discriminatory 
groups.  Would the government also run public service announcements telling people 
“Don’t believe the Catholic Church; homosexuals should be allowed to marry”, or “Don’t 
believe your religious leaders; women should not be limited to domestic tasks”?   
These hypothetical public service announcements sound a bit like caricature and 
maybe they are, but after we distinguish, as Alexander does, between “government speech” 
and “speech by particular members of the government”, it is hard to know for sure what 
kind of speech Brettschneider has in mind.  If he simply means “speech by particular 
members of the government”, then there probably is no liberal pluralist objection to his 
suggestions, but it seems like he means something more than that.  None of this is meant to 
deny the possibility or the wisdom of government speech.  I acknowledge that the state 
speaks, and I agree that it ought to engage in some degree of persuasion, not only when it 
spends and when it educates, but also when it celebrates, when it apologizes, and even when 
it explains its rationale for denying particular groups direct funds or tax-exempt status.  That 
said, Senators criticizing Supreme Court nominee Alito during his confirmation hearing is 
not the same thing as teaching public school children about Martin Luther King, denying 
Catholic Charities state funds if they continue to refuse to facilitate gay adoptions, or 
denying Bob Jones University tax-exempt status so long as it engages in invidious 
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discrimination.   In the first case individual members of the government are expressing their 
personal views about the potential unfitness of a candidate for the Supreme Court based 
upon his membership in a discriminatory organization, and in all the other cases the state 
itself is taking an official and non-neutral stance in order to promote liberal values, remain 
non-complicit with hate and discrimination, and (in those instances at least) gently and 
respectfully transform its citizens.   
V. Conclusion 
The solution is not to simply jettison the notion of democratic persuasion but, 
rather, to conceive of it in a more restrained and tolerant way, and to be very clear about the 
limited role that it plays in securing the goal of equal citizenship.  We often have good reason 
to criticize that which we tolerate in an effort to convince others to change their ways, but 
we can go too far if we are not careful, and find ourselves prioritizing certain liberal values 
(like equality, democracy, and autonomy) over other ones (like liberty and privacy), and 
sabotaging our own efforts.  Somewhere between criticizably lax passive approval and 
“overzealous criticism [that] may infringe both liberty and privacy rights and also be 
counterproductive” lies the zone of moderate, respectful, subtle, and gentle persuasion.247  I 
submit that liberal pluralism offers the best glimpse of this moderate zone wherein liberal 
values can be safely and fruitfully balanced by strictly tying both coercion and state-sponsored 
persuasion to the goals of safeguarding civic unity and advancing fundamental liberal 
purposes.   
It is also worth repeating that democratic persuasion, aggressive or otherwise, has 
but a small role to play in guaranteeing civic equality.  Any realistic effort to secure that goal 
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would also require addressing the socioeconomic inequalities that represent perhaps the 
greatest obstacles to the achievement of genuine civic equality.  What recommends the 
liberal pluralist view of democratic persuasion is, then, that it advances toward the goal of 
civic equality at least as well as Brettschneider’s aggressive version, and in a significantly less 
costly manner.   
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CHAPTER 3:  LIBERAL PLURALISM AND LUCK EGALITARIANISM 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider a liberal pluralist alternative to the luck 
egalitarian approach to distributive justice.  It scrutinizes the luck egalitarian approach and 
some of the common objections to it, in light of the “diverse objections to inequality” 
identified by Thomas Scanlon.248  Some of the most convincing objections to luck 
egalitarianism are implicitly based upon the “specific values”249 associated with Scanlon’s 
objections, and the most convincing luck egalitarian rebuttals to those objections are ones 
that explicitly acknowledge, accept, and seek to accommodate those values.  Hence the 
success of the luck egalitarian project is in part contingent upon its compatibility with 
Scanlon’s objections to inequality.  I consider this case for compatibility and conclude (1) 
that canonical luck egalitarianism cannot withstand two common objections (the harshness 
objection and the stigma objection), (2) that canonical luck egalitarianism cannot withstand 
the harshness and stigma objections because it fails to accommodate the specific values 
which underlie Scanlon’s objections, and (3) that canonical luck egalitarianism can be revised 
and moderated in order to accommodate the specific values and withstand the common 
objections, but not without sacrificing certain attributes seemingly essential to any version of 
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luck egalitarianism.  The chapter concludes by making the case for a liberal pluralist 
alternative to luck egalitarianism in line with Scanlon’s objections.   
In his paper, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality”, Scanlon advances the 
claim that the values and concerns of egalitarians support five objections to inequality:  a 
humanitarian objection, a status equality objection, a non-domination objection, and two 
procedural fairness objections (collectively, “Scanlon’s Objections”).250  Scanlon’s conception 
of egalitarianism and his objections to inequality follow from the widely endorsed 
commitment to treating all persons with equal respect and concern.  The “merely formal” 
principle of “equal consideration”, though it “provides a fruitful—even essential—starting 
point for moral argument” is, however, “too abstract to exercise much force in the direction 
of substantive equality.”251  Equal consideration is only realized, Scanlon argues, by means of 
substantive concerns, reasons, and objections to inequality underwritten by other more 
specific values “most of which are not essentially egalitarian.”252  Though Scanlon does not 
explicitly identify the specific values that he has in mind, I think that they at least include the 
values that we might call humanitarianism, fraternity, and fairness (collectively, the “specific 
values”).253 
The specific values in turn yield the concerns and reasons which justify Scanlon’s 
Objections.  Humanitarianism yields the concerns and reasons behind Scanlon’s humanitarian 
objection; fraternity yields the status equality and non-domination objections; and fairness yields the 
two objections concerned with procedural equality:  the real equality of opportunity and equality of 
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benefits objections.  The resulting humanitarian-, fraternal-, and fairness-based objections 
offer a unique and particularly useful framework within which to evaluate candidate 
egalitarian approaches to distributive justice.  It is doubtful that an approach to egalitarian 
distributive justice can be both valid and insufficiently responsive to the concerns associated 
with Scanlon’s Objections.  Accordingly, the concern of this chapter will be to see whether 
or not the luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice is or could be sufficiently 
responsive to those objections.  It will proceed as follows:  Section II includes a brief 
discussion of Scanlon’s Objections; Section III describes the luck egalitarian approach to 
distributive justice; and Section IV introduces the most common and effective objections to 
luck egalitarianism (the “Common Objections”) as well as the best rebuttals to those 
objections.  Finally, in Section V I conclude that a more moderate and avowedly “pluralist 
egalitarian” approach to distributive justice could better respond to Scanlon’s Objections, 
and I question whether or not a revised conception of luck egalitarianism can play this role 
and still remain identifiably luck egalitarian.   
II. Scanlon’s Objections 
A. Overview 
• Humanitarianism:  The specific source-value that generates the 
egalitarian’s concern for eliminating the avoidable suffering of all 
persons.  The value of humanitarianism underwrites the 
humanitarian objection. 
 
(1) The Humanitarian Objection:  “We often have reason to 
eliminate inequalities for essentially humanitarian reasons, 
because taking from those who have more is the only, or 
the best, way to alleviate the hardships of those who have 
less.”254 
 
• Fraternity:  The specific source-value that generates the 
egalitarian’s concern for abolishing humiliation, stigmatization, and 
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domination and for promoting the full citizenship of each one of 
her fellows.  The value of fraternity underwrites the status equality 
and non-domination objections. 
 
(2) The Status Equality Objection: “We sometimes have reason to 
eliminate inequalities because they create humiliating 
differences in status.”255   
(3) The Non-Domination Objection:  “We sometimes have reason 
to eliminate inequalities in order to prevent those who 
have more from exercising unacceptable forms of power 
over those who have less.”256 
 
• Fairness: The specific source-value that generates the egalitarian’s 
concern for ensuring that well-being is not determined by 
endowments and circumstances that are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view.  The value of fairness underwrites the first procedural 
objection—real equality of opportunity and the second procedural fairness 
objection—equality of benefits. 
 
(4) The First Procedural Fairness Objection—Real Equality of 
Opportunity:  “We sometimes have reason to eliminate 
inequalities in order to preserve the equality of starting 
places that is required if our institutions are to be fair.  
Great inequality of wealth and income can, for example, 
undermine equality of opportunity and the fairness of 
political institutions.”257 
(5) The Second Procedural Fairness Objection—Equality of Benefits:  
“In at least some cases, if an agency is obligated to deliver 
some good to various beneficiaries, it must, absent special 
justification, deliver it in equal measure to all of them.”258 
 
B. A Brief Discussion of Scanlon’s Objections 
 
1. Humanitarianism and the Humanitarian Objection to Inequality 
Scanlon claims that egalitarians object to distributive inequalities to the extent that 
they reflect the failure of institutions to prevent, eliminate, or reduce the avoidable suffering 
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or deprivation of persons.259  Equality is only a proxy for the success of humanitarianism, 
however, and not all equalities are created equal from the standpoint of humanitarianism.  
While the value of humanitarianism often gives egalitarians a reason to raise the level of well-
being of the least advantaged to the point that their welfare equals that of the most 
advantaged (leveled-up equality), it does not support leveling down the well-being of the 
most advantaged such that their welfare equals that of the least advantaged (leveled-down 
equality).260  Reasonable egalitarians do not “fetishize” equality and can always reject a 
distributive principle that undermines humanitarian concerns.     
Consider, for instance, Scanlon’s discussion of male life expectancy.261  He says that 
egalitarians object to the disparity in male life expectancy between the U.S./China (74.2 and 
70.4 years, respectively) and Malawi (37.1 years) on humanitarian grounds, but that they of 
course do not favor a leveled down equalization (37.1 years for each country) over the 
grossly unequal status quo.  Reasonable egalitarians object to the disparity in life expectancy 
between Malawi and the developed world not because of the inequality itself, but because of 
what it seems to indicate:  that some human beings are living lives that are much shorter 
than they ought to be and much shorter than they must be.262   
2. Fraternity 
a. The Status Equality Objection to Inequality 
Scanlon claims that egalitarians also object to inequalities that mark people as 
inferior.  They object to social arrangements that feature stigmatizing differences in status 
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(caste systems, racial discrimination, sexual discrimination, etc.) and to purely economic 
inequalities that force “the poor to live in a way that is reasonably seen as humiliating.”263  
Reasonable egalitarians object to these two forms of status inequality on the basis of what 
we might call the negative-fraternal impulse to ensure that one’s fellows are not damaged by 
feelings of inferiority and shame, and the positive-fraternal impulse to ensure that status 
inequalities do not damage the emotional and cultural bonds between members of a 
particular democratic society.     
The status equality objection, unlike the humanitarian objection, is genuinely 
egalitarian.  The humanitarian objection is non-egalitarian because it is “non-comparative” 
and “specific”, and the status equality objection is genuinely egalitarian because it is 
“comparative” and “unspecific”.264  The humanitarian objection is non-comparative in the 
sense that it operates on the basis of some type of objective scale of well-being.  A 37.1 year 
life expectancy for Malawi is clearly bad in this day and age because we know that human 
beings can live much longer lives, and this would be true even if the world average suddenly 
leveled-down to 37.1 years.  The status equality objection is, by contrast, comparative in the 
sense that it is concerned with relationships and comparisons between individuals.  For 
instance, we only know how well Caste B is being treated in terms of status by comparing 
their treatment with the treatment of Caste A.  The humanitarian objection is specific in that 
it is concerned with an absolute level of benefit above which inequalities do not seem to 
matter (at least in terms of the humanitarian objection).265  And the status equality objection is, by 
contrast, unspecific regarding the level of benefit in that Caste B’s feelings of inferiority and 
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shame are seen as a bad thing, regardless of whether Caste B’s feelings of inferiority and 
shame are high or low from a historical or international perspective (if such a thing could be 
determined).  Both objections support the elimination of inequalities but only the status 
equality objection does this for “genuinely egalitarian” reasons.266 
One very important characteristic of the status equality objection is that it does, in 
fact, provide a reason for a kind of leveling down.  In order to render Castes A and B equal 
in terms of status, for instance, it may be necessary to eliminate A’s benefits even if these 
benefits cannot, for whatever reason, be transferred to B.  Strictly speaking, no transfer of 
benefits from the most to the least advantaged occurs when we prohibit “[s]ocial practices 
conferring privileges of rank or requiring expressions of deference”, but egalitarians will still 
want to level down in such cases by eliminating A’s non-redistributable benefits.267  
Fraternity, unlike humanitarianism, justifies reducing everyone to a lower non-aristocratic 
position, even though this means (in a sense) that the lot of the aristocrats gets worse while 
the lot of the commoners stays the same. 
b. The Non-Domination Objection to Inequality 
Scanlon’s concern for eliminating domination leads him to find fault with a state of 
affairs in which some members of society have vastly greater resources than others, and find 
themselves in a position to “determine what gets produced, what kinds of employment are 
offered, what the environment of a town or state is like, and what kind of life one can live 
there.”268  The objection that emerges from this fraternal impulse to prevent domination and 
enable all citizens to share in the nature and design of society does not seem to require a 
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strict equalization of resources or capabilities.   Unlike the strict equality of status required by 
the status equality objection, the non-domination objection only calls for an equalization of 
societal power sufficient to undermine the genuine control of some over others.  Egalitarians 
pursue this goal of a domination-free society in terms of both political and economic power, 
and favor mechanisms that make it more difficult for particular segments of the population 
to assert continual control over the basic institutions of society.  In practice, these seem to 
include mechanisms—e.g. progressive taxation, affirmative action, and campaign finance 
reform—that empower the least advantaged, protect socially vulnerable minority groups, and 
restrain the capacity of the moneyed and the affluent to control politics.  
I’ve chosen to categorize non-domination as a fraternal objection because I think 
that the main impulse behind it is to see that citizens can and do live like fellows, and that no 
less-than-all-encompassing group can simply dictate the structure, attributes, and mores of 
society.  The objection does, however, bear an important resemblance to the fairness-based 
first procedural objection.  Egalitarians favor progressive taxation, affirmative action, and 
campaign finance reform for fraternal reasons and for fairness reasons.  They favor such 
programs both because of their non-egalitarian desire to prevent domination and because of 
their (somewhat more) egalitarian desire to ensure that procedures are fair and that no one 
misses out on an opportunity for reasons—like gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, and 
class—that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.  What this helps to show is that 
egalitarians have multiple reasons for objecting to inequalities—often multiple reasons for 
objecting to the same kinds of inequalities—and that it is quite possible that the degree of 
equalization called for by any one value will be insufficient to fully satisfy another. 
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3. Fairness 
Scanlon contends that egalitarians sometimes have reason to object to inequalities 
that undermine political and economic equality of opportunity, and to inequalities that result 
from the unequal provision of benefits to particular groups of entitled beneficiaries.  They 
object to these inequalities because they are seen as unfair.  It is unfair (1) that particular 
inequalities in holdings render opportunities unequal—that some individuals can do, be, and 
have things that others cannot simply because they were born into wealthier families or 
communities, and (2) that some institutions provide more (or better) benefits to some 
entitled beneficiaries and not others.   
The egalitarian sense of fairness relied upon by Scanlon seems to mean—to use 
some well-known but meaningfully different metaphors—that we ought to begin the race at 
the same starting line, that the playing field ought to be level, and that we ought to cut up the 
pie into equal slices unless we’re aware of a sufficient reason for doing otherwise.269  Such a 
sense of fairness animates the egalitarian’s objections to inequalities that might survive (in 
whole or in part) the implementation of policies based on the objections underwritten by 
humanitarianism and fraternity.270  In other words, inequalities that no longer reflect the taint 
of suffering, deprivation, discrimination, oppression, humiliation, stigmatization, 
exploitation, or domination may still be objectionable to the extent that they reflect one or 
both of the two kinds of unfairness discussed below.   
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a. The First Procedural Objection to Inequality—Real Equality of 
Opportunity 
According to Scanlon, egalitarians favor a real and lasting form of equality of 
opportunity that is broad enough to cover opportunities in both the economic and the 
political spheres.  They think it unfair and morally wrong that some have minimal 
opportunities for economic and political success and believe that the equalization of 
opportunities requires the elimination or reduction of inequalities in holdings that tend to 
undermine an individual’s chances for political and economic success.271  Egalitarians are 
very much aware of the somewhat obvious negative correlation between socioeconomic 
inequality and equality of opportunity.  Where we find great inequalities in wealth and 
income we also find that an individual’s prospects for success in the market depend heavily 
on the families and communities into which they are born rather than on the choices that 
they make or the effort that they exert.272  Likewise, where we find great inequalities in 
wealth and income we also find that the wealthy have much more control over the political 
process, through their contributions to candidates and office holders and in terms of their 
own potential candidacies.273  The egalitarian response, then, is simply to object to 
inequalities in holdings to the extent that they undermine real equality of opportunity. 
b. The Second Procedural Objection to Inequality—Equality of 
Benefits 
Lastly, egalitarians object to the unequal provision of benefits to the equally entitled.  
They object, in other words, to a situation in which Able and Baker are equally entitled to 
receive X and Baker either receives no X, less X, or lower quality X than does Able.  The 
                                                           
271 Scanlon, 2003a; Scanlon, 2007.   
272 Scanlon, 2007; see also, Rawls, 1999a; Rawls, 2001.   
273 Scanlon, 2007.   
 103 
equality of benefits objection, like the status equality objection, is genuinely egalitarian.  It is 
egalitarian because it is both comparative and unspecific.  Egalitarians determine whether or 
not benefits are being provided fairly by comparing the levels of provision across individual 
beneficiaries (comparative), and they are concerned with the unequal provision of benefits 
no matter the level of the benefits being provided to those who receive less (unspecific).274  
They determine the fairness of the provision of X by looking to see what is provided to Able 
and what is provided to Baker, and they object to any lesser (or worse) provision to Baker 
without regard to any objective-scale determination regarding the amount of X that 
individuals require.   
To illustrate the equality of benefits objection, Scanlon considers the provision of a 
higher level of basic services by the state of Israel to Jewish Israeli villages than to otherwise 
comparable villages occupied by Israeli Arabs.275  He claims that the inequality here “seems 
so clearly objectionable” because it easily fits the criteria of the equality of benefits objection.  
Because the egalitarian assumes that the Israeli government is obligated to supply the 
services at issue, and because she assumes that Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs have the same 
claim to the services, she finds it unfair that the equal claims of Israeli Arabs result in an 
inequality of benefits.276  This isn’t to say that all individuals, or even all citizens, always have 
the same claim to particular benefits, or that nothing could ever justify the unequal provision 
of benefits to the equally entitled, but only that the unequal provision of institutional 
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benefits to the equally entitled without “special justification” is objectionable on fairness 
grounds, no matter what else it might have going for it.277 
III. Background on Luck Egalitarianism 
A. “A Family of Views”  
In her 1999 paper, “What is the Point of Equality?”, Elizabeth Anderson used the 
terms “luck egalitarian” and “equality of fortune” to refer to a family of views which take 
“the fundamental injustice to be the natural inequality in the distribution of luck.”278  Her 
stated aim was to criticize the work of all theorists who subscribe to the view that “[t]he 
concern of distributive justice is to compensate individuals for misfortune.”279  Anderson has 
ascribed the luck egalitarian viewpoint to Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, 
Thomas Nagel, Eric Rakowski, and John Roemer.280  At this point virtually every theorist 
that has been dubbed a luck egalitarian has shown him or herself willing to use the term 
(which is not to say that all of them agree that they are in fact luck egalitarians), but there are, 
nevertheless, some important distinctions between the views of the theorists that Anderson 
mentions.  Luck egalitarianism, as Anderson herself acknowledges, is family of views that 
cluster around a somewhat elusive theoretical core.281  In addition, the family has grown in 
the years since the publication of Anderson’s paper, and there now exists a second 
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generation of theorists who have further tweaked, moderated, and complicated what 
continues to be known as luck egalitarianism.282 
Important implications of this family-resemblance dynamic are that there may be no 
clearly canonical luck egalitarians (no one who in no way qualifies or moderates the 
theoretical core) and that the critiques offered by Anderson and others often do not fully 
apply to most real world luck egalitarians.283  Virtually all luck egalitarians diverge from the 
strict and extremist view that Anderson tends to criticize, and so the case can and has been 
made that all or most of her criticisms miss their marks—they land but only against a strict 
canonical conception of luck egalitarianism that virtually no one actually endorses.284  
Although Anderson’s foil is a kind of canonical luck egalitarian who may not exist, I do think 
that it remains useful to imagine and analyze a canonical version of luck egalitarianism, and 
that it is important not to get lost in all of the ways in which actual luck egalitarians stray 
away from the approach’s theoretical core.  The disclaimer is, then, that what Anderson 
called “luck egalitarianism” and what I call “canonical luck egalitarianism” is (and must be) a 
stipulated construct from which all or most actual luck egalitarians diverge in various ways.   
B. Moral Equality and Equal Consideration 
To start with, I think that it might be worthwhile to consider what I see as the 
semantic bias inherent in the term “luck egalitarianism”.  The term seems to suggest a kind of 
pettiness and a lack of theoretical sophistication that is largely inaccurate.  By pairing “luck” 
with “egalitarianism” the term suggests that it is luck that luck egalitarians wish to equalize, 
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and this isn’t (necessarily) so.  Most luck egalitarians are not exercised by the mere existence 
of natural inequalities and do not claim that it is bad or unfair that, for instance, some (the 
lucky) were born able-bodied and others (the unlucky) disabled.  What is bad and unfair isn’t 
the variation in abilities, but the state’s willingness to permit the able-bodied to convert their 
undeserved abilities into greater holdings than the disabled, despite the fact that this chance 
thing (their non-disability) is arbitrary from a moral point view.  The problem for luck 
egalitarians isn’t really with unlucky circumstances, but with the societally-determined 
inequalities in holdings that result from mere differences in unchosen circumstances.   
Luck egalitarianism isn’t typically animated by a desire to fix or change natural 
endowments.  At the heart of the approach is a foundational belief in and commitment to 
the moral equality of persons that in turn supports the claim that all persons have “a right to 
equal respect and concern in the design and administration of the institutions that govern 
them.”285  Luck egalitarians argue (1) that one way that we can ensure that the state reflects 
and expresses equal respect and concern for all persons is by treating them fairly, and (2) that 
we treat persons fairly when we ensure that the actual distribution of holdings does not 
result from favoring some and disfavoring others on the basis of unchosen circumstances.   
1. Circumstances (Brute Luck)  
When luck egalitarians talk of morally arbitrary characteristics they typically refer to 
them as “circumstances” or, to use Dworkin’s term, “brute luck”.286  Society’s institutions are 
unfair if and when they permit brute luck to influence the distribution of holdings.  Luck 
egalitarians think it unfair when some have more or less in the way of holdings as a result of 
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circumstances over which they had/have no control—these circumstances are morally 
arbitrary characteristics like race, gender, ethnicity, social class, nationality, locality, family, 
native genetic endowments that individuals are simply born into, as well as the unchosen and 
unforeseeable things that happen to us in the course of our lives.   
2. Choices (Option Luck)  
On the other hand, it is not unfair when society’s institutions permit the voluntary 
and genuine choices of adults—what Dworkin calls “option luck”287—to affect an 
individual’s holdings.  It is not unfair that some have more or less in the way of holdings as a 
result of the free choices that they have made about how they wish to conduct their lives.  
Luck egalitarians, we begin to understand, are committed to the moral equality of persons, 
but not necessarily committed to an equality of holdings.  Certain unequal distributions are 
justifiable because they reflect deserved inequalities, and deserved inequalities are by their 
definition not unfair.  More formally:  luck egalitarians do not believe “that it is bad for some 
to be worse off than others”, but they do believe “that it is bad for some to be worse off 
than others through no fault or choice of their own.”288  Deserved inequalities, unlike undeserved 
inequalities, are not arbitrary from a moral point of view:  we fail to treat people as our moral 
equals when we permit them to do worse on the basis of characteristics or circumstances 
they didn’t and couldn’t deserve, but the same isn’t true when we permit them to do worse 
on the basis of the free choices they have made about how they wish to live their lives.289  
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3. The Luck/Choice Principle 
The luck egalitarian intuition—the intuition that says that it is bad for some to be 
worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own—supports what Kok-Chor 
Tan calls the “luck/choice principle” (hereinafter the “LCP”):  the idea that “distributive 
justice should be fundamentally choice-sensitive but luck-insensitive.”290  The LCP is a 
“grounding” rather than a substantive principle of distributive justice.  It further specifies the 
luck egalitarian intuition and the luck egalitarian conception of distributive justice, but does 
not operationalize the intuition in any substantive sense.291  The LCP isn’t (or needn’t be) a 
principle of morality or justice, and it doesn’t (or needn’t) suggest that substantive 
distributive justice must be wholly choice-sensitive or circumstance-insensitive.292293  
IV. Some Common Objections to Luck Egalitarianism 
The goals of this section are (1) to introduce the Common Objections, (2) to 
evaluate various luck egalitarian rebuttals to the Common Objections,  (3) to show that all 
but one of the Common Objections emerge out of the same concerns which underwrite 
Scanlon’s Objections, and (4) to show that the Common Objections illustrate the invalidity 
of canonical luck egalitarianism and also reveal the possibility of a valid approach to 
distributive justice that may no longer warrant the luck egalitarian label.  The so-called “free 
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will objection” to luck egalitarianism is the one Common Objection that I plan to consider 
that is in no way grounded in Scanlon’s Objections.  I’ve included it in my list of the most 
effective Common Objections anyway because I think it is an important objection that 
should not be casually ignored, and because I think that the luck egalitarian rebuttals to the 
free will objection set the stage for one of the two distinct strategies for dealing with the 
Common Objections.  One strategy—the one employed in response to the free will 
objection—seeks to avoid the Common Objections by limiting luck egalitarianism to the 
realm of ideal theory.  The other (more successful) strategy insists upon a continued role for 
luck egalitarianism in non-ideal theory, while conceding that much revision is required in 
order to accommodate the legitimate values and concerns which animate the Common 
Objections.   
 Here are the three Common Objections:   
• The Free Will Objection:  Luck egalitarianism fails because it 
depends upon an unproven and metaphysically questionable 
“libertarian” understanding of the human capacity to distinguish 
between voluntary choices and unchosen circumstances.  
• The Harshness Objection:  Luck egalitarianism fails because it 
depends upon the morally implausible claim that, while any 
inequality resulting from brute luck matters morally, inequality 
resulting from option luck matters not at all.  (This objection is 
concerned with the so-called “victims of option luck”).   
• The Stigma Objection:  Luck egalitarianism fails because it requires 
the collection and use of personal information that would cause 
the untalented to feel shame and to become a stigmatized class, 
undermining the egalitarian commitment to the expression of 
“equal respect and concern” for all persons.  (This objection is 
concerned with the so-called “victims of brute luck”).   
 
A. The Free Will Objection 
1. A Description of the Objection 
 110 
By now it should be clear that luck egalitarians place great importance upon the 
distinction between circumstances and genuine choices.  The LCP says (at a fundamental 
level) that all inequalities arising from circumstances must be extinguished, and that any and 
all inequalities that arise from the genuine choices of adults are permitted.  It would seem, 
then, that no question could be more important to luck egalitarians than whether or not it is 
possible to accurately and continually distinguish between brute and option luck inequalities.  
If we lack the capacity to distinguish between brute luck and option luck then it is hard to 
see how the luck egalitarian project can get off of the ground, let alone win out over 
alternative approaches to egalitarian distributive justice.   
Samuel Scheffler, a “relational egalitarian” critic of luck egalitarianism, has sketched 
out a “metaphysical case” against luck egalitarianism.  He claims that “the plausibility of the 
luck-egalitarian position tacitly depends on a libertarian conception of what genuine choice 
would look like.”294  The position depends, in other words, upon the questionable 
assumption that the distinction between voluntary choices and unchosen circumstances can 
be made definitively enough for the distinction to bear “the enormous political and 
economic weight that luck egalitarianism places on it.”295  Scheffler’s claim is that the 
“libertarian” or “incompatibilist” metaphysical account of choice that luck egalitarians 
depend upon seems implausible, and that, plausible or not, it hasn’t been defended by the 
very luck egalitarians who seem to depend upon its veracity.   
It isn’t simply the case that luck egalitarians are “incompatibilists”, and that relational 
egalitarians (like Scheffler and Anderson) are “compatibilists” and that is that, one group 
seeing things one way and the other group seeing things the other way.  Scheffler concedes 
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that “few, if any, proponents of a luck-egalitarian position endorse” the metaphysical 
account of choice that he ascribes to luck egalitarianism.  In fact, actual luck egalitarians are 
far more likely to be “agnostic about the nature of genuine choice, and even about whether 
human beings are capable of genuine choice.”296  G.A. Cohen, for instance, endorses a 
version of the LCP and also acknowledges that genuine choice may not be possible for us, 
and that his conception of luck egalitarianism may be subordinate to certain metaphysical 
questions that cannot be answered.297  Scheffler’s point is not that actual luck egalitarians 
claim that we can accurately and continually distinguish between genuine choices and 
unchosen circumstances, but that the plausibility of their position depends upon our capacity 
to make these distinctions.  Luck egalitarianism does not work without the distinction 
between genuine choices and unchosen circumstances required by the LCP, and no one has 
shown that such a distinction can be made (because that distinction probably cannot be 
made).  It is for this reason (the free will problem), as well as others, that Scheffler claims 
that luck egalitarianism fails as a candidate approach to egalitarian distributive justice.   
2. Luck Egalitarian Rebuttals  
At first glance it appears that the free will objection can simply be tossed aside 
because it is not a matter of political or moral philosophy—it might seem unfair or improper 
to introduce metaphysical concerns like this one into a discussion of political/moral 
philosophy.  If hard determinism and incompatibilism are both true, then far more than the 
luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice would be in jeopardy, so it may not be 
appropriate for luck egalitarians to bear the (sole) burden of proving something that is 
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perhaps beyond their ken and upon which so many other things (like, for instance, the 
conceptions of causation upon which our criminal and civil law) depend.  That said, there 
surely is something to Scheffler’s underlying point that maybe it is a bad idea to put so much 
weight on a distinction that may only be a convenient fiction we humans employ in order to 
feel that we control our own destinies.  Metaphysics notwithstanding, it does seem a fair 
objection, and it could be quite a powerful one.  Luck egalitarians do need to tell us 
something about how the distinctions between choices and circumstances either can be 
made, or why (contrary to the seeming thrust of their arguments) they are not essential to 
the approach.   
a. The Metaphysical Agnosticism Rebuttal 
A luck egalitarian might respond to the free will objection with an expression of 
metaphysical agnosticism akin to Cohen’s.  He might say, with a defender of luck 
egalitarianism like Carl Knight, that the approach “is not committed to either libertarianism 
or compatibilism, far less any particular formulation of free will and responsibility.  It simply 
favors that account that is correct, or most correct.”298  It could be that it is always possible 
to distinguish between voluntary choices and unchosen circumstances, never possible to 
distinguish between voluntary choices and unchosen circumstances, or something in 
between, and the agnostic believes that his position remains valid no matter which one is 
true.  Even in a world where there are few, if any, completely voluntary choices (and many 
think that we are living in such a world), the luck egalitarian would simply proceed in 
accordance with his mandate.  He would extinguish inequalities in holdings resulting from 
brute luck and remain prepared to permit inequalities resulting from option luck, if and 
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when genuine choices come into existence.  The agnostic luck egalitarian could hold fast to 
the moral distinction between genuine choices and unchosen circumstances and maintain the 
theoretical category (not-unjust-inequalities-resulting-from-option-luck) regardless of 
whether any actual inequalities fit into that category now or in the future.299   
b. The Limited Theoretical Scope Rebuttal 
In order to make out the case for metaphysical agnosticism, the luck egalitarian 
defender might also want to claim or specify that luck egalitarianism is properly understood 
as a work of ideal theory and that its prescriptions are not intended for the non-ideal real 
world.  Luck egalitarians rely upon idealizing assumptions that are not met in reality, so that 
they can work out the best conceivable approach to distributive justice for a fully just 
society.300  The claim is that because luck egalitarians (like John Rawls before them) make 
idealizing assumptions (including the assumption that we can accurately and continually 
distinguish between genuine choices and unchosen circumstances), they are entitled to 
simply ignore the free will problem or postpone contending with it until such time as luck 
egalitarianism is revised and adapted into a kind of non-ideal theory.  
c. The Approximation Rebuttal 
A luck egalitarian might also grant that it is difficult and perhaps impossible to truly 
distinguish between choices and circumstances, and nevertheless set about constructing a 
non-ideal world distribution that best approximates the goals of option-luck-sensitivity and 
brute-luck-insensitivity.  This luck egalitarian, who squarely confronts the free will problem, 
must give us some reason to believe that the choice/circumstance distinction can do some 
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real work and yield a world that is more just than our own.  John Roemer is one such luck 
egalitarian.  He implicitly addresses the free will problem in the context of his own 
“pragmatic” conception of luck egalitarianism.301  Roemer acknowledges that we here in the 
less-than-fully-just-real-world cannot make the fine-grained distinctions between the 
inequalities that result from choices and those that result from circumstances.  We cannot 
say that this or that individual is less well off because of circumstances, or more well off in 
spite of poor choices, but we can take steps to ensure that certain acknowledged matters of 
circumstance—like the characteristics Rawls called morally arbitrary in A Theory of Justice302—
have less influence on distributions.  We can say (to use a somewhat more interesting 
example that Will Kymlicka adapts from Roemer’s work on smokers vs. non-smokers), for 
instance, that a 60 year old able-bodied hard-working and prudent black woman whose 
parents received only a primary education should not earn less than a 60 year old able-bodied 
hard-working and prudent white man whose parents were college educated.303 
Imagine two groups or “types” of people divided along the lines of age, gender, 
(dis)ability, race, and parents’ education level.  Type A consists of 60 year-old able-bodied 
white males whose parents were college educated, and Type B consists of 60 year-old able-
bodied black females whose parents received only primary education.  Now imagine a range 
of incomes like this:   
 Type A Type B 
Top 10% >$100,000 >$33,000 
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Average $60,000 $20,000 
Bottom 10% <$40,000 <$10,000 
 
The idea is that there is no need to redistribute within types, but that there is reason to 
redistribute between types.  The ranges within types are assumed to be the result of 
voluntary choices made by similarly situated individuals, and the $67,000 difference between, 
for instance, the top 10% of Type A (>$100,000) and the top 10% of Type B (>$33,000) is 
assumed to be the result of unchosen circumstances.  The $67,000 difference is caused by 
only those things that distinguish the top 10% of Type A from the top 10% of Type B:  race, 
gender, and parents’ education level.  The goal, then, is to ensure that each percentile earns 
the same amount regardless of type.  We approximate circumstance insensitivity and choice 
sensitivity when we insist that the hardest working members of Type B earn as much as the 
hardest working members of Type A, and this is, again, because (presumably) all or most of 
the difference between their incomes can be attributed to morally arbitrary circumstances:  
race, gender, and/or parental education. 
Roemer’s plan, and Kymlicka’s adaptation of it, shows that there are ways to 
confront the free will problem in the non-ideal real world without jettisoning the basic luck 
egalitarian desire to construct a choice-sensitive and circumstance-insensitive society.  The 
distinction is clearly blunted, however, and some would undoubtedly be treated unfairly.  It 
is by no means clear that Roemer’s scheme is the best way to approximate the distinction 
between choices and circumstances, but it does show that there is at least one way that a 
theorist might pursue luck egalitarian ends without having to assume away the free will 
problem. 
3. Conclusion:   
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Scheffler is right that the free will problem presents a major obstacle to the direct 
application of the LCP to the real world.  A luck egalitarian theorist offering a non-ideal 
theory version of the approach must say something (and probably a great deal) about the 
nature of the adaptations that he favors and how they would enable us to instantiate 
identifiably luck egalitarian principles, despite the fact that definitively distinguishing between 
choice and circumstance is at best infeasible, and at worst impossible.  Non-ideal luck 
egalitarian theory has to show both that its conception of the approach could conceivably 
work and that its preferred method of adaptation to the real world wouldn’t render the 
conception unrecognizable as a species of luck egalitarianism.  It needs to show that its 
adaptations are sufficient for real world operation and that the process of adaptation hasn’t 
left us with something that is indistinguishable from, for instance, the non-ideal prescriptions 
of relational egalitarianism or the status quo.  
Roemer’s “pragmatic egalitarian planner” conception of luck egalitarianism may be 
one way to move in this direction.  His conception still seems identifiably luck egalitarian, 
following adaptation, but he does not claim (so far as I can tell) that his method is the best 
way to approximate the choice-sensitivity and circumstance-insensitivity at the heart of luck 
egalitarianism.  A fully fleshed out non-ideal theory conception of luck egalitarianism would 
need to include a claim like this (and support for it) before we could say that it offers an 
effective defense of luck egalitarianism against the free will objection (not to mention the 
two remaining Common Objections).  Until then, Scheffler’s critique stands, and seriously 
calls into question the validity of non-ideal theory conceptions of luck egalitarianism.   
The free will objection does not, however, constitute a major obstacle to ideal theory 
conceptions of luck egalitarianism, and it is important to note that almost all of the actual 
conceptions of luck egalitarianism on offer are works of ideal theory.  An ideal theorist of 
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justice looks to identify the principles of justice appropriate for a “perfectly just society”, and 
is entitled to assume full compliance with those principles and to assume that certain aspects 
of life are different than they are in reality.  Rawls, for instance, assumed full compliance, and 
also assumed that citizens are free and equal moral persons, that each citizen has the capacity 
for a sense of right and justice, that each citizen has the capacity to form and pursue a 
conception of the good, and that each citizen is capable of taking part in social cooperation 
and is willing to do so.304   
The question then, a question to which I do not have an answer, is whether or not 
distinguishing between voluntary choices and unchosen circumstances is merely infeasible or 
strictly impossible.  My own guess is that such a distinction is not strictly impossible, or at 
least no (or not much) less feasible than Rawls’s idealizing assumptions, and not as infeasible 
as a “radically face-insensitive” idealizing assumption like (for instance) the assumption of 
human immortality.305  In any event, perhaps we can just remain agnostic on this count, and 
simply say that so long as the capacity to distinguish between voluntary choices and 
unchosen circumstances constitutes a valid idealizing assumption, then the free will 
objection, though a powerful threat to non-ideal theory conceptions of luck egalitarianism, 
can be sidestepped by ideal theorist luck egalitarians.  As argued above, the onus ought to be 
on the non-ideal luck egalitarian theory to show that its adaptations address the free will 
problem and do so without undermining the luck egalitarian core.  The onus also ought to 
be on ideal luck egalitarian theory to explicitly identify its idealizing assumptions and to 
explicitly acknowledge the limited theoretical scope of its prescriptions.   
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305 See Robeyns, 2008.   
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B. The Harshness Objection  
1. A Description of the Objection 
The harshness objection questions the moral plausibility of an egalitarian approach 
to distributive justice that “abandons” the “victims” of option luck to their fates, no matter 
how dismal those fates may turn out to be.  Imagine, for instance, that Able and Baker each 
make a choice, and that that choice is (we will assume) both wholly voluntary and not at all 
influenced by circumstances.  Able puts all of his money into VHS VCRs while Baker puts 
everything into Betamax VCRs.  In time the VHS technology wins out over Betamax and 
Baker loses everything, while A enjoys a bonanza.  The canonical luck egalitarian would, the 
critics claim, see this result as wholly fair, wholly just, and in no sense problematic despite 
the fact that Baker is now destitute.   
Able made a free choice and it worked out well; Baker made a free choice and it 
didn’t work out well at all; end of story.  It doesn’t matter if this one bad (or merely unlucky) 
choice relegates Baker to dumpster-diving on the streets, because Baker is responsible for his 
decision and his responsibility for the decision renders his condition neither unfair nor 
unjust, no matter what all of that means for his present and future quality of life (or lack 
thereof).  But, the critics ask, isn’t this a bit harsh?  One bad or merely unlucky choice, and 
for that we abandon Baker to a life of abject destitution?  Do luck egalitarians really believe 
that an egalitarian approach to distributive justice can lack a social safety net of any kind and 
still remain valid and egalitarian?   
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Now consider another hypothetical in which Mark and Frannie are able-bodied 
fraternal twins.  The twins are, by all accounts and indications, equally endowed in terms of 
intelligence and in terms of their willingness to exert themselves.  They attend the same 
college where both excel, and upon graduation Mark heads to Wall Street to work as an 
investment banker, while Frannie returns home to care for their ailing mother (their father 
having already passed).  Mark’s choice was voluntary and so was Frannie’s (at least according 
to our conventional understanding of volition).  In this way and in many others, Anderson 
notes, the burdens of dependent care “fall overwhelmingly on women who, given work 
arrangements that refuse to accommodate their dependent care responsibilities, are seriously 
disadvantaged in the job market.”306 
Nevertheless, the canonical luck egalitarian again seems to see this result as wholly 
fair, wholly just, and in no sense problematic.  Mark made a free choice and it led to his 
banker’s salary; Frannie made a “free” choice—she may have felt pressure and her sacrifice 
may have made financial sense in an unjust society like our own, but no one coerced her—
and it led to her non-existent salary (or the minimal salary she can earn in the few hours she 
can spend away from their mother); end of story.  It doesn’t matter if this one choice 
converts Frannie into a profoundly less attractive option for potential employers down the 
road, because she is responsible for her decision and her responsibility for the decision 
renders her loss neither unfair nor unjust.   
Canonical luck egalitarianism does sound quite harsh.  Luck egalitarians seem hell-
bent on the elimination of brute luck influenced inequalities and paradoxically blasé about 
option luck inequalities that cause certain individuals—and often it is society’s most 
vulnerable individuals—to suffer and even perish as a result of potentially just one unlucky 
                                                           
306 Anderson, 2008a: 255.    
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gamble.  Canonical luck egalitarianism doesn’t fetishize equality (as some critics have 
claimed), instead it seems to fetishize the fairness and justness of distributions that result 
from voluntary choices  The critics of luck egalitarianism understandably question whether 
or not egalitarian justice can be such an austere and fairness-obsessed thing.  Egalitarian 
justice—which both luck egalitarians and the lion’s share of their critics agree is rooted in a 
commitment to the moral equality of persons and the belief that the state ought to treat its 
citizens with equal respect and concern—must mean something more than choice-sensitivity 
and circumstance-insensitivity, and it simply must do something for Baker and for Frannie, 
or so the critics claim.  Equal respect and concern must mean that the state will, among 
other things, ensure both that its citizens’ imprudent or merely unlucky choices do not cause 
them to fall below a sufficiently high social minimum, and that the burden of 
uncompensated labor does not fall to some and not others on the basis of morally arbitrary 
characteristics like gender or race.  The question, then, is whether or not luck egalitarianism 
truly is, or must be, such an austere and fairness-obsessed approach to distributive justice, 
and whether this, in turn, truly means that the luck egalitarian state necessarily mistreats the 
Bakers and Frannies of the world?    
2. Luck Egalitarian Rebuttals 
a. The Scope Limitation Rebuttal 
A luck egalitarian might limit the scope the LCP’s application to the fully just realm 
of ideal theory and argue (1) that only the Able-Baker example is conceivably problematic, 
and (2) that the Mark-Frannie example is flawed and doesn’t tell against luck egalitarianism 
properly understood.  He could defuse the intuitive appeal of the Able-Baker example, first, 
by claiming that a prudent Baker living in a fully just world where brute luck inequalities 
have been wholly extinguished surely wouldn’t gamble away all that he has.  Only a genuinely 
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and wantonly imprudent Baker would take such a risk in a fully just world in which all brute 
luck inequalities have been extinguished.  The luck egalitarian apologist would claim that the 
bad choices of a Baker who gambles in such a way in the fully just luck egalitarian utopia 
would surely be so comfortably ascribable to Baker’s abject imprudence that we would (or 
should) no longer be disturbed by the resulting option luck inequalities and destitution.  His 
losses would be as fair as fair can be, not unjust, and unproblematic in at least one important 
sense.  In sum:  the apologist acknowledges the limited scope of luck egalitarianism—the 
LCP is only a prescription for the fully just world of ideal theorization—and in so doing 
deflects the rhetorical force behind the Able-Baker example.307 
The luck egalitarian could then address the Mark-Frannie example by objecting to 
the underlying assumption of persistent gender inequality in the fully just society.  The entire 
point of extinguishing the impact of circumstances (and sex/gender is clearly a matter of 
circumstance) on holdings is so that we can be sure that any individual who earns less does 
so only because he or she is less ambitious (consider, for instance, the attention paid to 
gender in the Roemer/Kymlicka example discussed above).  In the fully just circumstance-
insensitive world, women would feel no more pressure to engage in uncompensated care-
work than would men, because similarly ambitious and hardworking women would earn just 
as much as similarly ambitious and hardworking men.  Women would be no more likely than 
                                                           
307 In the fully just world of luck egalitarian ideal theorization, all inequalities (or portions of inequalities) 
traceable to brute luck are wholly extinguished.  This means that all the inequalities that remain are the result of 
choices that are far more authentic and genuine than anything we have ever experienced.  I am not at all sure 
that this idealized choice/circumstance distinction is even comprehensible to those of us who live in this far-
from-ideal-real-world.  I think that at least some part of the intuitive appeal of the harshness objection comes 
from a lingering suspicion that whatever distinguishes Baker and Frannie from Able and Mark is never solely a 
matter of pure and voluntary choice.  It is hard for me to wrap my mind around what it would mean to be 
imprudent in a world where all brute luck inequalities have been extinguished.  What motivation would there be 
for making an imprudent choice in such a setting?  Would it be pure wantonness?  If so, it would have to be a 
kind of wanton behavior attributable to no social or natural circumstances (not even a mental health disorder 
of some kind), and as the discussion of the free will objection touches upon, it is not at all clear that something 
like wantonness can ever have nothing at all to do with circumstances.    
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men to sacrifice their salaries to engage in uncompensated care-work because their salaries 
would be no less high on average, and so it would be no more rational for a family to 
sacrifice a woman’s salary than a man’s.  Women would also, it is presumed, feel no more 
social pressure to be care-workers (or other similarly gender-correlated occupations) because 
no one would have ever had reason to think them better suited for that work than are men, 
or less well-suited for other kinds of work than are men.  In a society where the impact of 
gender on holdings was completely eliminated from the beginning of human governance and 
up to the present day we would expect to see an even split of men and women engaged in 
(virtually) every occupational category, or so the canonical luck egalitarian apologist might 
claim.   
One luck egalitarian response to the harshness objection is to say that the elimination 
of brute luck inequalities undercuts any conceivable harshness.  If every choice is tainted by 
brute luck, then there are no victims of option luck because there will be no circumstance-
free choices, and if not every choice is tainted by brute luck then option luck losers aren’t 
“victims” because they’re responsible for their failures in a most profound and definitive 
kind of way.  The LCP yields no harshness, for no one can be a “victim” of option luck in 
the fully just luck egalitarian utopia.   
b. The Value Pluralist Rebuttal  
A moderate luck egalitarian who accepts the “truth” of value pluralism (roughly, the 
Berlinian idea that human values are “irreducibly multiple, frequently in conflict with one 
another, and sometimes incommensurable”308) can tackle the harshness objection in another 
way.  Rather than (simply) limit the scope of luck egalitarianism, he can acknowledge and 
                                                           
308 Crowder, 2007: 122.   
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accept that the single-minded pursuit of the LCP would indeed yield harsh results, and still 
claim that the harshness objection can be avoided.  Kok-Chor Tan, for instance, is a luck 
egalitarian and a value pluralist who acknowledges that unmoderated canonical luck 
egalitarianism is too harsh to the victims of option luck.309  He doesn’t concede, however, 
that luck egalitarianism is invalidated by the harshness objection.310  Tan resists the harshness 
objection by clarifying two things:  first, he notes that the LCP is a fundamental rather than 
an all-things-considered principle, and second he notes that the LCP governs the domain of 
distributive justice and not the larger domains of justice or morality.311  By limiting the 
operation of the LCP in this way, Tan leaves room within justice and within morality for the 
pursuit of other values that moderate the harshness of the option luck inequalities that 
would result from the unfettered operation of the LCP.  In particular, Tan’s framework 
permits the pluralist luck egalitarian to acknowledge that egalitarians are also humanitarians, 
and that some principle of humanitarianism would guarantee a sufficiently high social 
minimum such that neither Baker nor Frannie would experience avoidable suffering.312  
According to Tan, though the LCP remains the sole fundamental principle of distributive 
justice, humanitarian concerns take “precedence over the commitment to distributive 
equality.”313   
Tan says, in effect, that the harshness objection does no damage to luck 
egalitarianism because reasonable egalitarians can object to inequalities (even option luck 
                                                           
309 See Tan, 2008; Tan, 2011.   
310 Tan, 2008; Tan, 2011.   
311 Tan, 2008: 674; Tan, 2011: 400-1.  
312 See Tan, 2008; Tan, 2011.   
313 Tan, 2008: 670 (Claiming that the purpose of luck egalitarianism “is to explain and justify why distributive 
equality with respect to economic goods and burdens, over and above those that persons need for basic subsistence, is 
required as a matter of justice.” Emphasis in original).   
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inequalities) that result in exactly what Scanlon’s humanitarian objection forbids:  avoidable 
suffering.314  Scanlon’s humanitarian objection to inequality illustrates why the harshness 
objection is effective against canonical luck egalitarianism (because canonical luck 
egalitarianism runs afoul of the humanitarian objection), and it reveals how the harshness 
objection can be resisted by a pluralist luck egalitarian like Tan (whose moderate luck 
egalitarianism fully accommodates the concerns behind Scanlon’s humanitarian objection).  
So long as a luck egalitarian is a pluralist he can also be a humanitarian, and so long as he is a 
humanitarian he needn’t be harsh to option luck losers, no matter what the LCP says.  
There is a limit, however, to the similarity between Tan’s egalitarianism and 
Scanlon’s.  Tan moderates luck egalitarianism in order to respond to the harsh manner in 
which canonical luck egalitarianism permits avoidable suffering, but not on account of the 
harsh (or merely unjustifiable) manner in which canonical luck egalitarianism undermines the 
values of fraternity and non-distributive fairness.  Tan does not explicitly acknowledge that a 
moderate pluralist luck egalitarian would also want to guard against option luck generated 
inequalities in holdings that result in status inequalities, domination, or procedural 
unfairnesses.315   
I think, however, that Tan’s domain de-limiting framework is nevertheless sufficient 
to accommodate the remaining specific values (and other non-specific values as well).  
Another pluralist egalitarian (or Tan himself were he so inclined) could add fraternal and 
non-distributive fairness concerns into the mix of values having an impact on distributions.  
Following Tan’s framework, this addition might mean that a substantive version of LCP 
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would only apply to whatever holdings remain after avoidable suffering, status inequalities, 
domination, and procedural unfairnesses have all been eliminated. 
Consider, for instance, the plights of Baker and Frannie.  Under Tan’s conception of 
luck egalitarianism, neither of these would experience avoidable suffering or deprivation, but 
both could conceivably experience the ills of status inequalities, domination, unequal political 
and economic opportunities, and the unequal provision of benefits to which they are equally 
entitled.  The claim isn’t that Tan would permit these ills, but that another pluralist luck 
egalitarian conception could (in Scanlonian fashion) include an explicit guarantee that no 
option luck inequalities would ever undermine the specific values of humanitarianism, 
fraternity, or fairness.   
3. Conclusions 
a. Rejecting the Scope Limitation Rebuttal 
Before I consider the more effective value pluralist rebuttal, I want to briefly state 
my reasons for rejecting the scope limitation rebuttal.  I reject the scope limitation rebuttal 
because I cannot agree that any choice, no matter how definitively genuine and wanton, 
could ever be sufficient (even in the context of ideal theory) to undermine the state’s 
commitment to preventing the ills targeted by Scanlon’s Objections.  If canonical luck 
egalitarianism really means that Baker, for instance, is to lose everything on account of his 
voluntary choice, then I agree that canonical luck egalitarianism is too harsh and think it is 
too harsh precisely because it subverts the reasonable egalitarian’s humanitarian, fraternal, 
and procedural fairness concerns.   
1) Humanitarianism 
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I agree with Scanlon, Tan, and others that reasonable egalitarians are also 
humanitarians, and that they have non-egalitarian reasons for disapproving of a LCP 
distribution that results in avoidable suffering.  Reasonable egalitarians object to the 
destitution of Baker even in the context of ideal theory because suffering is bad, Baker’s 
suffering is avoidable, and Baker’s imprudence has no bearing on whether or not he suffers.  
It may be fair in one sense that an imprudent Baker suffers in the largely inconceivable ideal 
theory world in which all brute luck inequalities have been eliminated, but that doesn’t make 
it altogether just, right, or desirable.  Baker, no matter how imprudent, remains the moral 
equal of all his fellows, and continues to deserve equal respect and concern from the state.  
This doesn’t mean that he needn’t face any consequences for his imprudence, but it does 
mean that we shouldn’t simply abandon him.   
2) Fraternity 
I agree with Scanlon and others that reasonable egalitarians also endorse the 
condition of fraternity and have egalitarian and non-egalitarian reasons for disapproving of a 
LCP distribution that is fair in at least one sense, but that also leads to discriminatory, 
oppressive, exploitative, or humiliating differences in status or the social domination of some 
by others.  Reasonable egalitarians object to Frannie’s poverty even in the context of ideal 
theory because her impoverishment is damaging to her social status and puts her in a 
position to be dominated by others.  It may be fair in one sense that an imprudent Frannie 
finds herself impoverished in the largely inconceivable ideal theory world in which all brute 
luck inequalities have been eliminated, but that doesn’t make it altogether just, right, or 
desirable.  Frannie, no matter how imprudent, remains the moral equal of her fellows and 
continues to deserve equal respect and concern from the state.  This fact doesn’t mean that 
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she needn’t face any consequences for her choices, but it does mean that we shouldn’t 
simply abandon her. 
3) Fairness 
Lastly, I agree with Scanlon and others that reasonable egalitarians also endorse 
procedural fairness.  Reasonable egalitarians object to the destitution of Baker even in the 
context of ideal theory because his destitution undermines the procedural fairness of various 
economic and political institutions.  It may be fair in one sense that an imprudent Baker 
reaches the point of destitution in the largely inconceivable ideal theory world in which all 
brute luck inequalities have been eliminated, but that doesn’t make it altogether fair, just, 
right, or desirable.  Baker, no matter how imprudent, remains the moral equal of his fellows 
and continues to deserve equal respect and concern from the state.  This fact doesn’t mean 
that he needn’t face any consequences for his imprudence, but it does mean that we 
shouldn’t simply abandon him.   
b. Preliminary Rejection of the Value Pluralist Rebuttal 
The best defense against the harshness objection is one that acknowledges and 
accepts the truth of value pluralism and the necessary impact of diverse values on legitimate 
distributions.  A defense that simply denies that the distributions yielded by canonical luck 
egalitarianism are in any sense unjust or undesirable is not valid.  The distributions yielded by 
canonical luck egalitarianism are not only undesirable, but also unjust and even unfair in their 
harshness, and this is true even if we limit our analysis to ideal theory conceptions of the 
approach.  
Tan’s pluralist and domain-delimited conception of luck egalitarianism, on the other 
hand, paves the way for a pluralist and Scanlonian conception of luck egalitarianism.  Such a 
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moderate, pluralist, and Scanlonian conception of luck egalitarianism would satisfy the 
reasonable egalitarian’s concerns related to fraternity and procedural fairness as well as 
humanitarianism. 316  Tan’s conception is only lacking to the important extent that he does 
not explicitly acknowledge that there are instances in which fraternity and procedural 
fairness, as well as humanitarianism, ought to take precedence over an LCP dictated 
distribution.  
One question that remains is whether or not the accommodation of all three specific 
value concerns yields something no longer recognizably luck egalitarian, given what a small 
percentage of any distribution might end up being subject to the LCP.  I suspect that these 
accommodations might give birth to a conception of liberal egalitarianism that looks as 
much like the democratic egalitarianism of Rawls or Anderson as it does like luck 
egalitarianism.  As a result, I believe that the harshness objection—though weakened by Tan 
and by my inclusion of fraternal and procedural fairness concerns into his framework—
remains standing and crucially important until such time as it is shown that accommodating 
the specific values produces a conception that both works and remains more luck egalitarian 
than anything else.    
C. The Stigma Objection 
1. A Description of the Objection 
                                                           
316 Imagine, for instance, a distribution of 100 units.  Tan might dedicate 60 units to the satisfaction of basic 
needs (humanitarianism) and then distribute the remaining 40 units according to the LCP.  The concern for 
humanitarianism appears to take lexical priority over the LCP, but the same cannot be said for fraternal or 
procedural fairness concerns.  Another value pluralist faced with the same 100 units and explicitly concerned 
with fraternity and procedural fairness as well as humanitarianism might dedicate 60 units to the satisfaction of 
basic needs, dedicate another 20 units to the satisfaction of procedural fairness, and another 15 to the 
satisfaction of fraternity, leaving only 5 units to distribution in accordance with the LCP.  The value pluralist 
luck egalitarian could, I think, use Tan’s framework in order to satisfy the specific values, but doing so might 
mean that vanishingly small portions of distributions remain subject to the core principle of luck egalitarian 
distribution.   
 129 
The harshness objection emerges from the claim that luck egalitarians abandon the 
so-called victims of option luck, and the stigma objection emerges from the claim that luck 
egalitarians humiliate and stigmatize the so-called victims of brute luck.  The victims of brute 
luck are those whose holdings have been negatively impacted by unchosen circumstances, 
and they are in one sense very fortunate to find themselves living in the luck egalitarian 
utopia because it is only there that all of the distributive inequalities that arise from 
circumstances are eliminated.  In another sense, however, the victims of brute luck are 
unfortunate to find themselves living in the luck egalitarian utopia.  They are unfortunate 
because the retrieval of information required for the elimination of the impact of 
circumstances on holdings necessarily humiliates and stigmatizes them, or so the objectors 
claim.  The luck egalitarian state may be fair in one sense, but it is also incredibly harsh to 
those that it abandons and incredibly disrespectful to those that it aids.   
Jonathan Wolff, Anderson, and Scheffler all claim that the victims of brute luck are 
subject to disrespect and humiliation when and because they are called upon to petition the 
state on the basis of their shortcomings.317  In the context of what Wolff calls “shameful 
revelation”, the victims of brute luck are forced to go before the state and prove that they 
are so defective, stupid, untalented, ugly, and/or socially awkward that they simply cannot 
achieve a bundle of holdings consistent with their degree of prudence and willingness to 
expend effort.318  The brute-luck-deficient petitioner “is required not merely to admit but to 
make out a convincing case that [he] is a failure, unable to gain employment even when there 
is no difficulty for others.”319  The petitioner must demean himself, he must “admit to 
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318 Wolff, 1998; see also, Anderson, 1999.   
319 Wolff, 1998: 114.  
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[himself] and then convince others that [he] has not been able to secure a job, despite [his] 
best efforts, at a time when others appear to obtain employment with ease.”320   
The luck egalitarian government offers compensation sufficient to close the holdings 
gap between, for instance, the innately intelligent and the innately stupid.  Imagine, in 
Roemerian terms, that we have two types, Type I (the innately intelligent), and Type S (the 
innately stupid), and that Types I and S are equal along every other relevant dimension (race, 
gender, etc), such that we can be sure that all of the disparity between the holdings of Type I 
and the holdings of Type S is caused by the gap between the unchosen innate intelligence of 
Type I and the unchosen innate stupidity of Type S.  So far all seems well and good—
compensation reaches those disfavored by circumstances and ensures that no morally 
arbitrary characteristics are permitted to impact anyone’s bundle of holdings.  The critics are 
quick to point out, however, that a great deal of information is required in order to show 
that unchosen innate intelligence/stupidity accounts for the holdings disparity, and that the 
revelation of this information will undoubtedly humiliate the stupid.  The members of Type 
S will find themselves standing before a “State Equality Board” (or something of the sort)321 
and having to prove that they are so naturally stupid that they simply cannot compete with 
their peers.  This procedure, the critics claim, is intrinsically disrespectful and necessarily 
humiliating.   
Shameful revelation is yet another feature of luck egalitarianism that causes the 
approach to fail what Anderson calls “the fundamental test any egalitarian theory must meet:  
that its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens.”322  Luck egalitarians 
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offer “a very inadequate safety net for the victims of bad option luck” and subject the 
victims of bad brute luck to “the stigmatizing regime of the Poor Laws, in which citizens lay 
claim to aid from the state only on condition that they accept inferior status."323  Luck 
egalitarianism leaves us, then, with “the worst aspects of both capitalism and socialism”—
allowing some to simply perish (the victims of option luck) and forcing others to grovel and 
demean themselves in order to receive the aid that they deserve (the victims of brute luck).324 
Wolff also makes it clear that shameful revelation remains a problem even for the 
ideal theory luck egalitarian.325  He anticipates a rebuttal claiming that the people of the fully 
just luck egalitarian utopia would not consider that one’s inability to contribute (in market 
terms) could be a source of shame or a reason for pity.326  One’s inability to contribute (as 
distinct from one’s unwillingness to contribute) is the result of morally arbitrary 
circumstances over which no one has any control, the luck egalitarian apologist might say.  
Knowing and believing that unchosen circumstances are wholly undeserved, the citizens of 
the luck egalitarian utopia would consider the difference between ability and inability to 
contribute no more meaningful than the difference between brown and green eyes—it marks 
a distinction for sure but it in no way impacts an individual’s moral worth or social standing.  
Wolff agrees that shameful revelation would not be a problem in such a world, but 
he questions the validity of the idealizing assumption itself.327  He acknowledges that “in an 
enlightened society of equals [prejudice against those with low talent] might be considered an 
                                                           
323 Andersion, 1999: 311.   
324 Anderson, 1999: 308.   
325 Wolff, 1998: 115.   
326 Wolff, 1998: 114-15.    
327 See Wolff, 1998: 115.   
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unfortunate fact about our barbaric prehistory”, but finds this to be a kind of “psychological 
speculation” that “we have little, if any, good reason to believe is true.”328  Accordingly, 
Wolff maintains that shameful revelation continues to undermine the egalitarian 
commitment to equal respect and concern, even in the more limited context of ideal theory.   
2. Luck Egalitarian Rebuttals 
a. The Scope Limitation Rebuttal 
Anderson and Scheffler improperly consider the prescriptions of ideal theory luck 
egalitarianism to be prescriptions intended for the non-ideal real world.329  They argue as 
though actual luck egalitarians have claimed something that they (largely) have not; they 
argue as though luck egalitarians have said that they think it just, good, and wise to 
implement the LCP in the here and now and without any revision or moderation.  In fact, 
the luck egalitarian society isn’t—or at least it needn’t be—a scheme that simply replaces the 
status quo in the here and now.330  A description of the luck egalitarian utopia neither 
contains nor immediately implies any policy prescriptions for the here and now, and ideal 
theory luck egalitarians do not suggest that we immediately go about collecting or accepting 
the information required for the comprehensive elimination of brute luck influenced 
inequalities in the non-ideal real world.331   
What actual luck egalitarians tend to imagine, instead, is a utopian society (like 
Rawls’s “fully just” one) that was built from the ground up with certain idealizing 
assumptions already in place and in continuous operation from Time 1 to the present day.  
                                                           
328 Wolff, 1998: 115.   
329 See Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2008; Scheffler, 2003a; Scheffler, 2003b.   
330 See, e.g. Tan, 2008: 674; Robeyns, 2008; Swift, 2008.   
331 See, e.g. Cohen, 1989; Temkin, 2001; Tan, 2008; Tan, 2011; Tan, 2012.  
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Their scope de-limited claim is that no stigma would attach to an individual’s being less 
talented than his or her fellows in such a fully just luck egalitarian utopia.  It is only in our 
non-ideal world—with our unjust history and with our traditions of mistreating so many 
vulnerable segments of the population—that shame attaches to what is wholly and 
quintessentially circumstantial:  the diminished capacity to convert prudence and willingness 
into marketable work and the holdings that result from that work.    
This rebuttal suggests that the critics of luck egalitarianism again misapprehend the 
nature of the luck egalitarian utopia.  This misapprehension is akin to taking Rawls to mean 
that his two principles of justice ought to be applied here and now in the United States, and 
that his idealizing assumptions are meant as empirical statements about our present reality.  
That wasn’t what Rawls intended and it isn’t what the luck egalitarians intend either.  The 
disrespectful and humiliating implications associated with collecting the information 
necessary for eliminating brute luck inequalities are very real and very important, but they 
simply do not exist in the ideal theory luck egalitarian utopia.  Luck egalitarians can be 
criticized for having boxed themselves into the realm of ideal theory, but not for humiliating 
and stigmatizing the victims of brute luck through shameful revelation.   
Unlike Anderson and Scheffler, Wolff at one point explicitly maintained that 
shameful revelation is also a problem for ideal theory luck egalitarianism.332  He objected to 
the LCP “even in an ideal egalitarian society” because he believed (and may still believe) that 
there is “little, if any, good reason” to think that people are capable of “overcom[ing] the 
prejudice against those of low talent.”333  In response, the luck egalitarian apologist would 
surely point again to Rawls’s own idealizing assumptions.  His claim wouldn’t just be that 
                                                           
332 Wolff, 1998: 115.   
333 Wolff, 1998: 115.    
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since Rawls made them that luck egalitarians can also make them, but that idealizing 
assumptions, like the assumptions that citizens have the two moral powers (the capacity for 
a sense of right and justice, and the capacity to form and pursue a conception of the 
good334), and that citizens do not feel shame when brute luck inequalities are nullified, are 
part and parcel of ideal theory theorization.  Ideal theorists are entitled to assume away 
prejudices and stereotypes in order to consider the nature and attributes of the fully just 
world.335  Luck egalitarians, in particular, are entitled to assume away “prejudice against those 
of low talent”336, not because it doesn’t exist but precisely because it wouldn’t exist in the fully 
just world.337  With shame and pity out of the way, the stigma objection is (as Wolff himself 
seems to admit) not a problem for luck egalitarians.338 
b. The Value Pluralist Rebuttal 
Luck egalitarians might concede that the stigma objection is an important one and 
agree that perhaps it cannot be fully sidestepped through an appeal to the scope limitation 
rebuttal, but also claim that they can nevertheless easily accommodate its concerns.  They 
can agree that any reasonable construal of egalitarianism is pluralist, and properly concerned 
with values other than the limited aspects of the value of fairness reflected in the LCP.  Luck 
egalitarians can hold fast to the importance of fairness without embracing moral monism, 
and they can welcome the balancing of values that would necessarily precede any all-things-
considered determinations. 
                                                           
334 Rawls, 1999a; Rawls, 1999b.   
335 See Robeyns, 2008: 353-55.   
336 Wolff, 1998: 115.   
337 See Robeyns, 2008: 354.   
338 See Wolff, 2010: 343.   
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This value pluralist rebuttal to the stigma objection follows the model of the value 
pluralist rebuttal to the harshness objection.  The claim is that because we can understand 
the LCP to apply to only those holdings that remain after basic needs have been met, and 
perhaps after other aspects of economic, political, and social justice have been guaranteed, 
no significant stigmatization will attend the collection of information or the transfer of 
holdings.  Pluralist luck egalitarians might also endorse the scope limitation rebuttal, but their 
more fundamental and powerful response to the stigma objection would include an 
acknowledgement that at least one other value—fraternity—would tell against any measures 
that would disrespect or humiliate the citizens of any truly egalitarian state.  The 
administrators of the luck egalitarian state simply cannot require shameful revelation, the 
value pluralist rebuttal says, because shameful revelation would contravene the value of 
fraternity and the concern for preventing humiliation and stigmatization underwritten by that 
value.  There is an obvious tension between fairness and fraternity at play here, and a 
balancing would have to take place that would surely result in tradeoffs between the two 
values.  The pluralist luck egalitarian’s beliefs are, then, that fairness is not forever trumped 
by fraternity or any other value, and that the LCP can and should solely govern the 
distribution of holdings not already earmarked for the satisfaction of more pressing 
concerns.  
3. Conclusions 
a. Partial Rejection of the Scope Limitation Rebuttal 
I partially reject the scope limitation rebuttal not because I don’t think it works, but 
because I think it gives up too much ground and represents a second-best refutation of the 
stigma objection.  It only makes sense for luck egalitarians to fall back on idealizing 
assumptions when they absolutely must, and it is better to accommodate the values behind 
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the stigma objection themselves than to simply assume away the problem to which they 
apply.  It is more powerful for the luck egalitarian apologist to say, “We can accommodate 
the specific values (and more)” than to say, “We don’t need to accommodate the specific 
values because we’ve imagined the world in such a way that fairness is the only concern.”   
It surely is unwise for luck egalitarians to paint themselves into the corner of only 
engaging in ideal theorization, but the larger concern has to be with making the best 
argument and taking seriously as many values as possible.  The LCP remains meaningful 
even if it is wholly relegated to the realm of highly idealized ideal theory, but it is leaps and 
bounds more powerful and important if luck egalitarians do not assume away value conflict, 
and if they also work to revise and moderate the approach so as to be applicable to the non-
ideal real world.  Luck egalitarians will only truly defeat the stigma objection when they can 
do two things:  (1) accommodate rather than assume away the conflict of values (especially 
conflicts between the specific values themselves), and (2) point to a scheme for the revised 
and moderated substantive expression of the LCP that could conceivably work in non-ideal 
theory.   
b. Preliminary Rejection of the Value Pluralist Rebuttal 
The best defense against the stigma objection is one that (1) acknowledges and 
accepts the truth of value pluralism and the necessary impact of other values on the 
collection of information required in order to achieve legitimate distributions, and (2) does 
not relegate the LCP to ideal theory.  Luck egalitarians can limit the scope of their approach 
not to ideal theory, but (as Tan does) to the province of distributive justice, acknowledging 
(as Tan does not) that the LCP will need to be tempered by our fraternal concerns in order 
to prevent (or, at least, limit the extent of) shameful revelation.  One question, however, is 
whether or not the accommodation of these fraternal concerns (shared by Scanlon, 
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Anderson, Scheffler, Wolff, and others) yields something no longer recognizably luck 
egalitarian.  Until this has been determined, the stigma objection, though weakened by the 
scope limitation and value pluralist rebuttals, remains standing and crucially important.   
V. Conclusion 
It is unwise for the defenders of luck egalitarianism to rely as heavily as they do upon 
ideal theory scope limitation arguments.  This strategy is unwise because it relegates all or 
most of the approach’s appeal to an unreachable utopia, and more importantly, because it 
tends to ignore the philosophical “truth of value pluralism” and the inevitability of value 
conflict.  The luck egalitarian utopia is typically marked by the maximization of certain 
aspects of fairness at the expense of other values like humanitarianism and fraternity.  This is 
surely fine so far as it goes (as a way of working out certain issues regarding fairness), but it 
also begs the question of how valuable an approach to distributive justice can possibly be 
that only works in ideal theory, while ignoring the impact of other values, including those 
specific values championed by other liberal egalitarians and evident in Scanlon’s Objections.   
It is for these reasons that the value pluralist rebuttals stand up better to the 
harshness and stigma objections.  Those rebuttals acknowledge, accept, and seek to 
accommodate the plurality of values, including the specific values.  The proponent of the 
value pluralist rebuttal to the harshness objection admits that the LCP is harsh to the victims 
of option luck, acknowledges that the LCP implicates values other than distributive fairness, 
accepts that these other values must have an impact on distributions, and promises to 
somehow accommodate that impact within the luck egalitarian framework.  Likewise, the 
proponent of the value pluralist rebuttal to the stigma objection admits that the 
implementation of the LCP would humiliate and stigmatize the victims of brute luck (at least 
within the context of non-ideal theory), acknowledges that the LCP implicates values other 
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than distributive fairness, accepts that these other values must have an impact on 
distributions, and promises to somehow accommodate that impact within the luck egalitarian 
framework. 
What would it mean to accommodate the specific values within a luck egalitarian 
framework?  First and foremost it would mean ensuring that the LCP does not yield 
distributions that cause or contribute to the avoidable suffering of individuals regardless of 
considerations of responsibility and blame.  This outcome is the impact of humanitarianism 
on distributions.  The luck egalitarian defender would also need to ensure that the LCP does 
not yield distributions that reflect, cause, or contribute to discrimination, oppression, 
exploitation, humiliation, stigmatization, or domination, regardless of considerations of 
responsibility and blame.  This outcome is the impact of fraternity on distributions.  Finally, 
the luck egalitarian defender would also need to ensure that the LCP does not yield 
distributions that reflect, cause, or contribute to unequal political or economic opportunities 
or reflect the unequal provision of benefits to the equally entitled.  This outcome is the 
impact of the procedural aspects of fairness on distributions.   
Moderate luck egalitarianism in the style of Kok-Chor Tan is concerned solely with 
distributive justice, and only applies the LCP as a kind of ideal theory grounding principle to 
the distribution of holdings that remain after basic needs have been met.  Tan-style luck 
egalitarianism could also be further moderated, such that the LCP would only apply to the 
distribution of holdings that remain after the distributive impact of each of Scanlon’s 
Objections has been fully accommodated.  In other words, the LCP would eliminate the 
impact of brute luck and give free play to option luck only so long as and only to the extent 
that doing so in no way undermines the full satisfaction of Scanlon’s Objections.  It is 
appropriate to wonder, however, whether or not any holdings would remain after Scanlon’s 
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Objections have been satisfied and, if so, whether or not an application of the LCP to this 
subset of holdings is enough to warrant calling the approach a species of luck egalitarianism.  
The approach that would result from such a value pluralist moderation of luck 
egalitarianism would surely look as much like other approaches to distributive justice as it 
does like luck egalitarianism.  The resulting hybrid approach would only appear as luck 
egalitarian when it comes to whatever holdings, if any, remain after Scanlon’s Objections 
have been satisfied.  The approach would appear democratic egalitarian in terms of its focus 
on fraternity (the distribution of holdings would not reflect or yield inequalities forbidden by 
the status equality and non-domination objections339), somewhat prioritarian in terms of its 
focus on humanitarianism (the distribution of holdings would not reflect or yield inequalities 
forbidden by the humanitarian objection340), and perhaps Rawlsian in terms of its concern 
for procedural as well as distributive fairness (the distribution of holdings would not reflect 
or yield inequalities forbidden by the real equality of opportunity objection341).  There is 
nothing wrong (which is not to say nothing problematic) with attempting to combine these 
approaches in order to satisfy Scanlon’s Objections, but there is something wrong with 
continuing the call the approach that emerges from this hybridization luck egalitarian.  What 
we’re left with is really a kind of “pluralist egalitarianism”, an approach that is plural, both in 
terms of the values that it accommodates, and in terms of the approaches that it combines or 
borrows from.   
Luck egalitarianism can be revised and moderated to accommodate the values and 
concerns which underlie Scanlon’s Objections.  The approach to distributive justice that 
                                                           
339 See, e.g. Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2008.   
340 See, e.g. Tan, 2008; Tan, 2011; Tan, 2012; Arneson, 2000; Arneson, 2008.   
341 See Rawls, 1999a; Rawls, 2001; see also, Scanlon, 2003a; Scanlon, 2007.   
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results from this revision and moderation does not, however, retain enough of the 
characteristics of canonical or even moderated luck egalitarianism to warrant consideration 
as a species of luck egalitarianism.  That said, what matters more than the question of 
appropriate categorization is the alternative pluralist egalitarian approach to distributive 
justice that is born out of luck egalitarianism’s revision.  The pluralist egalitarian approach 
would seem to satisfy Scanlon’s Objections, combine attractive aspects of a number of 
popular approaches to distributive justice, and represent an intriguing alternative to the 
singular adoption of those popular approaches that could benefit from further articulation 
and debate by and between liberal egalitarians.   
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CONCLUSION 
Each of the chapters in this dissertation concerns itself with the goal of maintaining 
an appropriate balance between liberal values and, in so doing, contributes to an 
understanding of liberal pluralism.  Liberal pluralism, because of its interest in maintaining an 
appropriate balance of liberal values, also invalidates the attempts of some liberals to 
promote particular liberal values to exclusion of others.  Theorists who insist upon the 
liberal state’s cultivation of robust autonomy for all citizens, or its guarantee of a congruence 
of values between the public and private spheres, are not sufficiently sensitive to the impact 
that such insistence would have on other liberal values like liberty, toleration, and privacy.  
This is also true for those theorists who emphasize fairness to the exclusion of fraternity and 
humanitarianism, and for those who emphasize fraternity to the exclusion of fairness.   
Chapter 1 criticized those liberals (so-called “autonomists” like George Crowder, 
Will Kymlicka, Susan Moller Okin, and Daniel Weinstock) who insist upon the liberal state’s 
cultivation of robust autonomy to the detriment of other liberal values like liberty, toleration, 
and privacy.  It also defended the so-called “exit rights strategy” of the liberal pluralists 
William Galston and Jeff Spinner-Halev, claiming that this strategy is far more sensitive to 
concerns related to the values of liberty, toleration, and privacy than its rivals.  The chapter 
ultimately concluded that the liberal pluralist exit rights strategy is superior because it reflects 
an explicit effort to not only safeguard choice and exit for the times when individuals change 
their minds and wish to leave their cultures, but also to provide them with the 
complementary and substantive option to remain if they so choose.   
 142 
Chapter 2 criticized Corey Brettschneider’s conception of “democratic persuasion” 
and his attempt to split the difference between “muscular democrats” like Stephen Macedo, 
Brian Barry, Ian Shapiro, and Susan Moller Okin and pluralists like Galston, Nancy 
Rosenblum, and Spinner-Halev.  It considered whether or not Brettschneider’s intermediate 
position was sufficiently sensitive to the importance of maintaining a balance between the 
liberal impulse to promote values like equality and autonomy, on the one hand, and the 
liberal concern to foster toleration and to safeguard liberty and privacy, on the other.  The 
chapter ultimately concluded that Brettschneider’s intermediate position was not sufficiently 
sensitive to maintaining the balance of liberal values, but that his insights could be channeled 
into a more constrained view that would pass liberal pluralist muster.   
Chapter 3 criticized both the proponents and opponents of the luck egalitarian 
approach to distributive justice.  It claimed that it is possible to revise (or merely 
reconceptualize) luck egalitarianism in such a way that it is no longer solely driven by a 
concern with the value of fairness.  The chapter ultimately concluded that an avowedly 
pluralist conception of luck egalitarianism could sidestep a number of important objections, 
but that the resulting “pluralist egalitarian” approach to distributive justice would have as 
much in common with other popular approaches to distributive justice as it does with luck 
egalitarianism.   
The policy implications of these conclusions are widespread and often somewhat 
inchoate.  Generally speaking, the policies of liberal democratic states are consistent with 
liberal pluralism when they do not reflect an imbalance of liberal values.  This means, for 
instance, that they do not insist upon fairness in the distribution of wealth or capabilities 
without simultaneously insisting on the objective well-being and equal social status of all 
citizens.  It also means that liberal pluralist states do not concern themselves with the social 
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status of citizens without simultaneously concerning themselves with issues of fairness and 
objective well-being.  The liberal pluralist state does not pursue fairness to the exclusion of 
other liberal values (like humanitarianism and fraternity), nor does it pursue fraternity to the 
exclusion of other liberal values (like fairness and humanitarianism).  It does not abandon its 
citizens even when it would “fair” to do so, nor insist that they shame themselves in order to 
receive the benefits to which they are entitled.  The liberal pluralist state does not ignore 
unfair inequalities in wealth or capabilities simply because all citizens are procedurally equal 
and everyone seems to have “enough” in terms of resources.  Liberal pluralism, to offer a 
few somewhat concrete examples, rejects (1) the complete absence of a social safety net, (2) 
procedures for the determination and transmission of social services that cause beneficiaries 
to feel shame, and (3) a tax policy wholly unconcerned with redistributing wealth in order to 
compensate for unchosen circumstances.   
The policies of liberal democratic states are also consistent with liberal pluralism 
when they are careful not to let liberal values like autonomy, equality, and democracy crowd 
out others like liberty, toleration, and privacy, and vice-versa.  This means that they do not 
promote autonomy, equality, and democracy without simultaneously concerning themselves 
with the impact of that promotion on liberty, toleration, and privacy.  It also means that they 
do not concern themselves with guaranteeing liberty, toleration, and privacy without 
simultaneously working to ensure civic equality, democratically sound public institutions, and 
at least a minimal degree of autonomy for all citizens.  Liberal pluralism is inconsistent with 
(1) prohibiting parents from opting their children out of instruction designed to promote 
robust autonomy and transform them into liberals, (2) revoking the tax-exempt status of 
non-liberal groups that do not threaten civic unity or liberal purposes, and (3) manufacturing 
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official government speech the intention of which is to overtly condemn or criticize 
particular non-liberal cultures or groups.   
It is important to acknowledge, in conclusion, that liberal values can only be 
balanced in the context of democratic deliberation, and that the optimal balance is clearly 
elusive and perhaps even unattainable.  There is, however, a world of difference between 
acknowledging notions such as these and failing to keep the good of achieving a balance of 
values in mind when developing theory and generating policy prescriptions.  Liberal theorists 
who refuse to seek this balance, or pretend that there is nothing to balance in the first place, 
run the risk of supporting policies that undermine the promise of liberalism even as they 
promote particular liberal values.  This dissertation serves as a reminder of the costs of 
inattention and the benefits that can be achieved through the cultivation of explicitly liberal 
pluralist strategies for securing liberal democracy.   
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